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Abstract  
 
The novels of Thomas Hardy have long been the subject of gender analysis, resulting in 
a voluminous body of fruitful criticism; comparatively few critics, however, have 
focussed on the issue of masculinity in these novels. This study aims to contribute to the 
work so far written on Hardy and masculinity by providing a new reading of six of 
Hardy’s novels, investigating their portrayal of masculinity in the light of social-
constructionist theories of masculinity and Foucauldian theories. The novels which will 
be examined (in chronological order) are Far from the Madding Crowd (1874), Two on 
a Tower (1882), The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886), The Woodlanders (1887), Tess of 
the d’Urbervilles (1891) and Jude the Obscure (1895).  
The male characters in these novels are shown to constitute themselves through 
the gender and class structures and discourses of their time. What is less clear, however, 
is the extent to which they are constrained by these forces and the extent to which they 
resist them. Hardy’s novels, as this study demonstrates, recognise the determining role 
of social structures in the construction of masculinity. To term themselves ‘men’ 
Hardy’s male characters have to operate within the domain of contemporary social 
structures and discourses, which have already delineated the ways in which they should 
formulate themselves. Governed by the prevailing discourses of masculinity, these 
characters appear mainly to define themselves in terms of power but the novels expose 
the limitations of such a construction of masculinity. These constraints are underscored 
more forcefully as Hardy moves towards the end of his writing career, which explains 
the growing tragic vision of the novels. 
 Although they are restricted by social structures, however, Hardy’s male 
characters are not completely trapped in them. Rather, the relationship between these 
structures and characters is portrayed to be a dynamic one; the structures which 
constitute the characters are actually shaped by them through their gender practices. The 
possibility of a limited resistance to these social forces therefore exists, as this study 
reveals. This research situates the exploration of masculinity in Hardy’s novels in the 
context of his philosophy, attempting to highlight Hardy’s perception not only of the 
ways in which gender is formulated but also of the mechanisms of change. The 
prevailing structures of masculinity are thus shown to be open to gradual change. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
John Stuart Mill, one of Thomas Hardy‘s favourite philosophers (to be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter), argues that ‗[w]hat is now called the nature of 
women is an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in some 
directions, unnatural stimulation in others‘.1 For Hardy, it can be argued, if femininity is 
a construction, so is masculinity, a production of social structures and regulative 
discourses.  
Even though in Hardy‘s novels biological factors and destiny may play a role in 
the shaping of individual lives, social forces are the key determinants of subjectivity and 
human life. That masculinity in Hardy‘s novel is a social construct is a point on which 
critics concur, certainly since the late 1970s, when feminist debates and revisionary 
readings of gender began to make their impact. It was in 1979 that Elaine Showalter 
wrote her seminal analysis of the effect of social conventions on the formation of 
Henchard‘s character. For her, The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886) was an attack on the 
patriarchal codes of masculinity which regarded men‘s dissociation from the ‗feminine‘ 
as a way of entering the world of men. The novel showed that the possibility of 
experiencing a full human life lay in the reconciliation of the masculine with the 
divorced ‗feminine‘ self.2 In another early analysis of masculinity in Hardy‘s novels, 
Susan Beegel,
3
 like Showalter, discussed Hardy‘s criticism of certain versions of 
masculinity. Her work on Far from the Madding Crowd (1874) is primarily an 
examination of male sexuality through the exploration of its imagery and figurative 
language. She argues that Hardy in this novel is critical of the kinds of love expressed 
by Boldwood and Troy towards Bathsheba, love in the form of ownership and passion, 
and is endorsing Oak‘s version of love, which takes the form of friendship.  
Hardy‘s attitude towards the changing gender roles at the turn of the century has 
been the subject of a number of critical works. Annette Federico, for instance, provides 
a discussion of the crisis of masculinity as experienced by Hardy‘s male characters and 
                                                 
1
 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), pp. 
38-9. Phillip Mallett also opens his article with this quotation; see ‗Hardy and Masculinity: A Pair of Blue 
Eyes and Jude the Obscure‘, in The Ashgate Research Companion to Thomas Hardy, ed. by Rosemarie 
Morgan, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 387-402.  
2
 Elaine Showalter, ‗The Unmanning of The Mayor of Casterbridge‘, in Critical Approaches to the 
Fiction of Thomas Hardy, ed. by Dale Kramer (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 99-115 (pp. 102-3, 112).  
3
 Susan Beegel, ‗Bathsheba‘s Lovers: Male Sexuality in Far from the Madding Crowd‘, in Sexuality and 
Victorian Literature, ed. by Don Richard Cox (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1984), pp. 
108-27. 
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the ways they cope with such a crisis. Examining portrayals of masculinity in the novels 
of Hardy (and Gissing) in their historical context, she investigates the ways changes in 
the perceptions of masculinity in the late nineteenth century – mainly under the impact 
of the feminist movement – led to a crisis of identity in men. These authors created male 
characters who were in a state of ‗ambivalence‘ — suggestive of the ambivalence of the 
authors themselves — perplexed how to deal with the changes in sexual roles and 
notions of masculinity and with the New Woman. Though aware that they need to 
change, they cling to more ‗reliable‘ patriarchal stereotypes of masculinity.4 
Hardy‘s ambivalent standpoint towards patriarchal ideals of masculinity has 
since been explored by several other critics. Joanna Devereux, for example, investigates 
the ways in which patriarchal values are examined in Hardy‘s novels through the 
portrayal of male protagonists. While for Showalter, Hardy is critical of patriarchal 
codes of masculinity, Devereux contends that he takes a hesitant position with regard to 
these codes, specifically the gentlemanly code of honour and heroism, both endorsing 
and questioning these values. Devereux also investigates the relationship between 
‗social class and sexual identity‘ in Hardy‘s fiction, seeing social and romantic 
aspirations of the male characters intertwined. She discusses ‗the ways in which the 
male protagonist attempts either to insert himself into a certain class or to come to terms 
with the failure of his social/sexual ambitions‘.5 
Hardy‘s dissatisfaction with conventional models of masculinity is linked by 
Tim Dolin with Victorian realist forms of narrative, which he sees as inherently 
masculine, recounting stories of male self-development. Jude the Obscure (1895), in 
particular, can be seen to undermine the Bildungsroman, invoking and finding 
unsatisfactory both the myths of transformation and the ‗ideal of realist narrative 
development‘ through its hero‘s incessant disillusionment and its episodic plot.6 The 
novel cannot portray Jude as the New Man, becoming the man Sue demands, ‗the sexual 
new‘, because there is no myth to make such a transformation comprehensible and 
readable; male sexuality for the Victorians was a fact, fixed and unchangeable. The 
novel‘s ‗failure‘ ‗to accommodate stories of men seamlessly to the life of one man‘, 
however, ‗succeeds, ironically enough, in making ―man‖ a question‘, ‗[i]nvoking a 
                                                 
4
 Annette Federico, Masculine Identity in Hardy and Gissing (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 
1991), pp. 16-8. 
5
 Joanna Devereux, Patriarchy and its Discontents: Sexual Politics in Selected Novels and Stories of 
Thomas Hardy (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. xi-xx. 
6
 Tim Dolin, ‗Jude Fawley and the New Man‘, in Jude the Obscure, New Casebooks Series, ed. by Penny 
Boumelha (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 209-27 (p. 214). 
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space, however confined, to imagine other stories about men, and hence to imagine 
other men‘.7 
Hardy‘s criticism of nineteenth-century norms of masculinity also appears in the 
works of Richard Nemesvari. His essay on Desperate Remedies (1871) explores the 
insecurity of masculine identity, the ways masculinity is confirmed, undercut and 
reaffirmed in this novel, particularly in relation to ‗the feminine and the female‘. It 
focuses specifically on the ways such issues are examined by means of the narrative 
structure, which involves erotic triangles. Nemesvari states that the novel voices 
‗growing Victorian anxieties about masculinity‘, about what constitutes masculinity or 
femininity, arguing that all characters, with the exception of the female protagonist, who 
‗acts as a catalyst‘ for others, ‗vacillate between gender roles‘, incorporating both 
feminine and masculine traits. The construction of ‗correct‘ masculinity in this novel 
entails the achievement of a clear-cut man/woman (as well as male/female) distinction, 
by ‗controlling both the feminine and the female‘.8 Such a construction of masculinity is 
questioned by Hardy, however, as ‗the ―successful‖ working out of the distinction‘ 
relies on ‗the first subordinating the second‘.9 
In his discussion of Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891), which he compares with 
Melville‘s Billy Budd, Nemesvari once more looks at masculinity both as constructed by 
the characters and as examined by the narrative structure.
10
 He discusses the ways 
masculinity is constructed, undermined and reconstructed in relation to the central 
female character and the desire for her, arguing that love triangles, situations of rivalry, 
have been employed to echo the late Victorian concerns about the threat of desire to the 
male gender identity. According to Nemesvari, the novel examines and criticises late 
nineteenth-century versions of masculinity, which was either constructed in terms of 
sensuality or sexual restraint; the vulnerability of male gender identity, its being 
threatened by desire, becomes destructive for the female character, who is the one who 
pays for her lovers‘ reaffirmation of masculinity.  
Andrew Radford‘s work provides another exploration of Hardy‘s condemnation 
of Victorian models of masculinity. In his article on The Woodlanders (1887), Radford 
discusses the male characters, Giles and Fitzpiers, as the embodiment of two conflicting 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., p. 223.  
8
 Richard Nemesvari, ‗―Is It a Man or a Woman?‖: Constructing Masculinity in Desperate Remedies‘, in 
Human Shows: Essays in Honour of Michael Millgate, ed. by Rosemarie Morgan and Richard Nemesvari 
(New Haven: The Hardy Association Press, 2000), pp. 67-88 (p. 68). 
9
 Ibid., p. 86 
10
 Richard Nemesvari, ‗―The Thing Must Be Male, We Suppose‖: Erotic Triangles and Masculine 
Identity in Tess of the d’Urbervilles and Melville‘s Billy Budd‘, in Thomas Hardy: Texts and Contexts, 
ed. by Phillip Mallett (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
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forces, two different kinds of masculinity, which can be found in the images, rituals and 
myths which inform the story.
 
He reads the story as an attack on the codes of chivalry 
and sexual restraint to which Giles adheres. ‗Unmanned‘ by a socially-formulated 
mentality, Giles fails to play his traditional role as the ‗fertility figure‘ and the 
‗guardian‘ of the woods, allowing the urban intruder, Fitzpiers, to assault the rural 
community and its culture.
11
 
Hardy‘s uneasiness about gender norms, his examination and questioning of 
cultural configurations of masculinity, also informs Judith Mitchell‘s exploration of the 
similarity between the presentation of masculinity in Hardy‘s novels, Jude the Obscure 
and The Mayor of Casterbridge, and the 1990s film adaptations of these works, arguing 
that both reflect anxieties about gender. Like Hardy‘s texts, these adaptations depict the 
‗inadequacy‘ of norms of masculinity and the impossibility (or, at least, difficulty) of 
living up to the cultural models of masculinity by portraying male protagonists as 
failures, as men who are ‗literally‘ fallen.12  
Another area of Hardy‘s fiction which has been critically explored is the 
treatment and presentation of male same-sex relationships in these novels. Tod E. Jones, 
for instance, explores male homoerotic desires in The Mayor of Casterbridge. Drawing 
upon discussions of the Victorian and Hellenistic conceptions of relationships between 
men, he suggests that Henchard‘s ‗misogyny‘, desire to strengthen his bonds with the 
male community, ‗masculine insecurities and aggressive hyper-masculinity‘, 
‗ambivalence towards heterosexual activity‘ and his unusual attachment to Farfrae, 
reflect suppressed homoerotic desires.
13
 Jones sees Henchard‘s tragedy as the 
consequence of ‗acting under the influence of desires that are unacknowledged, 
unidentified, and thus certainly unaccepted‘.14 
Another discussion of male same-sex liaisons, which focuses on the question of 
masculinity as investigated by narrative structure, is presented by Richard Dellamora. 
His essay reads Jude the Obscure in the context of Victorian pedagogical culture of 
male friendship (especially that between mentor and protégé), discussing the erotic 
implications of such relationships. Jude‘s desire for male friendship (for mentors) and 
                                                 
11
 Andrew Radford, ‗The Unmanned Fertility Figure in Hardy‘s The Woodlanders (1887)‘, Victorian 
Newsletter 99 (2001), 24-32 (pp. 24-5, 29). 
12
 Judith Mitchell, ‗All Fall Down: Hardy‘s Heroes on the 1990s Cinema Screen‘, in Thomas Hardy on 
Screen, ed. by T. R. Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 76-95 (pp. 77-80). 
13
 Tod E. Jones, ‗Michael Henchard: Hardy‘s Male Homosexual‘, Victorian Newsletter, 86 (1994), 9-13 
(p. 10). 
14
 Ibid., p. 12. 
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for Sue — who also functions in the text as a quasi-male mentor — reveals not solely 
ambition but also a yearning for emotional communication and intimacy.
15
 
A more recent investigation of manly love in Jude the Obscure is provided by 
Jane Thomas. In her essay, published in 2007, she discusses Jude the Obscure in ‗the 
historical context of the attempts to constrain and orientate the expression of male same-
sex desire‘ at the turn of the century, exploring Hardy‘s awareness of and his response 
to the debates concerning relationships between men. For Thomas, Sue‘s and Jude‘s 
attempted comradeship ‗can be read as paradigmatic of a male same-sex relationship in 
which ―the sense of sex‖ functions as a defining problematic‘.16 The novel‘s emphasis 
on the clash between flesh and spirit is reflective of the same tension experienced by 
other late-Victorian men of letters, with whom Hardy was acquainted, who struggled 
with forbidden desires, attempting to define manly love as spiritual and inspirational 
rather than sensual. Hardy‘s novel, however, as Thomas argues, remains doubtful about 
the possibility of a purely spiritual or intellectual comradely love.  
The most recent examination of the male-male relationship in Hardy‘s fiction 
emerges in the work of Phillip Mallett. Mallett‘s 2010 essay compares two of Hardy‘s 
novels written at the early and late stages of his career as a novelist, A Pair of Blue Eyes 
(1873) and Jude the Obscure, highlighting the similarities of the two. He maintains that 
both novels discuss the ‗processes of becoming  a ―man‖‘; in both, the plot is organised 
around the mentor/pupil relationship and ‗both, albeit in different ways, explore the 
boundary between the homosocial and the homoerotic, and in doing so call into question 
received notions of masculine identity‘.17 The essay examines male characters‘ 
endeavours to enter the world of men through the acquisition of culturally-defined 
masculine attributes, arguing that the novels are interrogations of conventional ideals of 
masculinity and present alternative ways of becoming a man.  
Some critics have applied post-structuralist approaches to the discussion of 
masculinity in Hardy‘s novels. Marjorie Garson, in her Lacanian approach to a selection 
of Hardy‘s novels, argues that these novels express ‗what might be called ―somatic 
anxiety‖—anxiety about bodily integrity, fear of corporeal dissolution‘; the novels 
express concerns ‗about wholeness, about maleness, and particularly about woman‘.18 
In her chapter on Jude the Obscure, she explores what Jude wants as a man. According 
                                                 
15
 Richard Dellamora, ‗Male Relations in Thomas Hardy‘s Jude the Obscure‘, Papers on Language and 
Literature, 27 (1991), 453-72. 
16
 Jane Thomas, ‗Thomas Hardy, Jude the Obscure and ―Comradely Love‖‘, Literature and History, 16.2 
(2007), 1-15 (p. 2). 
17
 Mallett, p. 390. 
18
 Marjorie Garson, Hardy’s Fables of Integrity: Woman, Body, Text (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), pp. 1-3. 
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to Garson, Jude‘s desire for Christminster, Arabella and Sue is a desire for achieving 
‗wholeness‘, a desire which is intrinsically unattainable. 19 But the text holds the female 
figures responsible for its thwarting, reflecting the narrator‘s (Hardy‘s) anxiety about 
the threat of the woman.  
Elizabeth Langland also explores the construction of masculinity in Jude the 
Obscure. Drawing upon Teresa de Lauretis, Linda Alcoff and Mikhail Bakhtin, she 
examines the role of ‗authoritative discourses‘ in the formation of Jude‘s masculine 
identity, Jude‘s internalisation of them and their becoming ‗internally persuasive‘.20 Sue 
is examined in this article not as a character in her own right but as the incarnation of 
Jude‘s ‗internally persuasive voice‘, ‗the feminine‘ in him, and an alternative to the 
unsatisfactory cultural constructions of masculinity.
21
 Langland asserts that Jude‘s 
desire for Sue reflects his desire for a more satisfying masculine identity outside the 
domain of culture yet his re-embracement of authoritative discourses at the end of the 
story undercuts the very idea of self-determination.  
Stephan Horlacher, like Langland, examines the constructedness of masculinity 
in Jude, but whereas Langland attributes Jude‘s failure to the inescapability of 
patriarchal discourses which form one‘s identity, Horlacher relates Jude‘s failure to his 
‗deficient understanding‘ of the ways ‗signs work‘. Taking a psychoanalytic Men‘s 
Studies approach which draws upon Lacan, deconstruction and discourse analysis, he 
investigates Jude‘s formation of masculinity within ‗discourses and sign systems‘. He 
argues that masculinity in the novel is presented as a linguistic construct and Jude‘s 
‗―tragic‖ fate‘ lies in his inability to recognise this fact, his seeking after ‗a 
transcendental signified‘, a fixed identity. 22 Hardy‘s novel in his view can be read in a 
‗positive‘ way: Jude‘s failure is an ‗example of how not to construct one‘s identity‘ and 
an evidence of ‗the freedom of the individual‘ in the formation of subjectivity.23  
The existing critical work on Hardy and masculinity can thus be seen to address 
issues such as Hardy‘s criticism of or ambivalence towards patriarchal ideals of 
masculinity, his challenging of conventional gender roles and the precariousness and 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., pp. 152-7. 
20
 Elizabeth Langland, ‗Becoming a Man in Jude the Obscure‘, in The Sense of Sex: Feminist 
Perspectives on Hardy, ed. by Margaret R. Higonnet (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 32-48 
(p. 45). 
21
 Ibid., pp. 32-4, 38.  
22
 Stefan Horlacher, ‗―The Letter Killeth but the Spirit Giveth Life‖: Masculinity in Thomas Hardy‘s Jude 
the Obscure‘, Proceedings of the Conference of the German Association of University Teachers of 
English, vol. XXVI, ed. by Lilo Moessner and Christa M. Schmidt (Trier, Germany: Wissenschaftlicher 
Verlag, 2005), pp. 171-82 (p. 172). 
23
 Ibid., p. 173.  
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destructiveness of nineteenth-century male gender identity. Scholarly discussions also 
embrace examinations of masculinity in relation to desire and the feminine, homosocial 
and homoerotic relationships and discursive and linguistic constructions of masculinity.  
Class and work and their relation to masculinity is referred to in some of these 
works but these structures are not examined as constituent and determinant of masculine 
subjectivity; we are not provided with the ways characters construct their masculinity 
through them. Devereux‘s discussion of class is more an exploration of social mobility 
and its conflation with romantic aspiration than of the ways male characters construct 
and negotiate gender and class identities. The significant role of power in the shaping of 
masculine subjectivity is another issue not sufficiently addressed by the scholarly work 
on Hardy and masculinity which this thesis aims to examine.  
The analyses of masculinity in most previous criticism of Hardy are mainly 
concerned with the ways characters acquire masculine qualities, their internalisation of 
ideologies or insertion into a specific class system; masculinity is also discussed in 
terms of attribute and temperament. Critical works on Hardy and masculinity do not, in 
my view, pay sufficient attention to the complex ways in which characters position 
themselves in relation to contemporary discourses or the simultaneous construction of 
masculinity within different class discourses. They do not always recognise the ways in 
which male characters‘ gender practices both constitute social structures and are 
constrained by them. The dynamic relationship between social structures and 
individuals, in other words, has not been fully examined.  
The present research aims to explore these issues by applying social-
constructionist theories of masculinity and Foucauldian theories to those novels of 
Thomas Hardy to which they appear most relevant: Far from the Madding Crowd, Two 
on a Tower, The Mayor of Casterbridge, The Woodlanders, Tess of the d’Urbervilles 
and Jude the Obscure. The application of these theories, whose perception of the ways 
individuals are constituted through social forces resembles Hardy‘s, as we shall see, can 
provide a new reading of the novels, by allowing us to see the ways through which male 
characters construct themselves through (or are constructed by) social structures. For 
even though scholarly works on Hardy and masculinity have treated masculinity as a 
social construction, they do not sufficiently examine the ways in which the male 
characters formulate themselves; social-constructionist theories of masculinity, which 
can be useful tools for such an analysis, have not yet been employed for the discussion 
of masculinity in Hardy‘s novels. This investigation of masculinity in Hardy‘s fiction 
also takes into account Hardy‘s philosophy, his conception of determinism and free-will 
 8 
and his notion of resistance and change. It is important to place his representation of 
masculinity within his wider world-view because it helps to explain both the tragic 
dimension of his work (his recognition of the extent to which individuals are 
constrained by contemporary discourses) and the space he allows for hope in the 
possibility of change.  
Hardy‘s male characters can be seen to be constrained by gender and class 
structures and discourses, which severely delineate the ways in which they can 
formulate themselves. These social forces do not, however, operate externally on 
characters but rather constitute them, shaping their subjectivities and their gender 
practices from within. This allows a certain flexibility in the ways they react to, modify 
or even resist such discourses. Such a portrayal of the ways social forces construct 
individuals, it can be argued, stems from Hardy‘s philosophy. His determinism (which 
is spelled out in more detail in the next chapter) incorporates the conception of power 
more as a force inherent in phenomena rather than operating above them; he calls this 
force ‗Necessity‘, ‗Causality‘ or ‗Immanent Will‘. Power, as he conceives it, governs 
individuals not in a repressive manner but by pervading their very existence. Hardy‘s 
kind of determinism, therefore, as Jane Thomas argues, bears resemblance to  
 
a more modern system of thought which stresses the role of power in the 
constitution of individual subjectivity – not as a force negatively applied from 
outside but as something which permeates the body and is itself embodied in 
every thought, gesture and social interaction.
24
 
 
This is a perception of power developed by Michel Foucault, as we shall see. Hardy‘s 
characters sometimes conceive of themselves as victims of a prohibitive external power, 
unaware of the extent to which they themselves have played a role in the reception of 
these forces.  
Hardy‘s philosophy of existence, in other words, though highly deterministic, 
does not verge on fatalism as for him the relationship between social structures and 
individuals is a dynamic one. Social forces do not determine subjects mechanically; 
both for Hardy and for more recent theorists of gender, social structures and discourses 
constitute individuals but it is individuals who bring those forces into existence by 
                                                 
24
 Jane Thomas, Thomas Hardy, Femininity and Dissent: Reassessing the ‘Minor’ Novels (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1-2. 
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formulating themselves through them. The probability of change to these forces is 
envisioned by Hardy and these theorists owing to such dynamics.  
The following review of a number of social-constructionist theories of gender is 
designed to provide a framework for discussing Hardy‘s novels. The point is not, of 
course, to suggest that Hardy could have been influenced by these theories although I 
intend to point out the similarity of Hardy‘s perception of gender formation to the 
discussions of gender provided by these theories. The analyses of the novels in the light 
of these theories can help bring to the fore Hardy‘s intuitive and often unconscious 
understanding of the ways in which gender is formulated.  
Andrew Tolson, for example, the pioneer of sociological works on masculinity, 
specifically touches on some of the issues which Hardy examines in his novels. Tolson 
discusses the role of patriarchy and capitalism in the formation of masculinity. He 
investigates the ways in which working-class and middle-class masculinities are 
constructed within institutions, such as the family, work-place, school and peer-groups. 
Tolson conceives of work as the key constituent of masculine subjectivity and social 
class as a determining factor involved in the making of male gender identity. For him, 
the definitions of masculinity in terms of work and success provided by patriarchal and 
capitalist discourses are ‗limitations of masculinity‘: at work, men ‗are condemned to a 
quest for personal rewards which they cannot hope to realise‘, and at home, ‗[s]ocial 
prestige becomes a psychological barrier, limiting their potentiality for personal 
relationships‘.25 The cultural and social constructions of masculinity, in other words, 
adversely affect men themselves.  In an attempt to achieve a sense of manhood, men are 
obliged to align themselves with paradigms of masculinity which do not always accord 
with their capabilities and desires.  
The formation of masculinity within social institutions, the interrelatedness of 
masculinity and class and the importance of work as constitutive of masculine identity 
are all issues which, as we shall see, Hardy explores vividly in his novels. Hardy‘s men, 
of course, are not simply representative of their class; rather, they interact with class 
norms, demonstrating a complex relation of resistance to and/or compliance with them. 
The problems and limitations which the construction of masculinity in accordance with 
the socially and culturally privileged models of masculinity creates for men are also 
notably investigated by Hardy.  
                                                 
25
 Andrew Tolson, The Limits of Masculinity (London: Routledge, 1977), p. 13.  
 10 
In Hardy‘s novels, as I have suggested, masculinity is not automatically 
determined by social structures; rather, structures which delimit the construction of 
masculinity are themselves constituted through the gender practices of individuals. This 
is a point emphasised by R. W. Connell, in his attempt to improve and develop 
arguments such as Tolson‘s. While Tolson‘s emphasis is on the ways in which 
patriarchal and class structures determine the construction of masculinity, Connell is 
more interested in the ways in which individuals interact with these structures. Connell 
argues that a discussion of gender should pay attention to the ‗interweaving of personal 
life and social structures‘, exploring ‗what people do by way of constituting the social 
relations they live in‘. He does not underestimate ‗the structure of social relations as a 
condition of all practices‘,26 but he insists that structure and practice are not separate 
from each other; ‗the structure of gender relations‘ — arrangements that constrain 
gender practice — ‗has no existence outside the practices through which people and 
groups conduct those relations‘; gender structures are constituted through social 
practice; ‗[i]f we don‘t bring it into being, gender does not exist‘.27 Yet practice itself is 
conditioned by those very structures; it cannot ‗float free; it must respond to, and is 
constrained by, the circumstances which those structure constitute‘.28  
That gender practice is constrained does not suggest that individuals are trapped 
in these structures; structures do not ‗mechanically‘ determine people‘s actions. 
Structures operate by defining ‗possibilities and consequences of action‘ and individuals 
formulate their gender, considering these possibilities.
29
 People do not passively 
internalise ‗gender-specific behaviours‘; rather, they engage with them; gender is 
learned in ‗the situations of everyday life‘; ‗it needs not be explicitly named as gender – 
it might be thought of as ―sports I enjoy‖, ―fights with my parents‖, ―jobs I am suited 
for‖, etc‘. Individuals ‗negotiate the gender order‘, learning ‗how to distance themselves 
from a gender identity‘ and ‗how to adopt‘ one.30  
In the construction of gender, Connell considers both the ‗agency‘ of individuals 
and ‗the intractability of gender structures‘; ‗[g]ender patterns develop in personal life 
as a series of encounters with the constraints and possibilities of the existing gender 
order. In these encounters the learner improvises, copies, creates, and thus develops 
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characteristic strategies for handling situations in which gender relations are present‘.31 
The diversity of masculinities is indicative of such a negotiation.  
For Connell, the main structures which constrain and condition the formation of 
gender are ‗the sexual division of labour‘ (the allocation of jobs and differentiation of 
tasks according to one‘s sex), ‗power‘ (the construction of masculinity in terms of the 
domination of women or other men) and the structure of ‗cathexis‘ (a term he borrows 
from Freud to refer to ‗emotional attachment‘ or ‗emotional relations‘).32 By this last 
category, Connell refers to the social patterning of emotional attachments and 
relationships. This structure incorporates different kinds of emotional relationships but 
specifically involves the definition of the ‗objects of desire [...] by the dichotomy and 
opposition of feminine and masculine‘; men and women, for instance, tend to attract 
each other through behaviour and appearance.
33
 Following Freud, Connell argues that 
emotional attachment to people can be ‗affectionate‘ (‗favourable‘), ‗hostile‘ or 
‗ambivalent‘, that is, ‗hostile and affectionate at the same time‘.34  
By constituting themselves as breadwinners, decision-makers and husbands, 
lovers or fathers, men formulate their masculinity within these structures. Such 
structures of gender relations do not operate separately but are usually interwoven with 
each other and mainly interact with other structures, such as social class.
35
 Connell also 
recognises the role of discourse as another structure involved in the formation of the 
conceptions of masculinity and femininity but his emphasis is more on the exploration 
of the first three structures. 
Such structuring of gender relations, according to Connell, can be found, more 
or less, in all social institutions as well as in society at large; he terms the gender 
arrangement of a particular institution as the ‗gender regime‘ of that institution, which 
itself is a ‗part of wider patterns‘ that he calls ‗the gender order of society‘. Even 
though the ‗gender regimes of institutions usually correspond to the overall gender 
order‘, they ‗may depart from it‘;36 this is the place where change can develop.  
The applicability of Connell‘s discussion to Hardy‘s novels relates to the ways 
in which their male characters‘ practice of masculinity can be seen to emerge out of 
such structures. By taking masculine careers, providing for their families, asserting their 
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authority and engaging in matrimonial and romantic relationships, they reveal the ways 
in which their gender practice is conditioned by the structures described by Connell. 
Hardy‘s characters are not passively affected by these structures; rather, they constitute 
these structures through their practices. For Hardy, as for Connell, the negotiation of 
different versions of masculinity is possible; his characters may adopt or distance 
themselves from certain masculine and class identities; they cannot, of course, operate 
outside the domain of structure and discourse. 
In Hardy‘s novels, masculinity can be seen to be constructed also through 
individuals‘ interaction with each other and this is the point also made by sociologists of 
masculinity. David H. J. Morgan, in his book Discovering Men, argues that masculinity 
and femininity are constructed ‗in relation to each other through everyday social 
interaction‘. From this ‗relational or interactionalist‘ viewpoint, ‗what it feels like to be 
a man can only fully be answered in the context of gendered encounters‘, encounters ‗in 
which men and women meet‘. For Morgan, masculinity is both shaped out of and 
shapes such encounters.
37
 That men construct their masculinities through interaction 
with others, however, does not mean that they are free to practise any version of 
masculinity; rather, their gender practice is strictly regulated by ‗the demands of the 
particular situation‘ and by ‗the array of masculinities that may be available and 
privileged‘.38 Whether they assert themselves through forcefulness, intimidation or 
gentle behaviour depends on the kinds of circumstances in which they find themselves 
and the gender practice they encounter in others. But in whatever way they constitute 
themselves, the kind of masculinity they practise is necessarily chosen from a range of 
models of masculinity already provided by their culture and society.    
For Hardy, gender is constructed not only by structure but by its intertwined 
element, discourse. Foucault‘s discussion of the ways individuals formulate themselves 
through regulatory discourses proves useful here. According to Foucault, in order to 
constitute themselves as subjects, individuals need to fit themselves ‗into certain games 
of truth‘ — ‗rules by which truth is produced‘.39 These come in the form of sciences or 
discourses promoted by institutions of power. Individuals acquire their sense of self by 
taking an already-defined subject position in discourse; the subject, according to 
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Foucault, is an ‗empty function‘ that ‗can be filled by virtually any individual‘.40 
Discourses provide ‗speaking persons subject positions from which to make sense of the 
world while ―subjecting‖ speakers to the regulatory power of those discourses.‘41 
Hardy‘s characters, as we shall see, constitute themselves in similar fashion through the 
discourses of masculinity and class which are provided by their society.  
In Hardy‘s novels, the construction of masculinity is not, of course, a matter of 
entire acceptance or refusal of the prevailing norms of masculinity. His male characters 
may have a paradoxical or conflicted relationship with these norms. This is an issue 
highlighted by post-structuralist discussions of masculinity such as those developed by 
Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley. Their discursive psychoanalytic analysis of 
masculinity explores the ways men ‗negotiate regulatory conceptions of masculinity in 
their everyday interactions‘, arguing that men ‗position themselves in relation to 
conventional notions of the masculine‘ in a paradoxical way.42 Their research 
demonstrates how men rarely consider themselves to be constructed by hegemonic 
ideals of masculinity,
43
 such as ‗strength, boldness, winning challenges‘ or ‗cool 
toughness‘. Most men tend to assume that they are free from the regulatory power of 
discourse. But someone who describes himself as ‗ordinary‘, an ‗independent man who 
knows his own mind‘, is paradoxically ‗most hegemonic‘ in being ‗non-hegemonic‘. 
Such a man is still ‗enmeshed by convention; subjectified, ordered and disciplined at the 
very moment he rehearses the language of personal taste, unconventionality and 
autonomy, or ordinariness and normality‘. Negotiating hegemonic masculinity is not 
therefore a matter of either following or defying the norms; rather, men can be 
‗hegemonic and non-hegemonic, complicit and resistant at the same time‘.44 Hardy‘s 
male characters, I will argue, demonstrate a similarly complex, at times paradoxical, 
relationship of simultaneous resistance to and compliance with the norms of 
masculinity. They apparently defy certain discourses while practically constituting 
themselves through them.  
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Foucault‘s discussion of the ways in which mechanisms of power and regulatory 
discourses are involved in the formation of subjectivity is applicable to Hardy‘s novels 
for the two men hold similar conceptions of the ways in which power operates. Both 
conceive of power not as a negative force operating above individuals and society but 
rather immanent in them, a kind of power which is constitutive of human subjectivity. 
Foucault states:  
 
When I think of the mechanics of power, I think of its capillary form of 
existence, of the extent to which power seeps into the very grain of individuals, 
reaches right into their bodies, permeates their gestures, their posture, what they 
say, how they learn to love and work with other people.
45
  
 
Hardy‘s characters, as I attempt to show, are governed by such a mechanism of power; 
power of discourse pervades them, governing their thoughts and actions.  
In The History of Sexuality (1976), Foucault explains that the power he describes 
is not a monolithic form of dominance, repressive power on the one side and the 
subjugated individual on the other, but a ‗multiplicity of force relations‘, scattered 
throughout the entire social network.
46
 Power, he argues, is not an entity, not something 
that can be ‗held‘ or ‗acquired‘. It is not external to but ‗immanent‘ in all kinds of 
relationships, economic scientific or sexual. Power ‗is everywhere; not because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere‘.47   
For Foucault, power is not always negative and repressive; rather, it should be 
perceived of as a ‗positive‘ mechanism as well. Power is productive for it creates 
knowledge and discourse. The emergence of the knowledge of sexuality in the 
nineteenth century, for instance, is an effect of power. The aim of the bourgeois 
machinery of power was not to suppress sex but to produce the ‗true discourse‘ about it 
in order to manage and regulate it for the maintenance of the power of the dominant 
class. This mechanism of power, which, as Foucault argues, first emerged in the 
eighteenth century with the aim of governing the population, operates not through ‗law‘ 
and by means of ‗punishment‘ but through ‗normalization‘ and by means of ‗control‘.48  
But power also produces resistance. Power cannot always get what it wants; for 
‗where there is power, there is resistance‘ to it. Resistance, as Foucault argues, is an 
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indispensible accompaniment of any relation of power; ‗points of resistance‘ can be 
found all throughout ‗the power network‘. In the same way that power relations form ‗a 
dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly 
localized in them, so too the swarm of points of resistance traverses social stratifications 
and individual unities‘. 49 Change for Foucault can be realised when points of resistance 
are codified and unified. A similar conception of the mechanism of power and 
resistance, as we shall see, can be found in Hardy‘s contemporary, Herbert Spencer, and 
in Hardy himself.   
In his earlier work, Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault argues that one form 
that power takes is that of discipline, which is a mechanism for producing useful, docile 
subjects. This machinery of power operates through mechanisms such as the gaze and 
‗normalizing judgement‘,50 the techniques through which individuals are constantly 
supervised by other members of society and by themselves. The mechanism of the gaze 
allows the machinery of power to operate in the most efficient manner by distributing 
the act of supervision among all members of society, accordingly making everybody 
feel her/himself under constant supervision. For Foucault, Bentham‘s ‗panopticon‘, an 
ideal model of prison, best suggests the ways the act of surveillance can operate in a 
society.
51
 In the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham designed the panopticon as a 
circular-shaped prison-building, divided into cells, with a tower at the centre and with 
the inmates placed in cells and a supervisor in the tower.  The individuals in such a 
structure are subjected to the power of the gaze, which is both ‗visible‘ and 
‗unverifiable‘. Such a machinery of power is effective since it makes the observed 
exercise power over him/herself: the one who ‗is subjected to the field of visibility, and 
who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself‘.52 Conscious that he is watched constantly, the observed 
takes upon him/herself to check his/her conduct all the time; surveillance takes the form 
of self-surveillance and the gaze becomes a gaze at oneself. 
Hardy, as I will demonstrate, was conscious of similar mechanisms of power 
operating in society, constituting individuals. It is not just Hardy‘s female characters 
who are subjected to the disciplinary power of the gaze; his male characters are also 
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affected by the mechanism of surveillance. They, likewise, are scrutinised for their 
compliance with the norms of masculinity, such as work, success, acceptance of the role 
of provider or assertion of authority. The disciplinary power operates on them, making 
them constantly check their own conduct, to avoid transgressing the norms of the 
discourses of masculinity through which they have constituted themselves.  
In a disciplinary society, Foucault argues, individuals are regulated not only by 
the power of the gaze but by that of ‗normalizing judgement‘, which accompanies the 
gaze. The disciplinary system has its own system of evaluation; in this system the norm 
is the law and individuals are punished for deviation from the norm. Individuals are 
compared with each other, differentiated according to the degree of their compliance 
with the ‗overall rule‘, evaluated on their level of ‗conformity‘ and (if they fail this test) 
finally excluded in order to be corrected. The normalizing judgement, therefore, works 
through a system of dividing and ‗branding‘ or naming, dividing individuals into 
categories and labelling them accordingly.
53
 Hardy, as I will show, portrays his men as 
subjected to similar disciplinary power; they are judged (or judge themselves) according 
to their degree of conformity with the norms of prevailing discourses of masculinity and 
are branded (or brand themselves) as manly or unmanly, successful or failed. 
As the primary aim of the disciplinary system is to normalise, punishment in this 
mechanism is ‗essentially corrective‘. Although making use of punishment in the 
negative sense, in the form of ‗fines‘, for example, the disciplinary system also 
advocates positive ‗punishments that are exercise – intensified, multiplied forms of 
training, several times repeated‘.54 Punishment, in this sense, is a form of education. It is 
not always inflicted by others; rather, individuals subject themselves to chastisement as 
well. The struggles of Swithin and Jude for the acquisition of knowledge, for instance, 
can be seen as examples of punishment in the form of exercise; they subject themselves 
to hard work in order to gain qualifications and define themselves as men of knowledge.  
As the main end of the discipline is to train, to produce specific subjects, 
punishment, in a disciplinary mechanism, is always accompanied by rewards; in fact, 
punishment ‗is only one element of a double system: gratification-punishment‘; 
individuals are punished for non-conformity and rewarded for their achievements. Rank 
is the functioning instrument of this double system, being employed as both ‗reward‘ 
and ‗punishment‘: ‗Discipline rewards simply by the play of awards, thus making it 
possible to attain higher ranks and places; it punishes by reversing this process.‘ The 
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disciplinary system differentiates individuals according to their qualifications and 
assigns them a rank accordingly; each individual is ‗defined‘ according to his/her rank, 
that is, ‗the place one occupies in a classification‘. What makes the rank a valuable 
disciplinary tool is that it does not guarantee the individual a ‗fixed‘ status: ‗It is a 
perpetual movement in which individuals replace one another in a space‘. Individuals 
are evaluated, and evaluate themselves, constantly; those holding lower ranks can 
improve their position by acquiring qualifications and those of higher ranks descend 
into lower positions if they prove unworthy.
55
  
It can be argued that characters in Hardy‘s novels discipline themselves in this 
manner in order either to ascend to higher ranks (if we define ‗rank‘ as a space or 
subject status in discourse) or to maintain their present ranks and thus avoid descending 
to lower positions. Working through a system of punishment and gratification, the 
disciplining power of discourse makes male characters work on themselves in order to 
gain certain qualifications and be awarded certain subject positions. The self-discipline 
they undergo is accompanied by the gratification of winning a specific rank to which 
they aspire, for example, that of a man of knowledge. Since rank is not a fixed status, to 
maintain a specific rank (subject position) requires the male characters‘ constant, life-
long pursuit of certain norms. The moment they cease following those norms, they will 
lose the subject status which is awarded to them in return for their compliance with 
those norms. A man may immediately lose his status as a ‗man‘ if he fails to live up to 
the norms of the discourses of masculinity within which he has constituted himself.  
Hardy‘s novels will be seen to demonstrate some of the ways in which the 
exercise of such power over oneself and others serves to construct masculinity. In 
patriarchal discourses, femininity is delineated as a passive mode of being while 
masculinity is associated with acting; as Berger observes, conventionally ‗men act and 
women appear‘56 or, in D. H. Lawrence‘s words, ‗[t]he male exists in doing, the female 
in being‘,57 a conception of gender which Hardy‘s novels both portray and challenge, as 
we shall see. Masculinity in such systems of signification is associated with the 
incorporation and the exercise of power. As John Berger states,  
  
[a]ccording to usage and conventions which are at last being questioned but 
have by no means been overcome, the social presence of a woman is different 
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in kind from that of a man. A man‘s presence is dependent upon the promise of 
power which he embodies. If the promise is large and credible his presence is 
striking. If it is small and incredible, he is found to have little presence. The 
promised power may be moral, physical, temperamental, economic, social, 
sexual—but its object is always exterior to the man. A man‘s presence suggests 
what he is capable of doing to you or for you. His presence may be fabricated, 
in the sense that he pretends to be capable of what he is not. But the pretence is 
always towards a power which he exercises on others.
58
    
 
A man‘s ‗presence‘, in other words, according to patriarchal discourses, is associated 
with power.  
Relating Berger‘s argument to the discussion of the social construction of 
masculinity, Tolson states that ‗presence‘ is ‗a certain style of behaviour, an outward 
presentation‘ which ‗becomes part of an internal self-image‘. A man should have 
‗presence‘ to understand himself as ‗man‘. The ‗promise of power‘, as Tolson argues, is 
associated with certain ‗conventional masculine characteristics‘, such as ‗authority, self-
assertion, competitiveness, aggression‘ and ‗physical strength‘.59 Supporting and 
providing for the family are other ways of constructing masculine ‗presence‘. The 
definition of ‗presence‘, of course, varies from one class discourse to another; while 
manhood for the middle classes is defined more in term of ‗achievement‘ and 
‗professionalism‘, for working-class men it is more linked with ‗toughness‘ and 
‗aggression‘.60 
Hardy portrays a range of definitions of ‗presence‘ offered by various discourses 
of masculinity. His male characters may attempt to assert their ‗presence‘ intellectually 
and socially (the Bishop of Melchester, Swithin or Jude), financially and socially 
(Henchard or Melbury), morally (Gabriel Oak or Giles Winterborne), physically 
(Henchard) or by reliance on sparkling appearance and verbal techniques (Troy or 
Alec). The domination of women either by providing for, deciding for and supporting 
them or by intimidating and possessing them can also be seen as examples of the other 
ways through which the male characters construct their ‗presence‘. Hardy‘s men need to 
have ‗presence‘ (even if ‗presence‘ is fabricated) if they are to be termed ‗men‘. The 
undermining of a position of supremacy, in any of these senses, can undercut the male 
characters‘ masculine subjectivity.  
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‗Presence‘ defined in terms of dominating others, specifically, proves to be quite 
vulnerable because the person dominated can respond in unpredictable ways. All the 
characters‘ interactions with each other can be seen as relations of power in the 
Foucauldian sense of the term. For Foucault, any human relationship is a relation of 
power in the sense that ‗one person tries to control the conduct of the other‘. A relation 
of power, however, far from being one-sided and fixed, is ‗mobile‘, modifiable and 
‗reversible‘, for the person on whom power is exercised is capable of resistance.61 
Hardy demonstrates that it is the presence of resistance in any relation of power which 
makes the task of the constitution of masculinity in terms of the assertion of authority 
demanding and renders masculine subjectivity insecure.  
 However, ‗presence‘ in the novels of Thomas Hardy is not always associated 
with the exercise of power on an external object, as masculine ‗presence‘ is 
conventionally described. Oak and Giles, for instance, may assert their manhood by 
helping others (when the power they embody is towards an external object and thus in 
line with conventional definitions of masculine ‗presence‘); mainly, however, they 
construct their ‗presence‘ by means of dissociation from external objects. Their practice 
of self-sufficiency is not the means of impressing others but a mode of life, associated 
with their Stoic inclinations, as will be discussed. As such, they can be seen to resist the 
dominant gender and class discourses of their time, formulating their subjectivities in 
alternative ways.  
Even though supremacy is what most of Hardy‘s men seek in the private 
domain, it is not all that they need. An important point which Hardy emphasises in his 
novels is that men, like women, long for emotional fortification, a need not reflected in 
the definitions of ‗presence‘ offered by prevailing discourses of masculinity. They want 
to be loved and cared for, a desire which they are taught to suppress if they want to be 
termed ‗men‘. That Hardy‘s men are sometimes empowered not merely through the 
assertion of authority but by finding themselves the object of affection (as is apparent in 
the case of Jude) undermines the conventional delineation of masculine ‗presence‘, 
presenting a definition of the term which incorporates the so-called feminine 
characteristics.  
With patriarchal discourses accentuating the significance of men‘s ‗presence‘ in 
the public arena, defining men in terms of employment, social standing or financial 
success, men find it essential to assert themselves in this domain. One important way of 
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establishing ‗presence‘ in the social sphere, for men, is work, which is the main 
constituent of masculine subjectivity.
62
 Men are obliged to define their masculinity in 
terms of work, as Tolson argues, ‗―becoming someone‖ through working, ―making 
something of yourself‖‘. The conflation of masculinity with work and success, 
articulated by patriarchal and bourgeois discourses, can be problematic for men; 
unemployment can signify emasculation for them and the need to assert themselves 
through achievement makes them follow ‗a mirage of success, an ever-retreating image 
of having ―made it‖‘.63 Hardy‘s novels provide a critique of such delineations of 
masculinity, revealing their limitations. For Hardy‘s men, the construction of ‗presence‘ 
in the public domain — whether by means of work, financial and social standing, 
acquisition of knowledge or renown — proves to be a priority. Their entire lives may 
become a desperate struggle to achieve success while failure undermines their sense of 
masculinity. Though sometimes aware of the oppressiveness of the norms of 
masculinity, Hardy‘s characters are rarely able to defy them, to constitute themselves in 
alternative ways.  
Hardy‘s novels, however, envisage the possibility of limited resistance to the 
prevailing discourses of masculinity and class. The practice of Stoicism, for instance, as 
I suggest, is, for Hardy, a way of self-fashioning outside the domain of these discourses, 
a point to which Foucault also alludes. In his later works, Foucault suggests that one 
way of formulating one‘s subjectivity in ways other than those demanded by the 
regulative discourses is through ‗technologies of the self‘,  
 
which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of 
others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality‘.64   
 
He conceives of the formation of the self, as accomplished by the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, as an example of resisting the dominance of regulatory discourses. He 
argues that in antiquity, ‗the care of the self‘ was ‗an ascetic practice‘, ‗an exercise of 
the self on the self by which one attempt[ed] to develop and transform oneself and to 
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attain a certain mode of being‘.65 For the Stoics, for instance, the emphasis was on 
‗mastery over oneself‘, to develop independence in relation to ‗the external world‘.66  
For the ancients, ‗the care of the self‘, the government of oneself and one‘s appetites, 
was associated with ethics and regarded as the practice of freedom. The care of the 
self was also considered as ‗a way of limiting and controlling‘ one‘s power over 
others, for the power one exercised over oneself could ‗regulate one‘s power over 
others‘.67 Foucault states that, for the Greeks, the ‗work on the self with its attendant 
austerity‘ was a matter of ‗personal choice, of aesthetics of existence‘ and ‗not 
related to any social — or at least legal — institutional system‘. Individuals decided 
whether to constitute themselves in terms of morality or not.
68
 
Even though the Stoics constituted themselves through such practices of the self, 
Foucault does not suggest that this was autonomous self-formation on their parts. For 
these practices are ‗not something invented by the individual himself‘; ‗they are models 
that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his 
culture, his society, and his social group‘.69 Foucault‘s discussion nevertheless supports 
Hardy‘s conception of Stoicism as an alternative mode of being in the world. Gabriel 
Oak and Giles Winterborne, whom I will discuss as Stoics, are able to resist the 
dominant gender and class discourses of their time, through their practice of self-
sufficiency, abstaining from constructing their masculinities through social and material 
achievement or in terms of sexuality and the overpowering of the beloved. Giles, 
however, is still partly governed by the prevailing discourse of social decorum, as we 
shall see. Both nevertheless can be seen to develop alternative ways of being a man 
even though these alternatives are still discursively determined. 
 The possibility of resistance to social structures and discourses is limited in 
Hardy‘s novels. For Hardy, as for social-constructionist theorists of masculinity and 
Foucault, there is no possibility of functioning outside the domain of structure and 
discourse. But the development of alternative ways of self-formation within that domain 
is assumed to be possible. Hardy‘s novels present male characters who are constrained 
by social structures and discourses but they are not mechanically determined by these 
forces; rather, it is the characters who bring these elements into existence by practising 
them. This study attempts to examine the ways masculinity is formulated in Hardy‘s 
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novels, the ways male characters constitute themselves through gender and class 
structures and discourses, the extent to which they are constrained by these forces and 
the extent to which they can escape their dominance.  
Before I proceed to a discussion of the novels, however, I need to articulate 
Hardy‘s general philosophy in terms of his own reading and explicit statements. This 
will clarify his standpoint on the issues of freedom, determinism and the possibility of 
change, which are crucial to an understanding of the construction of masculinity. This is 
the task which the next chapter hopes to accomplish. 
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Chapter 2 
Hardy’s Philosophy: 
The Question of Freedom 
 
Hardy‘s views on the ways in which gender and class structures and discourses 
constrain and constitute individuals can be seen to be associated with his deterministic 
philosophy. His dark view of existence is rooted in the conviction that humans are 
governed by forces which permeate their mind and body and govern their actions, 
precluding the possibility of any autonomous self-formation. For Hardy, the governing 
power of the universe is not external to the universe but inherent in it; he calls this 
power ‗Necessity‘, ‗causality‘, ‗First cause‘ or ‗Immanent Will‘. Hardy‘s thoughts in 
this area were nourished by deterministic thinkers of his time, such as Charles Darwin, 
Herbert Spencer and Arthur Schopenhauer but he was also interested in Auguste Comte 
and John Stuart Mill, both of whom envisage the possibility of humans‘ effecting 
change in themselves and in the social order.
1
 Hardy‘s interest in these diverse thinkers 
and philosophers reveals a tension in his world-view; at times, he appears deterministic, 
while at others, he allows for a certain degree of freedom. In spite of his deterministic 
philosophy, in other words, he envisages a limited degree of freedom which can 
instigate change and ultimately lead to the amelioration of the human condition.  
Darwin‘s influence on Hardy has long been recognised. His autobiography 
acknowledges that ‗[a]s a young man he had been among the earliest acclaimers of The 
Origin of Species‘.2 The gloomy vision of the novels has its roots in Hardy‘s writing in 
the post-Darwinian world, where mechanical, indifferent forces were assumed to be 
behind world phenomena. In Darwin‘s world, Nature and its laws determined the 
development of species, a process which ‗was utterly indifferent to the emotions of 
men‘.3 Darwin substituted, however, the view of the universe as ‗a fixed order‘ with that 
of ‗an organic structure‘4 which, though highly deterministic, incorporated the element 
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of progress and change. For Darwin, living beings were not created in ‗their present 
forms‘ but evolved throughout the course of time from some primary forms of life.5  
Darwin contends that living beings play no role in developing their own 
characteristics; rather, individual traits are determined by heredity and the laws of 
nature. Generations are connected lineally, with biological characteristics transmitted 
from one generation to another. He regards ‗the inheritance of every character whatever 
as the rule, and non-inheritance as the anomaly‘.6 For Darwin, the rigid laws of biology 
are susceptible to change, however; environmental changes are able to modify the 
course of inheritance; they can trigger ‗variations‘ in living organisms which, if 
preserved by Nature, will be inherited, giving rise to new forms of life.
7
  
For Darwin, individual characteristics are determined not only by heredity but 
by the laws of nature. Sexual Selection and Natural Selection specify which 
characteristics are preserved and inherited. He argues that ‗[s]exual selection depends 
on the success of certain individuals over others of the same sex, in relation to the 
propagation of the species; whilst natural selection depends on the success of both 
sexes, at all ages, in relation to the general conditions of life‘.8 According to his theory 
of Natural Selection or ‗the Survival of the Fittest‘ — a phrase he borrows from Herbert 
Spencer — in the struggle for survival, only those who can develop characteristics 
which make them stronger in the battle with others and those who can ‗adapt themselves 
with the changing conditions‘ will be chosen by Nature to survive. Those unable to 
adapt to changes in the environment are doomed to extinction.
9
  
Inspired by Darwinian ideas, Hardy‘s novels portray biology as a key 
determinant of human destiny.
10
 For Hardy, it is not the individual but heredity which 
specifies human characteristics, as Peter Morton demonstrates.
11
 But individuals in 
these novels are not solely determined by biological factors; social structures and 
discourses play an even more significant role in the formation of subjectivity and human 
life, as we shall see. As Angelique Richardson observes, Hardy‘s interest in both 
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Darwin and Mill demonstrates that for him ‗[h]umans were part of nature, but that did 
not preclude their capacity to make up stories about nature‘12 and even to improve it.  
The operation of laws of Nature and their role in the preservation and 
elimination of individuals also inform Hardy‘s novels, which illustrate the survival of 
the fittest and the elimination of the weakest. Those characters who are unable to adapt 
to the conditions of their lives are eradicated. But Hardy‘s sympathy often lies with the 
unfit individual – Boldwood, Henchard and Jude, for instance – for the fittest is not 
necessarily the best. He copied an extract from the Examiner in 1876: ‗Science tells us 
that, in the struggle for life, the surviving organism is not necessarily that which is 
absolutely the best in an ideal sense, though it must be that which is most in harmony 
with surrounding conditions.‘13 It is clear that Hardy did not simply accept Darwinian 
ideas without a certain reluctance and even resistance. 
The other evolutionary thinker who might have influenced Hardy‘s perspective 
on life is Herbert Spencer. Hardy‘s literary notes demonstrate his extensive reading of 
Spencer
14
 and Hardy himself acknowledges his interest in Spencer‘s First Principles15 
even though ‗[w]hat Hardy found in Spencer‘s First Principles‘ is ‗conjectural‘, as 
Walter F. Wright maintains.
16
 But Spencer could have ‗provided the germ of Hardy‘s 
later notions about Immanent Will‘, the idea that the governing force of the universe is 
not external but inherent in phenomena.
17
 Jane Thomas argues that ‗[f]or both Hardy 
and Spencer the power that constitutes the human individual in terms of docile and 
resistant bodies is immanent and all-pervasive as opposed to extra-social‘.18  
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For Spencer, all phenomena in the world are the ‗manifestation of some 
Power‘.19 This ‗Ultimate Cause‘, which lies behind every phenomenon, however, is by 
no means graspable by human mind, hence his calling this Power ‗The Unknowable‘. 
This Power is the guiding force of the universe, whose persistence is the cause of 
constant transformation and progress.
20
. For Spencer, evolution is the invariable law of 
the universe; in the same way that a seed necessarily becomes a tree, the whole 
universe, including human society, necessarily progresses towards perfection: ‗progress‘ 
is ‗not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity‘.21  
Spencer‘s evolutionary model allows no space for individual autonomy; the role 
of individuals is just to play their parts in the overall process of advancement. Social 
changes, apparently implemented by great men, are in fact ‗parts of the general 
developmental process‘ which necessarily occurs in all phenomena, including human 
society. If great men shape their societies, they are also shaped by their societies; they 
are the effects of ideas and beliefs to which they are exposed so social changes are in 
fact the work of ‗the social causes which produced these individuals‘.22 He thus 
highlights the role of society in the formation of subjectivity, an idea Hardy also shares. 
In Spencer‘s highly deterministic world-view, change occurs as a part of the process of 
evolution and through the human mind. The ‗Unknown Cause‘, which is immanent in 
individuals, creates in them both docility and resistance, both ‗conservative‘ and 
‗progressive‘ opinions. Contrary opinions, therefore, produced by the Unknown Cause, 
should be expressed for they can eventually instigate change.
23
 This is a conception of 
change to which Hardy also adheres and which anticipates Foucault‘s discussion that it 
is through the convergence of points of resistance that change occurs.
24
 This is an issue 
to which I will return in my conclusion.   
A philosopher who provided Hardy with further ideas about the possibility of 
change is Comte.
25
 Comte held a deterministic view of existence yet he recognised the 
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possibility of the improvement of society by human effort. For Comte, the phenomena 
of the external world are mainly governed by rigid laws and thus cannot be altered in 
the least degree yet there are certain phenomena, those related to human life and society, 
which can be modified by humans. The ‗natural order‘, therefore, for him, ‗amounts to a 
fatality admitting modifications‘. With regard to the fundamental phenomena, humans 
are unable to effect any change and should therefore submit to them but in relation to 
those phenomena which can be modified, humans can and should take action. Human 
fate for Comte is thus ‗a compound of resignation and action‘,26 resignation to what 
cannot be changed and action where change is possible.   
Comte contends that the order of the universe is far from perfect and that is the 
reason why humans have to ‗[struggle] against difficulties of every kind‘.27 But that is 
also the reason why humans can participate in its improvement. The advancement of 
humanity, in particular its moral nature, for Comte, is what humans are capable of 
accomplishing. The progress of human race lies in ‗the subjection of Self-interest to 
Social-Feeling‘,28 that is, in the cultivation of altruism. This is the objective which 
Positivism hopes to achieve with the help of women who, according to Comte, represent 
the victory of love over self-interest and can help in the cultivation of social affection in 
society as a whole.  
Comte‘s argument that humans live in a world which is governed by laws over 
which they have no control and that there only exists a limited possibility for human 
action accords with Hardy‘s worldview. For Hardy, as for Comte, the world is not ‗a 
comfortable place for man‘29 and ‗the only remedy for this lies in resignation to the 
inevitable, combined with determined action toward the progress of the race‘.30 
Although Hardy could not wholly share Comte‘s optimism, he did believe in the 
gradual amelioration of human society through the development of altruism.
31
 By 
fellow-feeling, we are able to alleviate suffering; we certainly should not add to the 
misery of the world by oppressing each other. As he notes in his interview with William 
Archer in 1901,  
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What are my books but one plea against ‗man‘s inhumanity to man‘ – to 
woman – and to the lower animals? [...] Whatever may be the inherent good or 
evil of life, it is certain that men make it much worse than it need be. When we 
have got rid of a thousand remediable ills, it will be time enough to determine 
whether the ill that is irremediable outweighs the good.
32
  
 
Much that is wrong with society, in other words, is capable of rectification.  
John Stuart Mill was another thinker whose belief in the possibility of improving 
the human condition Hardy admired; he states that in 1865 he knew On Liberty ‗almost 
by heart‘ and in 1868 he writes of the chapter on ‗Individuality (in Liberty)‘ as one of 
his ‗[c]ures for despair‘.33 Hardy is in general agreement with Mill in most areas though 
he is perhaps not quite so optimistic about the extent of human freedom of action.  
Mill highlights the impact of society on the formation of human character and 
the human condition yet he contends that both society and human character can be 
modified through the exercise of liberty. On Liberty condemns ‗the tyranny of the 
majority‘, ‗the tendency of society to impose [...] its own ideas and practices as rules of 
conduct‘ on individuals, ‗[preventing] the formation, of any individuality not in 
harmony with its ways‘ and demanding that all ‗fashion themselves upon the model of 
its own‘.34 An Individual should be responsible for those actions which concern others 
but in what ‗merely concerns himself [sic]‘ he should be allowed to assert himself as he 
desires: ‗Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.‘35 
When complying with the rules of conduct laid down by others, one has no chance of 
developing his/her own faculties, a development which is required both for ‗happiness‘ 
and ‗the individual and social progress‘.36 Mill regards the coexistence of a multiplicity 
of opinions and modes of self-articulation as necessary for the advancement of society. 
His is a more liberal model for the amelioration of the race than Comte‘s.  
Hardy, like Mill, underlines the importance of giving freedom of expression to 
various opinions and allowing for the formation of various forms of subjectivity, 
criticising the ‗necessity of conforming to rules which in themselves have no virtue‘.37 
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He writes in a letter to the L’Ermitage, in 1893: ‗I consider a social system based on 
individual spontaneity to promise better for happiness than a curbed and uniform one 
under which all temperaments are bound to shape themselves to a single pattern of 
living.‘38 Hardy is thus closer to Mill than to Comte, in this respect.  
Both Mill and Comte proclaim the necessity of the suppression of egotism and 
the development of altruism for the progress of society. Individual freedom, even Mill 
accepts, should be constrained in matters which are related to the good of all. This 
limitation of liberty can be fruitful as ‗the restraint put upon the selfish part‘ of human 
nature can lead to ‗the better development of the social part‘,39 cultivating the sympathy 
which is required for the general good and happiness.  
For Mill, society is imperfect and responsible for much human suffering; if 
individuals do not have their portion of happiness in life, the ‗present wretched 
education, and wretched social arrangements‘ are to be blamed.40 Yet, these social 
arrangements, if modified and improved by humans, can become the means of removing 
social evils. Owing to the important role that society plays in the formation of ‗human 
character‘, it can help to foster in individuals motives which concern the good of all: 
‗laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or [...] the interest, of every 
individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest, of the whole‘.41 It is 
through the development of fellow-feeling and even self-sacrifice, renouncing one‘s 
own happiness for the happiness of others, that society can improve. In Mill, therefore, 
as well as Comte, Hardy could find inspiration for his belief in the amelioration of the 
human condition through fellow-feeling.  
Mill‘s discussion of the importance of opinion and social arrangements in the 
formation of ‗human character‘ anticipates, to some extent, twentieth and twenty-first 
century systems of thought which underscore the role of social institutions and 
discourses in the constitution of subjectivity. In The Subjection of Women, a critique of 
the subordination of women to men, Mill continues to explore the same line of 
argument, maintaining that what is assumed to be women‘s true nature is socially 
determined; women are made to believe by all sorts of social institutions and ideologies 
that the ideal femininity is associated with ‗submission‘ and that ‗it is the duty of 
women‘ ‗to live for others [...] and to have no life but in their affections‘.42 Though he 
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does not discuss masculinity, it can be inferred from his discussion of femininity as 
artificially shaped, that what we regard as man‘s nature is also socially constructed. 
Mill suggests that society, which has created women, as they are, can help by 
granting them liberty to demonstrate their real capabilities. Mill‘s optimism stems from 
his belief in the existence of ‗a unique self subject to social constraints‘, which can be 
liberated once the constraints are removed.
43
 Hardy, however, is less optimistic about 
such liberty. For him, subjectivity is socially constrained and constructed. His male 
characters might be able to defy the dominant discourses of their time, itself a difficult 
task, but they still have to operate within the domain of discourse.  
Hardy‘s deterministic worldview and his reservations about the possibility of 
freedom seem to have been intensified by his reading of Schopenhauer, in whom he 
found both a system of thought closely similar to his own and a new phraseology for 
expressing more vividly his own dark view of life.
44
 His Literary Notebooks contain 
quotations from Schopenhauer dating back to the late 1880s and early 1890s, copied 
from Encyclopedia Britannica and Schopenhauer‘s Studies in Pessimism respectively.45 
He also read James Sully‘s 1877 book on Pessimism, which, according to Björk, ‗alone 
can account for the many traces of Schopenhauer‘s philosophy found in Hardy‘s works‘ 
before the late 1880s.
46
 Hardy himself, of course, denied that he was highly influenced 
by Schopenhauer, though he does mention him as one of the philosophers who had his 
‗respect‘.47 For Hardy, what ‗governs the universe‘ is ‗Necessity‘, an ‗indifferent and 
unconscious force, at the back of things, ―that neither good nor evil knows‖‘.48 In the 
course of his writing career, he employs different terms to refer to this governing Force; 
in ‗Hap‘, written in 1866, he calls it ‗Crass causality‘ and in his later writing, he terms it 
‗First Cause‘ and eventually the ‗Immanent Will‘,49 a concept which appears most fully 
in Tess and Jude and which is thoroughly explored in The Dynasts (1904-8).  
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For Schopenhauer, the creative power of the universe is ‗not transcendent‘ to 
phenomena but ‗immanent‘ in the latter.50 All phenomena are the manifestation of the 
Will, which Schopenhauer characterises as Immanent, Unconscious, Groundless, 
Aimless and Endless. Will is ‗the inner nature‘ of everything in the universe; it ‗appears 
in every blind force of nature, and in the preconsidered action of man‘.51 It guides our 
actions, our mind and our body movements, our whole existence; ‗everyone carries it in 
himself, indeed it is himself‘.52 Hardy draws his conception of the Immanent Will from 
Schopenhauer and, like Schopenhauer, conceives of the Will as Unconscious and 
autonomous.
53
  
Since Will permeates human body and mind, Schopenhauer allows for no 
freedom of will and action. Every human action is subjected to the laws of ‗necessity‘. 
Will, operating as character and motives, determines human action. Although in every 
situation an individual is ostensibly capable of taking a number of actions and 
apparently offered a variety of choices, he necessarily takes the action which is most 
strongly recommended by ‗his character‘ and ‗his motives‘.54 The decision he makes, 
though apparently the act of reflection, is the effect of the Will and thus not under his 
control. That humans are guided not so much by intellect but by irresistible forces 
which are not under their control is something that Hardy accepts, as revealed, for 
instance, by his depiction of characters who fail to resist their emotional and bodily 
impulses.
55
 For Hardy, however, as I will show, the power which pervades humans and 
determines their subjectivity also takes the form of discourse.  
For Schopenhauer, suffering is the end of existence, as willing, which constitutes 
the essence of all phenomena, entails suffering: ‗the basis of all willing is need, 
deficiency, and thus pain‘.56 Man suffers so long as he wills, for willing is nothing but 
continuous striving for the satisfaction of the wants, which can never truly be satisfied.
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For Hardy, likewise, ‗[p]ain has been, and pain is‘.57 He quotes Schopenhauer in his 
Literary Notebooks: ‗so long as the will to live remains unbroken, happiness in the true 
sense is impossible‘.58 His characters suffer as long as they will. 
Though suffering is experienced by all animals and humans, according to 
Schopenhauer, it is highly intensified by the ‗power of deliberation‘ and knowledge; 
humans therefore suffer more than brutes and sensitive and gifted individuals more than 
duller minds: the ‗frustration of the will, if it is to be felt as pain, must be accompanied 
by knowledge‘.59 Hardy also highlights the role of reflection in the suffering of his 
characters. An unthinking character, such as Troy, for example, suffers less than the 
more gifted, sensitive Jude.  
The suppression of the will to live, according to Schopenhauer, is the only way 
to escape pain, the only means of attaining serenity and in fact the only act of freedom 
available to humans. Through the knowledge of the nature of the will, acquired through 
a knowledge of one‘s own nature, that willing is an endless futile striving, which 
incorporates anxiety, care and suffering, one can resist the will. Asceticism, the 
renunciation of worldly attachment and suppression of bodily desires, as practised in 
Christianity as well as by the Stoics, for Schopenhauer, is the way through which one 
can reject one‘s own will. Ultimately, though, it is annihilation alone which can put an 
end to all human strife and suffering. For Hardy, however, there is the possibility that 
the Will becomes conscious and grows sympathetic; this is the task which conscious 
humans can accomplish through the exercise of sympathy. For Hardy, although the 
human will is governed by the Will, there are moments when the mind can disentangle 
itself from the power which permeates it and think in alternative ways; these moments 
offer the potential for change. This is another issue to which I will return in my 
conclusion.  
Though Hardy does not acknowledge the affinity of his thoughts with those of 
the Stoics, his fictional works reveal his sympathy with this ancient philosophy. He had 
knowledge of the Stoic philosophy before writing his first novels. He owned a copy of 
The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, which was given to him by Horace 
Moule on New Year‘s Day, 1865.60 Though not agreeing with all the Stoic tenets, for 
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instance that the universe is governed by a benevolent power and that happiness is 
achievable, he finds certain of their doctrines interesting enough to explore in his novels 
and to embody in his characters, Gabriel Oak and Giles Winterborne.  
For the Stoics, ‗the order and harmony‘ of the universe suggest the existence of 
‗a First Cause and Governing Mind‘ behind all phenomena. They conceive of this 
Cause, or creative power, as both transcendent to phenomena and inherent in them. 
‗Spoken of as active power He is God, but as the sum of his emanations and effects he 
is the world‘.61 Their emphasis is, of course, more on the Power being immanent in, and 
not distinct from, phenomena. It is one and all-pervasive: there is ‗one god who 
pervades all things‘; as there is ‗one light of the sun‘, there is ‗one common substance‘ 
and ‗one soul‘ although it is apparently divided among indefinite animate and inanimate 
objects; it permeates all beings, ‗[carrying] everything along with it‘, ‗like a winter 
torrent‘.62 This conception of the Cause pervading all phenomena, including human 
mind, is in harmony with Hardy‘s own perception of the power permeating the human 
subject. But while for Schopenhauer and Hardy, the governing power immanent in the 
universe is unconscious and irrational, for the Stoics it is both conscious and rational, as 
the creation of ‗conscious creatures‘, humans, and the order of the universe 
demonstrate.
63
  
 According to the Stoic philosophy, a ‗universal reason‘, or ‗law‘, determines 
everything in nature, whose main goal is to maintain the unity, order and perfection of 
‗the whole‘, of which human being is ‗a part‘. Everything happens the way ‗providence‘ 
and ‗necessity‘ demand. Since individuals have no role in the formation of their destiny, 
their happiness and in fact their tranquillity lie in their acquiescence in the law of the 
universe, ‗the voluntary acceptance of the things which are assigned to thee [them] by 
the common nature‘,64 trusting that whatever happens is the best as can be for the 
benefit of the whole.   
For the Stoics, human rationality is the same as the reason of the universe — it is 
‗the Deity which is planted‘ in man — and as the universal reason wants what is best for 
creatures, man‘s well-being lies in harmonising himself with this Reason. Happiness 
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consists in living according to ‗nature‘ and such a life involves living in accordance 
with ‗reason‘. As a rational creature, man should live as his true nature, his rationality, 
demands and govern the bodily desires, impulses and appetites which he shares with 
other animals.
65
 By taking rational action, man is in fact acting as the divinity within 
him demands so for the Stoics, rational action is moral action or ‗virtue‘.66 According to 
Socrates, whom the Stoics followed, ‗virtue‘, as the ‗knowledge of what is best for the 
agent‘ is ‗necessary and sufficient to guarantee right conduct in whatever aspect of life 
that knowledge is applied to‘.67 Virtue, to know what kind of rational action to take 
according to circumstances, is ‗the only good‘ and enough for happiness; all other 
things are ‗―indifferent‖, that is, neither good nor bad‘.68 ‗[A]dvantageous things‘, such 
as ‗health, pleasure, social standing‘ and so on, are ‗preferred but not good‘. Material 
possessions and ‗romantic attachments‘, in the same manner, are not essential for 
happiness; they are ‗worth having‘ but one should not be obsessed about them.69 The 
Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, which, as we have seen, was one 
of Hardy‘s ‗treasured possessions‘,70 is pervaded by such Stoic teachings. For Aurelius, 
happiness and serenity can be achieved only by leading a rational life, being 
‗indifferent‘ towards the things which are ‗indifferent‘,71 renouncing pleasure and any 
kind of passion and living a simple and modest life without caring for wealth, luxury, 
and fame. This, as I shall demonstrate, is the way Hardy allows his Stoic characters to 
live.  
For the Stoics, compliance with the reason of the universe is not a passive 
obedience but a decision made voluntarily and willingly by ‗a careful study of our 
capabilities and limitations‘.72 Although humans are constrained by the laws of 
necessity, they can choose whether to follow their nature (reason) or not and it is this 
decision which determines their happiness or failure.
73
 In other words, happiness is 
bound up with the recognition of the domain of freedom. We have freedom of action 
only in the domain of things over which we have control: ‗Certain things are ours‘ and 
certain ‗things are not ours‘; ‗[o]urs are things in our power, under our control. Not ours 
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are things not in our power, not under our control‘.74 According to the Stoic philosopher 
Epictetus,
 
the only thing that is ours is our ‗volitions‘, by which he means ‗our essential 
selves‘, our ‗mental faculties, consciousness, character, judgements, goals, and desires‘. 
This is the only thing that we own; we do not ‗even [...] own our bodies‘. Individuals 
have freedom only in the domain of their ‗volitions‘. Those who make ‗a mistaken 
attachment‘, ‗[identifying] themselves‘ with what is not theirs, such as ‗their bodies and 
all manner of external things — other persons, commodities [...] and so forth‘, ‗are 
constrained, thwarted, and emotionally enslaved‘. Freedom and happiness, according to 
Epictetus, lie in ‗[transferring] all wants, values, and attachments away from externals 
and [situating] them within the scope of one‘s volition‘, as ‗the locus of all that truly 
matters to humans who have understood cosmic order and their own natures and 
capacities‘.75  
Those male characters of Hardy who make such false attachments can be found 
to face similar psychological problems; detachment is the task which only Hardy‘s Stoic 
men, Gabriel Oak and Giles Winterborne, are able to accomplish. These characters are 
able to dissociate themselves from the things which are not under their control. For the 
Stoics, ‗[t]he wise man‘ is ‗free‘ as he is not entangled in the bondage of the ‗things 
external to himself‘: ‗There will be nothing for him then to fear, for unreason is the only 
evil; nothing to desire beyond himself, for his happiness of intellectual balance is quite 
self-contained.‘76 The sense of self-sufficiency should therefore be seen as a Stoic 
attribute. 
For the Stoics, although rationality is embedded in humans, to constitute oneself 
as rational requires working on the self by practising asceticism. Their emphasis is on 
self-cultivation, as the idea of ‗perfection‘ of ‗volition‘ suggests.77 The ‗ascetic life‘ is 
‗a course of training‘, ‗a series of experiments to test the soul‘s native power to resist 
temptation‘.78 The cultivation of subjectivity, as practised by the Stoics, is referred to by 
Foucault as ‗the care of the self‘.79 While, for the Stoics, ‗volition‘ is the only thing 
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humans own, for Hardy one cannot claim to own even that, since subjectivity is shaped 
by discourses, whose power is difficult to escape.  
Yet, it can be argued that the ways in which Stoics constitute themselves is 
something Hardy admires. He perceives the formulation of the self in the manner of the 
Stoics as a way of self-fashioning beyond the domain of prevailing gender and class 
structures and discourses. Hardy‘s Stoic characters, Gabriel Oak and Giles Winterborne, 
are able at least partly to resist the dominant discourses of masculinity, through their 
Stoic renunciation and government of desires, substituting passion and sexuality with 
friendship and fellow-feeling, presenting alternative ways of being a man. They also 
defy the discourses of class offered to them by institutions of power by detaching 
themselves from materialistic concerns.  
In The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius, we can also discern some passages 
highlighting the importance of benevolence and justice which are in harmony with 
Hardy‘s belief in the significance of fellow-feeling. From the conception of ‗the 
universe as one living being‘, having ‗one substance, and one soul‘, the Stoics construe 
that humans are parts of one body; all are ‗of one kin‘ and should naturally be 
benevolent and just towards each other.
80
 They recommend, of course, only reasonable 
kindness and not sympathy in the form of excessive passion since, for them, vice is the 
only evil and all other things which we regard as evil, such as ‗hardship, poverty‘, ‗pain‘ 
and ‗death‘ are in fact ‗indifferent‘; it is our opinion and our fantasy that makes them 
appear as evil.
81
 For Hardy, however, as we saw, pain is a very real evil.  
Hardy‘s belief in the constraints on human beings makes him sympathetic to the 
Stoic philosophy; in the highly deterministic world-view of the Stoics, the only act of 
freedom is resignation to reason (the reason of the universe). Like the Stoics, Hardy sees 
resignation to one‘s fate as a way of attaining equanimity and an act of wisdom, as his 
interest in the words of Marcus Aurelius indicates: ‗This is the chief thing: Be not 
perturbed, for all things are according to the nature of the universal‘.82 Yet Hardy finds 
it difficult to achieve this goal in practice.
83
 His sympathy remains with those 
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individuals who are unable to conform to reason (the reason of the universe) and thus 
suffer.  
 In Hardy‘s novels, the lives of the characters are determined not so much by 
Providence, however, as by society and man-made discourses and human affliction is 
largely attributed to the latter. Hardy perceives most human suffering to be the result of 
‗man‘s inhumanity to man‘ and to ‗woman‘, as we saw above. He distinguishes between 
‗irremediable‘ and ‗remediable‘ aspects of existence;84 the former does not accept 
modification but the latter can be rectified. With regard to what is out of man‘s control, 
resignation is virtue but in relation to that aspect of existence which is related to society, 
and thus under man‘s control, he believes, concurring with Comte and Mill, that 
improvement is desired. The Stoic practices of renunciation and government of desires 
and the substitution of egotism with fellow-feeling are perceived by Hardy to be among 
the ways to improve oneself and subsequently society. 
Hardy‘s philosophy clearly determines the ways he presents the construction of 
gender in his novels. Having a conception of power as a force which governs 
individuals by permeating them, he portrays male characters who are ruled by social 
forces, forces which pervade them, formulating their thoughts, mentalities and their 
gender practices. But despite his deterministic view of gender formation, Hardy, in 
accordance with his general philosophy, does not depict his characters as passively 
dominated by social structures; rather, the novels demonstrate that these structures are 
shaped through social practice. It is individuals who bring these structures into existence 
and are therefore capable of modifying them. This makes the amelioration of gender 
relations conceivable. The analysis of Hardy‘s novels which follows demonstrates in 
more detail how this might come about.  
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Chapter 3 
Far From the Madding Crowd: 
The Limits of the Construction of Masculinity   
 
Compared with Hardy‘s earlier works, Far from the Madding Crowd, first published in 
serialised form in 1874, attracted warmer critical attention. The work was a success as 
Leslie Stephen, who edited the manuscript, confirmed in a letter to Hardy.
1
 According 
to Michael Millgate, Far from the Madding Crowd not only brought ‗professional 
recognition‘ for Hardy but ‗impelled him forward into the front ranks of contemporary 
novelists‘.2 It is ‗the most organically sound and ambitious work of Hardy‘s early 
career‘, as Robert W. Clarke observes.3 Even though incorporating a degree of 
optimism which is absent in Hardy‘s later works, the novel engages with some of the 
same issues to be examined in the fiction following it. Behind the serene surface of the 
novel lurks a gloom, mainly rooted in the entanglement of individuals in the forces 
which determine them, which presides over his more overtly tragic novels, a fear that 
complex problems of gender and sexuality are not ultimately resolvable.  
Far from the Madding Crowd reveals that from the early stages of his writing 
career, Hardy was preoccupied with the effect of society on the formation of 
subjectivity, particularly with the question of the social construction of gender. The 
discussion of the role of society in the shaping of human character was topical at the 
time, especially discussed by John Stuart Mill (as examined in Chapter 2).
4
 For Hardy, 
it is social structures and discourses which mainly determine the ways in which his male 
characters should formulate themselves. These characters‘ practices of masculinity can 
be seen to be constrained by gender structures, such as the sexual division of labour, 
power and emotional attachment, which R. W. Connell regards as the delineators of 
gender practice.
5
 Hardy‘s male characters need to define themselves through ‗games of 
truth‘, discourses which are provided by their society, in order to acquire a ‗rank‘ 
(subject position) of a ‗man‘.6 To be termed ‗men‘, these characters should have 
‗presence‘; John Berger explains that a man‘s ‗presence‘ is associated with the ‗promise 
of power‘ which he embodies. If the ‗promise of power‘ is large, a man has striking 
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‗presence‘, otherwise he is found to have little ‗presence‘. The ‗promised power‘ can be 
social, moral, physical or sexual ‗but its object is always exterior to the man‘; to have 
‗presence‘ a man should be capable of exercising power over others.7 Andrew Tolson 
defines ‗presence‘ as ‗a certain style of behaviour, an outward presentation‘ which is 
conventionally constructed through authoritativeness, assertiveness, aggression or 
physical strength.
8
  
In his portrayal of Boldwood, Hardy investigates the ways in which social forces 
become the determinant of one‘s subjectivity. Boldwood formulates himself through the 
gender and class structures and discourses of his time, which have delineated the ways 
he should constitute himself. When introduced to the reader, Boldwood has already 
defined himself through the sexual division of labour (one of the structures which, as 
Connell explains, conditions the practice of gender),
9
 constructing his masculinity in 
terms of commerce and work. As Tolson explains, work is a major determinant of 
masculine identity.
10
 By defining his masculinity in terms of profession and the 
achievement of financial and social status, by becoming a ‗gentleman farmer‘,11 
Boldwood can be seen also to be operating within class structures. For the Victorian 
bourgeoisie, success and manhood were conflated; ‗business prowess‘ was what 
middle-class men were expected to incorporate, as Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall 
note.
12
 Boldwood has worked on himself, complying with the middle-class norms of 
masculinity, to achieve success and thus a ‗rank‘ as a middle-class man.  
Enjoying a strong sense of manhood in the public arena, Boldwood has not 
envisaged constructing his ‗presence‘ in the private domain, through marriage, which 
was ‗the economic and social building block for the middle class‘ even though ‗[t]he 
goal of all the bustle of the market place was to provide a proper moral and religious life 
for the family‘.13 The structure of emotional attachment (another delineator of gender 
practice, according to Connell),
14
 which demands that a man finds a mate, in other 
words, has not yet conditioned his practice of masculinity: ‗I had never any views of 
myself as a husband in my earlier days, nor have I made any calculation on the subject 
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since I have been older‘, he mentions to Bathsheba later in the story (p. 111). His 
pursuit of material and social status and his renunciation of sexuality and marriage 
demonstrate a formulation of masculinity according to the ‗[b]ourgeois industrial‘ 
discourses which equated ‗manliness‘ with success in the public domain and which 
demanded the containment of sexuality as a way of achieving success. Inspired by 
monasticism, such discourses conceived of ‗maleness‘ as ‗a potent dangerous energy‘ 
which needed to be controlled and disciplined if success was to be achieved.
15
  
Boldwood could have also been governed by another bourgeois discourse which 
allowed the assertion of sexuality but restricted it to marriage. According to Mark 
Girouard, ‗muscular Christianity‘ and nineteenth-century chivalry defined purity not in 
terms of renouncing sex completely, in the manner of monks, but in terms of 
‗[confining] it to marriage‘; prior to marriage sexuality needed to be contained.16 
Annette Federico has discussed Boldwood‘s sexual restraint in relation to this model of 
masculinity.
17
 Boldwood‘s celibacy appears initially to be in line more with the former 
discourse, ‗industrial manhood‘; later, however, once deciding to marry, he redefines 
himself and pursues the latter discourse, Christian manliness.  
The suppression of emotions and desires can be read as the discipline Boldwood 
has undergone in order to win a ‗rank‘ as a thriving man. He is a reserved, dignified 
man who has frustrated ‗all girls gentle and simple‘ in the neighborhood who futilely 
‗courted and ‗tried‘ him (p. 67). For him, ‗women had been remote phenomena rather 
than necessary complements‘ whom he ‗had not deemed it his duty‘ to think of 
seriously. Bathsheba‘s Valentine reminds him, however, of alternative ways of 
constructing his masculine ‗presence‘, through an intimate relationship. He is now 
experiencing himself in a new way and as a sexual being: ‗Adam awakened from his 
deep sleep, and behold, there was Eve‘ (p. 102). His bizarre behaviour upon receiving 
the Valentine and his fantasies about the woman who might have sent it reflects the 
awakening of powerful dormant emotions and exposes the insufficiency of the 
discourses of manliness/success through which he has previously formulated himself. 
He gradually begins to be oppressed by a desire for possession over which he has little 
control: ‗the spherical completeness of his existence‘ is ‗slowly spreading into an 
abnormal distortion in the particular direction of an ideal passion‘ (p. 87).  
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Boldwood‘s infatuation with Bathsheba, of course, suggests a state of ‗mental 
derangement‘. At the beginning of the story, the text alludes to his peculiar nature: ‗his 
was not an ordinary nature‘; underneath the ‗stillness which struck casual observers 
more than anything else in his character and habit‘ ‗was the perfect balance of enormous 
antagonistic forces – positives and negatives [...]. The equilibrium disturbed, he was in 
extremity at once‘ (p. 105). After the murder of Troy, the narrator clearly considers the 
possibility of ‗insanity‘ in Boldwood, endorsed by evidences such as his purchasing of 
articles for Bathsheba, all ‗labelled ―Bathsheba Boldwood‖‘ and all dated ‗six years in 
advance‘ (p. 338). In the serialised version of the novel, there is a reference to madness 
as an inherited disease: in reply to Troy‘s inquiry, ‗if insanity has ever appeared in Mr 
Boldwood‘s family‘, Coggan replies that he has heard ‗that an uncle of his was queer in 
his head‘.18 Steve McCarty explains that even though ‗the legal question of madness as 
an inherited disease became prevalent in the early 1870s, the idea in English literature 
had been implanted well before then (e.g. twenty years earlier in Jane Eyre, through 
Bertha Rochester‘s twisted family tree)‘.19 By bringing in the discussion of an inherited 
mental illness, Hardy can be seen to examine the determining role of Darwinian 
heredity, side-by-side with the social forces, in the constitution of individuals; both 
these forces, it is suggested, combine to determine Boldwood‘s fate.   
Oppressed by sexuality, Boldwood renounces the discourse of celibacy to 
redefine himself according to the discourse of Christian manliness, which allows him to 
practise sexuality within the framework of marriage. He acknowledges the insufficiency 
of the norms of masculinity which he has so far pursued and expresses his zeal to define 
himself in a new way: ‗my present way of living is bad in every aspect. Beyond all 
things, I want you as my wife‘ (p. 111). His practice of masculinity from this point 
onwards can be seen to be conditioned by the structure of emotional attachment which 
demands that a man pursues the object of desire, attract and win her. The structure of 
matrimony calls into play other structures as well, such as the sexual division of labour 
and power (another structure which circumscribes gender practice, as Connell 
observes),
20
 which specify the ways in which Boldwood should construct his 
masculinity. As a husband, he is expected to have a career in the public domain through 
which to provide for his wife and should be the one who accepts the superior role of a 
protector. Once deciding to become a husband, therefore, he simultaneously thinks of 
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accepting roles as breadwinner and supporter, to ‗take care‘ of her, ‗protect and cherish‘ 
her (p. 112). For the Victorian middle classes, masculinity incorporated the ability ‗to 
manipulate and control property in order to support dependents‘.21  
The construction of masculinity within these terms allows Boldwood to define 
himself as the dominant figure, the one who has authority over the object of desire, 
socially and sexually. In the discourse of chivalry, which now permeates Boldwood, 
‗the husband was expected to be reverent and protective, but he was also undoubtedly 
superior‘.22 The experience, though initially welcome by virtue of its novelty, leads to 
the weakening of Boldwood‘s ‗presence‘ in the public domain: he does not protect his 
hay from the storm, which Oak likens to ‗a sailor forgetting he was in a ship‘ (p. 224). 
He even intends to forsake the social realm altogether, ‗to retire from the management‘ 
of the farm once he marries Bathsheba (p. 320). His subject position as a ‗gentleman 
farmer‘, a ‗successful man‘, becomes irrelevant in the face of the imperative to define 
himself as a husband.  
The construction of masculinity through a matrimonial relationship, however, is 
not something that Boldwood can accomplish by himself for he requires Bathsheba to 
define herself within the same structure, which, of course, she is reluctant to do. 
Governed by patriarchal and capitalist discourses and conceiving Bathsheba as an object 
which he can possess or purchase, he disregards this fact. That his love is not 
reciprocated does not matter to him; what is important is that she is ‗a very beautiful 
woman‘ (p. 328) [my emphasis]. The consolidation of his position as a ‗man‘ now 
depends on his ability to possess the woman he desires.  
Boldwood‘s gender practice in relation to Bathsheba is conditioned by the 
structure of power which requires him as a ‗man‘ to take the dominant role in relation to 
the opposite sex, hence his endeavour to govern her actions, to dictate the rules and win 
her. However, their relationship, an example of a Foucauldian relation of power,
23
 is far 
from being stable, that is, Boldwood is unable to maintain the position of power 
permanently. Linda M. Shires is correct in arguing that Hardy ‗does not believe in a 
dialectical theory of power where one sex oppresses the other, but rather in power as 
shifting, as attained and lost by multiple negotiations that cross gender, age, and class‘; 
she states that in Hardy‘s novels ‗the male‘ is not always associated with ‗power‘ and 
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‗the female‘ with ‗victimization‘.24  Even though at the beginning of the story, when 
still not constrained by desire, Boldwood is able to constitute himself as a self-
sufficient, dignified man and unknowingly overpower Bathsheba by his ‗presence‘, the 
relationship undergoes drastic changes once he becomes governed by sexuality. By 
sending the Valentine, Bathsheba is able to turn the ‗dignified‘ man, who passed her on 
the road ‗unconsciously and abstractedly as if she and her charms had been thin air‘ (pp. 
81-2), into a desperate lover.  
Despite his infatuation with Bathsheba, Boldwood attempts to appear as a self-
sufficient man. When coming to speak to her at the barn, at the time of ‗sheepwashing‘, 
he ‗[bade] her good morning with such constraint that she could not but think he had 
stepped across to the washing for its own sake‘. But as soon as he addresses her, he 
betrays the change in himself: ‗His tone was so utterly removed from all she had 
expected‘; ‗[i]t was lowness and quiet accented‘ (p. 110). When proposing to her, he is 
not a man speaking from the position of power but a helpless suitor: ‗My life is not my 
own since I have beheld you clearly. Miss Everdene – I come to make you an offer of 
marriage‘ (p. 111).  He is unable to impress Bathsheba, however. Despite the fact that 
Boldwood‘s ‗standing‘ is ‗sufficient‘, and ‗his qualities‘ are ‗even supererogatory‘ in 
her eyes, and though she ‗esteemed and liked him‘, ‗she did not want him‘ (pp. 113-4). 
Boldwood‘s large ‗presence‘ in terms of financial status and social prestige carries little 
weight with someone who is already the ‗absolute mistress of a farm and house‘ (p. 
114). One problem for her is that his marriage offer suggests that they should constitute 
themselves through the conventional structure of the sexual division of labour, which 
defines social and domestic domains as masculine and feminine spheres respectively; 
she needs not be concerned about outdoor duties but become ‗a household goddess‘, as 
Susan Beegel argues.
25
 Such a marriage offer is not attractive to Bathsheba for it 
‗involves total reduction to the domestic sphere‘.26 What Boldwood, as a ‗man‘, 
requires here to win Bathsheba is the technique of seduction, which he lacks, and his 
rival, Troy, practises faultlessly; as the narrator suggests, ‗[i]t was a fatal omission of 
Boldwood‘s that he had never once told her she was beautiful‘ (p. 145). Federico 
suggests that Boldwood‘s adherence to ‗the gentlemanly arts of winning a woman 
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properly‘ makes him ‗handicapped placed against the win-her-at-any-cost mentality of 
the less patient seducer‘.27 Unable to develop characteristics to attract the opposite sex, 
he is not selected by Sexual Selection, that is, by Bathsheba.  
Pervaded by the discourses of masculinity which require a ‗man‘ to define 
himself in terms of winning the object of desire, however, Boldwood is unable to 
renounce Bathsheba. He is eventually able to govern her conduct, gaining her assent, at 
least, to consider his proposal, by reinforcing his entreaties and working on her 
conscience. Overawed by Boldwood, she is unable to utter an emphatic ‗No‘. Her 
practice of femininity is, to this extent, responsible for his practice of masculinity, 
reflective of David H. J. Morgan‘s argument that masculinity and femininity are 
constructed in relation to each other and through everyday social interaction.
28
 By 
appearing hesitant, conscientious and yielding, she allows Boldwood to practise 
assertiveness. Upon receiving Bathsheba‘s letter of refusal, however, Boldwood 
becomes a very different man. The ‗favourable‘ emotional attachment, which, up to this 
point, has conditioned his practice of masculinity, becomes a ‗hostile‘ one; Connell 
explains that emotional attachments to people can be ‗favourable‘, ‗hostile‘ or 
‗ambivalent‘ (that is, both favourable and hostile).29 Assuming that unless he possesses 
the woman he loves, he cannot term himself a ‗man‘, he resorts to forcefulness and 
threatening, emphasising that his feeling for her is ‗[a] thing strong as death. No 
dismissal by a hasty letter affects that‘ (p. 176). Such an insistence on his ownership of 
Bathsheba is also rooted in his idealisation of her, as Beegel and Federico observe,
30
 
which is itself the corollary of suppressed sexuality: for him Bathsheba is not someone 
who ‗lived and breathed within his own horizon‘, ‗a troubled creature like himself‘, but 
a creature from another sphere (p. 109).  
In his inability to satisfy the demands of the prevailing discourses of 
masculinity, to constitute himself as the possessor of the one he desires, Boldwood feels 
he cannot term himself a ‗man‘. The power of normalising judgement operates on him, 
rendering him ‗visible‘ to the power of the gaze: ‗now the people sneer at me — the 
very hills and sky seem to laugh at me till I blush shamefully for my folly‘. The fact that 
he can conceive himself a ‗man‘ only if society recognises him as such is evident by his 
being prepared to have been ‗jilted secretly, and the dishonour not known, and my 
                                                 
27
 Federico, p. 65 
28
 See Chapter 1, p. 12. 
29
 See Chapter 1, p. 11. 
30
 Beegel, p. 111; Federico, p. 58. 
 45 
position kept!‘ (p. 179). What bothers him now is that he has lost not only his 
masculinity as a lover but also his social status as an independent man.  
Boldwood‘s final strategy for redefining himself a ‗man‘ is to govern his rival‘s 
conduct. Here, Hardy portrays a power struggle between the two male characters, where 
Troy displays his power both as the man who has already won Bathsheba and as a man 
not entangled in the discourse of honour. He undertakes to emasculate Boldwood 
completely: playing with him, teasing him, deceiving him and humiliating him. At the 
beginning of this encounter, Boldwood, who has the advantage of being physically the 
stronger man, manages to intimidate Troy by his forceful practice of masculinity, 
making him think it is better ‗to be civil‘ to the farmer (p. 199). Once able to govern 
Troy‘s conduct to the extent of obliging him to listen to him, Boldwood constitutes 
himself as a businessman, attempting to eliminate his rival by bribing him to marry 
Fanny. By situating himself in the position of need, however, Boldwood unknowingly 
provides the young man with the opportunity to swindle him. By asking Boldwood to 
listen to his conversation with Bathsheba, Troy emasculates the older man further: 
‗there was a nervous twitching of Boldwood's tightly closed lips, and his face became 
bathed in a clammy dew‘ (p. 202). When Troy labels Bathsheba a ‗deluded woman‘, 
Boldwood readily abandons his once desired subject status as Bathsheba‘s husband, 
allowing the young man to take the position (p. 203); he is now ready ‗to sell 
Bathsheba‘s fertility to Troy, who has already assumed physical and contractual 
ownership‘.31 In the bourgeois discourses within which Boldwood has constituted 
himself, ‗the husband of a deluded woman‘ is not a socially acceptable subject position. 
His immediate renunciation of the long-sought-for status and even ironically his 
insistence on his rival‘s taking it demonstrate the extent to which his subjectivity is 
shaped by such discourses. His sexual desires are suppressed so that his ‗rank‘ as a 
‗gentleman‘ may be maintained. 
By declaring himself Bathsheba‘s husband and by his ‗contemptuous‘ throwing 
of Boldwood‘s money on the road, Troy completes the process of the emasculation of 
his rival. The picture of Troy inside Bathsheba‘s house, lit up by a candle and 
Boldwood outside the house, in the dark road metaphorically represents Troy‘s victory 
over Boldwood; it is Troy who has succeeded in establishing his ‗presence‘ in the 
private sphere, with Boldwood barred from entering by a chain (pp. 205-6). Boldwood 
refuses to accept his status as an emasculated man, however, by pretending still to be 
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powerful. He describes himself to Oak as a man whose ‗constitution is an iron one‘ (pp. 
223-4).  
With the disappearance of Troy and the news of his death, Boldwood 
recommences another series of efforts to redefine himself as Bathsheba‘s would-be 
possessor. Her subject position is changed from that of the socially-invalid ‗deluded 
woman‘ to the legitimate status of a ‗married woman‘ and then a ‗widow‘, which means 
that he can once more dream of defining himself as her husband. At the Christmas 
party, Boldwood succeeds in eliciting a positive reply from her, mainly because of 
Bathsheba‘s decision to become more considerate to the one who has once wronged. 
Once she accepts the ring, ‗the seal of a practical compact‘ (p. 329), Boldwood becomes 
a man of large ‗presence‘, imagining himself the winner of the object of desire.  
Boldwood‘s project of constructing his masculinity through marriage finally 
fails with the reappearance of Troy. With his ‗mechanical laugh‘, Troy mocks the 
farmer‘s status as a husband. He nevertheless pays a high price for depriving Boldwood 
of such a position. Robbed of the desired status as a possessor of Bathsheba, Boldwood 
undertakes to dispossess his rival of that status as well. Feeling emasculated, this time 
under the direct gaze of patriarchal society — people observing his humiliation — 
Boldwood undertakes to re-establish himself as a ‗man‘ by subduing another man, 
physically eliminating him. He resists constituting himself as a defeated man at the end 
by assuming the air of a dignified hero: he ‗crossed the room to Bathsheba‘, ‗kissed her 
hand‘, ‗put on his hat, opened the door, and went into the darkness‘, ‗passed into the 
high road‘, headed towards ‗the gaol‘, pulled the bell, and ‗entered‘ (pp. 332-3).  
Though witnessing the futility of his endeavour to construct his ‗presence‘ in 
terms of the possession of the loved one, Boldwood is unable to constitute himself 
within alternative discourses. Incapable of adapting to the conditions of his life, 
insisting on pursuing ‗perfectly consistent conduct in a world made up so largely of 
compromise‘ (p. 34), Boldwood is eliminated both by Natural Selection and by society. 
With his portrayal of Boldwood, Hardy demonstrates the difficulty of resisting the 
discourses that permeate the subject. Boldwood‘s tragedy is depicted as the result of 
discourses which define masculinity either in terms of the containment of sexual desires 
or in terms of possession of the object of desire. He pursues these norms of masculinity 
until the end, unable to stand outside the structures of class and gender and their 
pertinent discourses. In this respect, he anticipates Hardy‘s growing preoccupation with 
the ways in which such discourses constrain individuals, causing their suffering.  
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Hardy portrays Troy in sharp contrast with Boldwood; in the young man‘s case, 
reserve gives way to flamboyance, codes of honour to deceitfulness and sexual restraint 
to debauchery. Troy‘s masculinity, of course, like Boldwood‘s, is constrained by the 
prevailing gender and class structures which specify the way he should formulate 
himself. In choosing a career which is exclusively masculine, he too constructs his 
masculinity within the structure of the sexual division of labour. In situating himself in 
the position of supremacy over the opposite sex, furthermore, he can be seen to define 
himself through the structure of power. His sensuousness, his defining his ‗presence‘ in 
terms of sexual assertiveness, also suggests a practice of masculinity delimited by the 
structure of emotional attachment.  
 ‗A doctor‘s son‘ in name, but of noble blood in reality (pp. 144-5), being ‗an 
earl‘s son by nature‘ (as the serialised version of the novel reveals),32 Troy is apparently 
exposed to both middle-class and aristocratic discourses (Merryn Williams refers to his 
‗professional and aristocratic connections‘).33 Troy‘s masculinity, however, is not 
conditioned by bourgeois class structures; he is neither a professional, a breadwinner 
nor a husband; instead he has copied the models of masculinity provided by the 
aristocracy. While in middle-class discourses, manliness is defined in terms of ‗hard 
work‘, the formation of family life and morality, in aristocratic discourses, which 
determine Troy‘s gender practice, manhood is associated with ‗hedonism, 
sensuousness‘ and ‗idleness‘.34 By exchanging the stable life of a professional with the 
unstable, but more enjoyable, life of a soldier, he has distanced himself from middle-
class models of masculinity. As Boldwood comments, Troy, though a ‗clever fellow and 
up to everything‘ — as a ‗copying clerk‘ who ‗might have worked himself into a decent 
livelihood of some sort‘ — has spoiled his opportunities by ‗[indulging] in the wild 
freak life of enlisting‘. By constituting himself as a philanderer, Troy moves even 
further from middle-class paradigms; for Boldwood, Troy is not an honourable man and 
thus ‗not one to build much hope upon‘ in a case such as Fanny‘s (p. 100).35 For Troy, 
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by contrast, it is the practices of hedonism, sensuality and amorality that make one a 
‗man‘. 
Soldiering is of significance to Troy not only because it allows him to formulate 
himself according to upper-class ideals of ‗hedonism‘, ‗idleness‘ and ‗sensuousness‘ but 
also because it is associated with another aristocratic discourse which associates 
manliness with ‗military honour‘.36 Williams observes that ‗Troy‘s links are [...] with 
the army and the aristocracy‘.37 Joe Fisher also describes Troy as the ‗aristocratically-
descended Trojan invader‘ whose identity ‗is military‘.38 The discourses through which 
Troy identifies himself, however, are in tension with each other: one defines masculinity 
in terms of ‗hedonism‘ and the other in terms of ‗heroism‘. Unable to pursue both 
discourses simultaneously, Troy constitutes himself through the first, as a hedonist, 
while playing the role of a warrior. His subject status as a ‗warrior‘ is an imaginary one; 
he does not fight in any war and lacks the heroism of mythical warriors; as Fisher 
observes, ‗Troy‘s name is purely ironic: Virgil and Homer both describe their Trojans as 
truthful, brave, patriotic and confiding‘.39 Troy, who displays none of these qualities, 
only simulates the large ‗presence‘ and the dazzling appearance of a warrior: the 
costume, the armour and the art of sword play.  
Constituting himself more as a hedonist than a military man, Troy forsakes the 
army for a life of comfort he can enjoy as Bathsheba‘s husband. He has no intention of 
exchanging his subject status as a solider for that of a middle-class husband and farmer, 
however; rather, he aims to remain a soldier (both a hedonist and a hero in name), while 
adopting the new roles as well: ‗[having purchased] his ‗discharge‘ from the army ‗to 
attend to the new duties awaiting‘ him at Bathsheba‘s house and farm, he intends to 
‗continue a soldier in spirit and feeling‘ (p. 210). His subject positions as a breadwinner 
or professional, nevertheless, are false ones: he remains a ‗soldier under the yeoman‘s 
garb‘ (p. 227). The scene where Troy talks of betting and ‗horseracing‘ amid 
conversation about farming and weather, when he is walking beside Bathsheba‘s ‗gig‘, 
as her ‗husband‘ and ‗in a farmer‘s marketing suit‘, best reveals the incongruity between 
the man he is and the man he pretends to be (p. 226). Permeated by hedonist discourses, 
he is incapable of practising a different version of masculinity with any conviction.  
Though we witness the vulnerability of Troy‘s ‗presence‘ at certain points in the 
story (as will be discussed below), he generally possesses a strong sense of manhood, 
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evident from his ‗sanguine‘ mood (p. 277) and his self-confidence. Hardy defines him 
as ‗the most fortunate of his order‘ for his living in the ‗present‘, only ‗caring for what 
was before his eyes‘, giving no thought to the ‗past‘ and the ‗future‘: he is a ‗man to 
whom memories were an encumbrance and anticipation a superfluity‘ (pp. 145-6). Even 
though Hardy does not seem to have encountered Schopenhauer until the late 1870s,
40
 
and certainly not at the time of writing Far from the Madding Crowd, the resemblance 
of the portrayal of Troy to Schopenhauer‘s depiction of a fool reveals the affinity of the 
world-views of the two men. For Schopenhauer, only brutes and dull minds enjoy such 
cheerfulness: ‗thinking about absent and future things‘ is ‗the origin of care, fear and 
hope which once aroused, make a far stronger impression on men than do actual present 
pleasures or sufferings‘. The animal suffers less: ‗[lacking] the faculty of reflection, joys 
and sorrows cannot accumulate in the animal as they do in man through memory and 
anticipation.‘41 The brute‘s ‗consciousness is restricted to what is clearly evident and 
thus to the present moment‘, hence ‗its peaceful, untroubled enjoyment of the present‘.42 
This unthinking model of masculinity is also invoked by Hardy in his Literary 
Notebook, where he copied a passage from Schopenhauer, claiming: ‗I have made one 
now unalterable mistake in my life – I have not been a fool. I wish to God I could be!‘.43   
Living in the ‗present‘ time, it can be argued, Troy constructs his ‗presence‘ 
upon the power he can exercise on whatever object he has ‗before his eyes‘ (p. 147). 
Once he hears no news of Fanny and instead encounters Bathsheba, he attempts to 
assert his manhood by winning the woman he now has before him. He constructs his 
‗presence‘ in terms of the possession of any, and not an exclusive, object of desire. 
Troy, therefore, as the narrator observes, is ‗vulnerable only in the present‘ (p. 145); 
whether or not he can win the one he desires ostensibly provides him with or deprives 
him of a sense of manhood. Even if he is unsuccessful, the pain is only transitory.  
It can be argued that if Troy‘s masculine subjectivity appears to be more secure, 
as suggested by his placid mood, it is also because he is quite at home with the 
discourses of masculinity which have permeated him. While Boldwood has to renounce 
or discipline his sexuality, suppress emotions and adhere to the codes of honour, 
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morality and hard work in order to be awarded the rank of a ‗man‘, Troy does neither of 
these and is still regarded as a ‗man‘. The discourse of masculinity which he follows 
demands that he gives free play to his sexual desires and passions, asking for no self-
control and not requiring him to constitute himself in terms of honour and morality or 
hard work. He can be sensual, amoral and idle and still be a ‗man‘. Since he does not 
equate manliness with honour and scruples, Troy is immune from the threats to 
masculine subjectivity which honourable men experience in the case of dishonour. As 
the narrator suggests, Troy‘s ‗moral‘ ‗poverty‘ makes him appear as a strong man, not 
because he is really so, but because ‗what Troy had never enjoyed he did not miss‘ (p. 
146), that is, morality. In fact, it is in his liberation from the codes of morality that Troy 
defines himself as a ‗man‘. For him, Fanny becomes the means of the assertion of his 
manliness, priding himself on his capability to play with her and renounce her. His 
contentment with the hedonist discourses which he has internalised is evident from his 
satisfaction with the kind of man he is, from the fact that he conceives himself as the 
‗hero of his story‘ and has never ‗[envied] other people their condition‘, never desired to 
be another man (p. 277). 
It can be argued, however, that although free from the constraints of discourses 
of honour and morality, Troy is subject to other prevailing discourses of his time, those 
which associate masculinity with sexuality; his debauchery cannot be read as the sign of 
his freedom from social conventions but rather his being enmeshed in them. In his 
pursuit of Bathsheba also he is functioning within the conventional structure of 
emotional attachment which demands that a man employs techniques to attract and win 
the opposite sex. Devoid of Boldwood‘s financial and social ‗presence‘ and Oak‘s 
moral ‗presence‘, Troy fabricates himself a ‗presence‘ through a sparkling appearance 
and flattery, which surpasses Boldwood‘s and Oak‘s. While, in their proposals, his 
rivals talk of what they can do for Bathsheba, Troy describes what Bathsheba can do to 
him, the way she enchants him. In Troy‘s language, Bathsheba is the subject of the 
sentences: she has a ‗beautiful face‘, she is a ‗charming woman, she is a ‗beauty‘ (pp. 
143-4). Troy overpowers Bathsheba by empowering her, praising her. His ‗knight-
service‘ for her, his coming for ‗haymaking‘ in her farm (p. 148) and his show of 
sword-play are among the other techniques he employs to govern her conduct, to allure 
her: ‗he was altogether too much for her‘ (pp. 162-3). Here, Hardy criticises Bathsheba 
for her false perception: she sees Troy‘s ‗embellishments [which] were upon the very 
surface‘ and is unable to discern his ‗deformities [which] lay deep down from a 
woman‘s vision‘, in the same way that she does not see Oak‘s ‗virtues [which] were as 
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metals in a mine‘ but his ‗defects [which] were patent to the blindest‘ (p. 165). In J. B. 
Bullen‘s words, Bathsheba ‗suffers from what Ruskin calls ―false taste‖‘, where ‗self-
preoccupation and subjectivity, clouds the judgement‘.44 Through a fabricated 
‗presence‘, Troy thus manages to transform Bathsheba from a proud, independent 
woman to a desperate lover and ultimately a wife.  
 Even though he initially resists constituting himself through matrimony, drawing 
a strong sense of manhood from his capability to overpower any object of desire, Troy 
ultimately defines himself through that structure. His marriage to Bathsheba, of course, 
echoes neither his love, nor his desire to accept a role as a breadwinner; rather, it is an 
attempt to assert himself as a capable man who can simultaneously win a wife and a 
chance of leading a life of leisure. For him, Bathsheba is a ‗handsome‘ woman (p. 303) 
‗with plenty of money, and a house and farm and horses, and comfort‘ (p. 321). His 
construction of masculinity through marriage thus strengthens his sense of manhood. 
Conceiving himself as both a soldier and the possessor of Bathsheba and her wealth, he 
perceives himself as a man of impressive ‗presence‘.  
The way Hardy portrays him on the first morning of his married life best reveals 
this: he emerges at the window of Bathsheba‘s house in his soldier‘s uniform, in his 
typically sanguine mood, addressing Oak and Coggan as the master of Bathsheba‘s 
house and farm. Troy‘s sense of large ‗presence‘ is further manifested on the night 
which he, as Bathsheba‘s husband and the master, has chosen for the ‗harvest supper 
and dance‘, when he assumes the position of power in relation to his wife and the work 
folk, ordering her to leave the room and deciding that the ricks need not be protected 
against the storm. His practice of masculinity is revealed to be determined by the 
structure of power which demands that a ‗husband‘ constitutes himself as the decision-
maker and the dominant figure in relation to his wife and household. Authority, as 
Tolson argues, is one way of constructing ‗presence‘.45 The institution of the family has 
already specified the roles and duties that a husband and a wife should assume; 
Bathsheba has to give up her role as the head of the farm, allowing her husband to take 
it instead. Troy‘s show of power in this scene can also be read as an attempt on his part 
to establish his authority in the eyes of the workers, as a compensation for the kind of 
‗presence‘ he lacks as a breadwinner and a professional man. As Beegel observes, 
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Troy‘s financial dependence on Bathsheba ‗seems to typify the sexual power struggle of 
their marriage‘; he ‗fears and resents Bathsheba‘s proud independence of character‘.46  
Since he is not equipped with the power which a husband or a professional 
usually embodies in terms of financial autonomy, and therefore lacks a strong sense of 
‗presence‘ in these roles, Troy abandons them altogether to constitute himself once 
more as a bachelor and a soldier. The kinds of jobs he takes after forsaking the 
matrimonial relationship as a ‗Professor of Gymnastics, Sword Exercise, Fencing, and 
Pugilism‘ are all in accord with his desired subject position as a soldier. Yet none of 
these sources of income can grant him the financial power he requires to constitute 
himself as an idle man; he therefore returns to the idea of marriage, not necessarily with 
Bathsheba.  
Possessing a strong sense of manhood and professing not to care if Bathsheba or 
other Weatherbury people recognise him in his low position as a circus clown, he 
‗recklessly‘ comes to play in a place near Weatherbury Farm. His ‗confusion‘ upon 
seeing Bathsheba among the audience, however, and the ‗sense of shame‘ he 
experiences ‗at the possibility that his attractive young wife‘ should see him ‗in so mean 
a condition‘ (p. 300) reveal the vulnerability of his masculine subjectivity. As the one 
who is concerned with what is ‗before his eyes‘, he is ‗vulnerable only in the present‘ 
(p. 145): overpowered by Bathsheba‘s beauty, he feels the shrinking of his ‗presence‘. 
Bathsheba reminds him of the kind of man he was and the kind of man he is now. 
Although in this scene it is Bathsheba who is physically visible, it is Troy who is 
subjected to the power of the gaze. The normalising power operates on him, making him 
judge himself according to norms of aristocratic discourses through which he has 
constituted himself. As Joanna Devereux argues, ‗Troy is anxious not to be remembered 
as ridiculous, as a ludicrous, comic figure, instead of a dashing hero‘.47 His concern 
about the possibility of his being ‗nicknamed ―Turpin‖ as long as he lived‘ (p. 304) 
suggests the constructedness and fragility of his subjectivity; he can conceive of himself 
as ‗Sergeant Troy‘ only if society defines him in this way. In order to reconstitute 
himself as a husband, he needs to have his former ‗presence‘ in the eyes of his wife so 
‗these few months of his existence must be entirely blotted out‘ (p. 304).  
Troy never questions the validity of the discourses which he has internalised yet 
Hardy at one point in the story suggests the possibility of a different identity constructed 
through fellow-feeling. Fanny‘s death enables him to experience love and sympathy, 
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making him momentarily distance himself from the aristocratic norms of masculinity 
(and Schopenhauer‘s folly). As soon as he relates himself to the past and future, he 
becomes acquainted with misery and frustration; he experiences ‗grief‘ at Fanny‘s death 
and ‗disappointment‘ on witnessing the thwarting of his attempt to compensate for his 
past actions by planting flowers on her grave. Suffering enables him to query the norms 
of masculinity which he has previously pursued; he becomes no longer the man who 
‗had laughed, and sung, and poured love-trifles into a woman‘s ear‘ but ‗a miserable 
man‘ who ‗wished himself another man‘, who ‗hated himself‘ (p. 277). He is unable, 
however, to sustain this new identity or to resist the discourses which have previously 
permeated him. For ‗a man who has spent his primal strength in journeying in one 
direction has not much spirit left for reversing his course‘; once his flowers are swept 
away by the rain he does not attempt to replace them but simply gives up on the whole 
enterprise (p. 278). His conspiracy with Pennyways for the repossession of Bathsheba 
and her properties, at end of the story, marks a return to the former subjectivity. 
With his portrayal of Gabriel Oak, however, I would argue, Hardy examines the 
possibility of alternative ways of being a ‗man‘. Oak‘s masculinity, like other 
characters‘, is conditioned by the structures of gender and class but he is not as 
constrained by these structures as other characters are; rather, he is able, to some extent, 
to resist constituting himself through these structures. It can be argued that Oak is able 
to improvise his own version of masculinity by defying the dominant Victorian 
discourses of sexuality, success and power.  
In taking masculine jobs as a shepherd and a farmer, Oak has formulated himself 
through the structure of the sexual division of labour. The kinds of occupations he 
pursues further suggest that he has defined himself through his social class structures, 
which have delineated the kind of masculinity he needs to practise. As the son of a 
shepherd, Oak is brought up in a working-class family and social context. Though 
introduced to us as ‗Farmer Oak‘, he used to be ‗a shepherd only tending the flocks of 
large proprietors from his childhood with his father‘. He has endeavoured to improve 
the conditions of his life, of course (as his ‗venture, unaided and alone, into the paths of 
farming as master and not as man‘ demonstrates), but he still lives as a working-class 
man, dwelling in a cottage and tending his sheep by his own hand (p. 10). He sees 
himself as working-class throughout the story, as his contentment with his way of life as 
a worker and his enthusiasm for work suggest. Even though he defines himself in terms 
of work, material achievement alone does not determine his masculine subjectivity. In 
taking interest in ‗work‘ per se, whether he does it for himself or someone else, whether 
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he is well-paid or not, he formulates himself through working-class discourses, which 
conceive of work as the means of living and not the ladder to success, as is the case with 
middle-class men, as Tolson notes.
48
 Oak‘s readiness to do any kind of job, though 
associated with his working-class subjectivity, also hints at certain Stoic inclinations. 
He is a self-governed, self-possessed man throughout the course of the story, a strong 
man not subdued by the loss of material possessions, his position as a farmer and his 
beloved. It can be argued that in portraying Oak as a man who is able to shun worldly 
attachments (whether fortune, position or beloved), govern his passions, live according 
to his reason, conform to destiny and therefore lead a self-sustained life, Hardy depicts 
Oak as a Stoic.
49
  
Oak‘s mentality, his behaviour towards others and his reaction to the events of 
his life, which distinguishes him from other characters, can be seen to indicate a 
tendency on his part to formulate himself through Stoic discourses. I am not suggesting, 
of course, that Oak consciously pursues such discourses; rather, it is Hardy who invests 
his shepherd with Stoic attributes, ostensibly to examine the possibility of alternative 
modes of being in the world and alternative ways of practising masculinity. He portrays 
Oak as a man who is capable of governing his desires and a man who acts rationally. 
Hardy explicitly endows him with ‗wisdom‘ in the scene where Oak encounters Fanny 
on the road: he ‗fancied that he had felt himself in the penumbra of a very deep sadness 
when touching that slight and fragile creature‘ but he thought ‗wisdom lies in 
moderating mere impressions, and Gabriel endeavoured to think little of this‘ (p. 46). As 
Bullen notes, ‗through the personality of Gabriel Oak, he [Hardy] infers that right 
judgement can be made, and that such judgments should be made‘.50 It appears that for 
Oak, to act rationally, to do what is right according to circumstances is the real good, 
the virtue at which he should aim, and all other things, including appearance, luxury, 
wealth, and beloved are inessentials.
51
 It is not the external phenomena but living in 
accordance with reason which provides him with a sense of self. A dashing appearance 
or a luxurious life is of little significance to him. He is a man who does not rest ‗his 
valuation [...] upon his appearance‘; even his way of walking suggests that he has ‗no 
great claim on the world‘s room‘ (p. 4). He readily accepts a drink from a dirty cup the 
rustics offer him and, at the end of the story, despite his better financial condition, he 
still ‗[lives] in no better style than before, occupying the same cottage, paring his own 
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potatoes, mending his stockings, and sometimes even making his bed with his own 
hands‘. That he is ‗provokingly indifferent to public opinion‘ (pp. 290-1) echoes his 
sense of self-sufficiency, acquired by his conviction that to live rationally is enough for 
happiness.  
By virtue of living in accordance with reason, Oak knows that whatever is 
external to him is not his and attachment to it, therefore, is a mistake. If he maintains his 
equanimity in the midst of misfortune, it is because he recognises his limitations as a 
human being and does not attempt to take into possession the things over which he has 
no control. For him, as a Stoic, wealth and romantic relationships are ‗preferred‘ but 
‗indifferent‘ things; that is, he would be pleased to have them but is able to do without 
them. Though sad under the burden of calamity, he is not subdued: he has ‗passed 
through an ordeal of wretchedness‘ but has gained more than he has lost in this process: 
‗a dignified calm he had never before known‘ (pp. 34-5). Despite his ‗inward 
melancholy‘, he makes himself a bed of hay in a wagon, lying on it, ‗feeling physically 
as comfortable as ever he had [been] in his life‘, ‗[summoning] the god [of sleep] 
instead of having to wait for him‘ (p. 37). His acquiescence in fate resembles that of a 
Stoic who ‗[viewing] the world as a system that is both deterministic and providential‘, 
‗[finds] it irrational and pointless to wish that things might be otherwise than what‘ he 
‗actually [experiences]‘.52 Geoffrey Thurley describes Oak as ‗passive‘: ‗he must 
endure until the end of the book‘.53 But it can be argued that for Oak, as a Stoic, 
compliance with fate is itself a rational action. He is acting rationally in not attempting 
to control what is out of his control. To know one‘s place in the order of the universe is 
the ‗simple lesson‘ which other characters have ‗not yet learnt‘ but he has mastered: he 
‗meditatively looked upon the horizon of circumstances without any special regard to 
his own standpoint in the midst‘ (p. 257). His happiness, and in fact his survival, lies in 
his ability to harmonise himself with the law of nature, that is, destiny.
54
 For Hardy, 
apparently, resignation to what is out of human control is a virtue for it can liberate one 
from anxiety and sorrow.  
Hardy‘s interest in depicting Oak as a Stoic is also evident from the portrayal of 
the serenity of his shepherd‘s cottage and his equanimity. We see Oak sitting in his 
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cottage with the peace of a man who, by virtue of his dissociation from worldly 
possessions, is free from worries and anxieties: ‗The shutters [of his cottage] were not 
closed, nor was any blind or curtain drawn over the window‘ for ‗neither robbery nor 
observation […] could do much injury to the occupant of the domicile‘ (pp. 257-8). He 
is seen as a man who possess the calmness which other characters, including Bathsheba, 
‗sadly [lack]‘, as ‗the atmosphere of content‘ within his ‗little dwelling‘ echoes and as 
his act of ‗[kneeling] down to pray‘ reveal (p. 258). It is significant that in her hour of 
need, Bathsheba feels the need to learn ‗stoicism‘ from him: ‗What a way Oak had, she 
thought, of enduring things‘ (p. 257). If he does not undergo the psychological problems 
which other characters experience, if he is described by critics as ‗well-adjusted‘55 or ‗a 
balanced and integrated figure‘,56 it is because he has been able to grasp the reason of 
the universe and the domain of his freedom and has, accordingly, avoided making false 
attachments. Later in the story, when Bathsheba and Boldwood, the owners of the farms 
which Oak manages, are ‗sitting in their [...] homes in gloomy and sad seclusion‘, Oak 
can be seen ‗mounted on a strong cob‘, ‗daily trotting the length and breadth of about 
two thousand acres in a cheerful spirit of surveillance, as if the crops all belonged to 
him‘ (p. 290). He has nothing but he is content, for he needs nothing.  
In his equanimity, Oak aligns himself with one of the Stoic principles Hardy was 
fond of quoting, as alluded to in Chapter 2: ‗This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed: 
for all things are according to the nature of the universal‘.57 These are the very words 
Angel Clare utters at the time of misery, as we shall see. Among Hardy‘s male 
characters, Giles Winterborne is the other main character who seems able, to some 
extent, to live according to this principle. Hardy‘s other men lack the serenity of a Stoic; 
neither Henchard nor Jude can live up to this doctrine, and Angel, even through 
equipped with the knowledge of Stoicism, fails to achieve equanimity. In all of these 
examples, Hardy can be seen to explore the possibility of practising such a Stoic 
doctrine. But the fact that he portrays most of his male characters, especially in his later 
novels, as perturbed, reveals the difficulty of living according to reason. For most men 
are ruled by aspirations, desires and emotions.
58
 His portrayal of Oak, however, implies 
that, at least at this stage of his writing career, he conceives the task of shaping one‘s 
subjectivity as a Stoic as viable.  
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Oak‘s practice of masculinity can be seen to be mainly determined by his subject 
position as a Stoic, through which Hardy examines an alternative way of being a man. 
Oak does not define his ‗presence‘ in the public sphere in materialistic terms. Although 
he has worked hard to improve the conditions of his life, he does not associate his sense 
of manhood with success. John Goode (along with Fisher and Devereux) reads Oak‘s 
success at the end as a bourgeois ideal yet this reading is unable to explain Oak‘s 
indifference towards, and his renunciation of, worldly possessions.
59
 Though success is 
achieved at the end, it is not constitutive of Oak‘s masculinity. He resembles, I would 
suggest, a Stoic who ‗has no need of things external to him, although he may […] use 
them‘.60 When seeing that ‗the ewes lay dead at his foot‘, his ‗first feeling‘ is ‗one of 
pity for the untimely fate of these gentle ewes and their unborn lambs‘; it is only later 
that he recognises that ‗all savings of a frugal life had been dispersed at a blow‘ and that 
‗all his hopes‘ for becoming ‗an independent farmer‘ are lost (pp. 32-3). He is not 
defeated by his loss as for him worldly possessions and social status are ‗indifferent‘ 
things. The loss of his subject position as a farmer does not undermine his masculine 
subjectivity; he readily offers himself as a bailiff and a shepherd; he even thinks of 
enlisting in the army and eventually earns his day‘s wage by playing his flute (pp. 34-6). 
I do not, therefore, concur with Shires that unemployment signifies loss of power and 
masculinity for Oak.
61
 It can be argued that, through the practice of self-sufficiency, 
Oak manages to resist the prevailing discourses of masculinity, especially those 
provided by the bourgeoisie, and shape his masculinity in an alternative way. Foucault 
argues that, for the Stoics, the ‗work on the self‘ through the practice of asceticism was 
a way of self-formation which was not dictated by institutions of power.
 62
 
If Oak‘s masculinity is not undermined by the loss of fortune and position, it is 
also because he relates his ‗presence‘ in the public sphere to his capabilities, his 
intuitive power, his skill and even his musical talent, the things which cannot easily be 
taken from him. He possesses the ‗intuition‘ to ‗ascertain the time of night from the 
altitude of the stars‘ (p. 12), to read the weather and predict the storm (p. 209), 
capabilities which enable him to assert himself in the public domain as a ‗man‘. His 
sensitiveness to weather, for instance, ‗is to his advantage as a worker‘, as Goode 
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notes.
63
 Oak also has the expertise of a shepherd and that of a farmer. He can ‗[lamb] 
the ewes‘ (p. 10) and is the only one who can rescue Bathsheba‘s flock. Hardy admires 
Oak‘s skill, describing his ‗trochar‘ as an ‗instrument of salvation‘ (p. 124). Oak also 
possesses the art of playing the flute with ‗Arcadian sweetness‘, an art he shares with 
pagan gods. Unemployment does not undermine his sense of manhood for he has such a 
talent to rely on: in the midst of his misfortunes, he ‗drew his flute and began to play 
[...] in the style of a man who had never known a moment‘s sorrow‘ (p. 36). His art 
allows him to resume defining himself as a man for he is still able to earn his living. 
Oak‘s ‗passivity‘ and lack of aggression, which have made critics see him as 
‗sexless‘ and ‗abnormal‘ or even feminine,64 is in accord with his Stoic inclinations. For 
him, a romantic relationship, like material success, is a ‗preferred‘ but ‗indifferent‘ 
matter; that is, marriage to Bathsheba is not essential for his happiness. His pursuit of 
Bathsheba suggests that he has constituted himself through the structure of emotional 
attachment yet he is also able to resist that structure for he has not associated his 
masculinity with the possession of the beloved. He speaks to Bathsheba‘s aunt about his 
proposal not as a passionate lover but as a Stoic who views marriage as an indifferent 
issue: ‗In short I was going to ask her [Bathsheba] if she‘s like to be married‘; ‗if she 
would I should be very glad to marry her‘ (p. 24). And when he is told that Bathsheba 
has ‗a dozen‘ ‗hanging around her‘, though disappointed, he does not insist: ‗Well, 
there‘s no use in my waiting, for that was all I came about‘ (p. 25). When Bathsheba 
runs after him, Oak, by virtue of his love for her, momentarily departs from his subject 
status as a Stoic and speaks ‗appealingly‘ to her but upon noticing the futility of his 
insistence, he resigns and reconstitutes himself as a self-sufficient man: ‗―Very well,‖ 
said Oak, firmly [...]. ―Then I‘ll ask you no more‖‘ (pp. 28-9). He accepts Boldwood 
and Troy as Bathsheba‘s possible husbands and even sympathises with his rival, 
Boldwood, speaking ‗with the repose of a man whom misfortune had inured rather than 
subdued‘ (p. 225). He is dismayed but not emasculated by his defeat in love for it is 
through renunciation that he feels himself a man.  
Even though interested in formulating himself through marriage, Oak can still 
shape his masculinity without it. He pursues the object of desire but, as a Stoic, he is 
aware that it is irrational to have any claim over the things which are external to him. 
Accordingly, he does not associate his masculinity with the possession of the beloved 
but primarily in terms of detachment from and renunciation of her. He constructs his 
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masculinity, of course, also in terms of helping her, regardless of his own interests. 
Through the government of his desires, he is able to resist the discourse of sexuality. In 
his substitution of sexuality and egotism, the desire for possession of the woman he 
loves, with friendship and loving-kindness, Oak offers an alternative practice of 
masculinity.  
Devereux reads Oak‘s helping Bathsheba as emblematic of his ‗insertion into the 
patriarchal, chivalric tradition‘ which is based on female inferiority65 yet we can argue 
that, in his depiction of Oak as a supporter of Bathsheba without making him a 
proprietor and a husband, Hardy is modelling his shepherd according to Positivist 
ideals. Lennart A. Björk sees Oak as ‗a paragon Positivist hero‘.66 Hardy himself refers 
to his reading of ‗Comte‘s Positive Philosophy, and writings of that school‘ at the time 
of the writing of the novel.
67
 Oak specifically urges Bathsheba to practise ‗true loving-
kindness‘ in relation to Boldwood, not to play with his emotions (p. 118). Even in the 
Stoic philosophy, fellowship has been admired; for the Stoics, individuals are part of 
one body and should naturally be benevolent to each other; they do not, of course, 
approve of passion.
68
  
Instead of possessing Bathsheba, Oak undertakes to construct his masculine 
‗presence‘ by means of helping and supporting her. He wants Bathsheba to be happy 
even though with someone else for Oak‘s love towards her is more of the nature of 
friendship than passion, as critics such as Beegel have argued.
69
 When finding out that 
he has lost all his material possessions, ‗[i]t was as remarkable as it was characteristic 
that the one sentence he uttered was in thankfulness: ‗Thank God I am not married: 
what would she have done in the poverty now coming upon me!‘ (p. 33). Here, Oak 
demonstrates that he cares for Bathsheba‘s happiness more than ownership of her. He 
remains Bathsheba‘s supporter throughout the story: he ‗[watches] her [‗homestead‘] 
affairs as carefully as any specially appointed officer of surveillance could have done‘ 
(p. 140); he runs after her to Bath and is relieved to see her back ‗safe and sound‘, 
forgetting ‗all grave reports‘ about her being seen there in Troy‘s company (p. 197); he 
accepts his rival, Troy, as a ‗kindness to her he loved‘ (p. 207); he risks danger in 
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rescuing Bathsheba‘s ricks, dismissing the fact that she is not his (p. 213). To be of any 
help to Bathsheba apparently provides Oak with a sense of large ‗presence‘. Once he 
has saved Bathsheba‘s ricks, though ‗drenched, weary, and sad‘ ‗he was cheered by a 
sense of success in a good cause‘ (p. 223). At the end of the story, he decides to leave 
Bathsheba, despite his own wishes, in order to save her ‗good name‘ (p. 347). In 
constituting himself as protector and advisor to Bathsheba, Oak can be seen to have 
supported her in the manner of a ‗husband‘, even though he was not nominally one. If, 
at the end of the story, he speaks of her as his ‗wife‘ with the air of a man who has been 
married for years (pp. 352-3), it is because practically he has taken the role a husband is 
expected to take, ‗[arguing] on her side when all the rest of the world was against her‘ 
(p. 344). The roles of husband and friend are here conflated.  
Although Oak constructs his ‗presence‘ in terms of helping Bathsheba and even 
though at some point in the story his ‗presence‘, as far as he comes to relate it to 
supporting Bathsheba, appears to be vulnerable (when, for instance he is enraged by 
hearing the rustics criticising Bathsheba), his sense of manhood is not tied up with 
helping her. Apparently, for Oak, as a Stoic, supporting Bathsheba, like marriage to her, 
falls into the category of ‗indifferent‘ things, that is, he endeavours to support her, as the 
hardship he undergoes for her sake suggests, but his masculine subjectivity is not 
undermined once he does not have the chance to help her. He is ready to leave her if she 
wishes it. Oak shapes his masculinity mainly by practising self-sufficiency and by doing 
what he rationally and morally regards as right.  
The structure of power also does not totally condition Oak‘s practice of 
masculinity. In his relationships with other characters, he refrains from dominating 
them. As a Stoic who is able to govern himself, he is able to govern his behaviour 
towards other characters, not seeking to overpower them. For the Stoics, as Foucault 
explains, the power a man exercised over himself could control his power over others.
70
 
Oak mainly maintains his tranquillity in relation to other characters for they cannot 
really harm him.   
It can be argued that what determines Oak‘s attitude towards other characters is 
his moral judgement of their conduct. He evaluates them according to their adherence to 
ethical codes and, accordingly, demonstrates a different practice of masculinity in 
relation to them. He respects Boldwood, whom he conceives as an honourable man, 
disregarding the fact that he is his rival. The relationship between the two men is more 
or less a balanced relationship; Oak does not attempt to subdue Boldwood, and the older 
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man, witnessing no threat from Oak‘s side, respects him. In relation to Troy, however, 
Oak is a different man. Troy‘s amorality degrades him in the eyes of Oak, allowing him 
to constitute himself as Troy‘s superior, regardless of Troy‘s higher social and financial 
status, as Bathsheba‘s husband and as his master.  
In relation to Bathsheba, again it is Bathsheba‘s observance or lack of 
observance of the codes of proper conduct which determines Oak‘s behaviour towards 
her. In this relationship, he constitutes himself in different ways, as a lover, an assertive 
man, an advisor or a resigned Stoic, based on the situation in which he finds himself and 
on Bathsheba‘s conduct. He mainly, however, behaves as a Stoic, practising self-
sufficiency and self-government. Since the possession of the beloved is not constitutive 
of his masculine subjectivity, Oak does not attempt to overpower Bathsheba by flattery, 
persistence or forcefulness. When proposing to her, he speaks about what he can do for 
her and the kind of life he can provide for her — a practice of masculinity demarcated 
by the social structures which demand a husband to take the role of breadwinner and 
protector. Devoid of a glittering appearance and the skill of flattery, he does not have a 
striking ‗presence‘ in the eyes of Bathsheba, hence the time it takes to become her 
husband.  
With the transformation in the material and social conditions of both Oak and 
Bathsheba, both demonstrate different gender practices.  Upon noticing that he has to 
ask a ‗woman farmer‘ for a job, Oak feels humiliated, suggesting that despite his 
resistance to patriarchal discourses, he is still governed by the rhetoric which defines the 
public domain as masculine territory. Here, Hardy modifies the conventional structure 
of the sexual division of labour by allowing a woman to take the culturally-defined 
masculine role. Oak‘s sense of manhood, although not threatened by unemployment and 
material loss, appears to be challenged once he notices that the farmer is a woman and 
that the woman is Bathsheba, as his reluctance to ask her for an employment suggests: 
‗Do you want a shepherd, ma‘am?‘ he asks, ‗in an abashed and sad voice‘ (p. 43). Yet 
his readiness to work for a woman demonstrates that he is not deeply entrenched in such 
rhetoric. He does not conceive himself, however, as Bathsheba‘s inferior, as his inward 
reprimanding of her arrogance demonstrates: ‗staggered by the remarkable coolness of 
her manner‘, he thinks ‗her air was the inevitable result of the social rise which had 
advanced her from a cottage to a large house and fields‘ (p. 72). For Oak, who perceives 
worldly possessions as ‗indifferent‘, such a change in Bathsheba by virtue of financial 
and social rise is not rational.  
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Upon witnessing Bathsheba‘s transgression of what Oak considers the codes of 
right conduct, ‗playing pranks upon a man like Mr. Boldwood, merely as a pastime‘, 
Oak rewrites his relationship with her, constituting himself as an assertive man, boldly 
criticising her: ‗Leading on a man you don‘t care for is not a praiseworthy action‘. 
Caring for Bathsheba and sympathising with Boldwood, Oak intends to govern 
Bathsheba‘s conduct, not to win her but to maintain her reputation and, ironically, to 
prevent her from harming his rival. The text thus initiates a power struggle between the 
two, where both attempt to govern the conduct of the other, to make the other person the 
one s/he desires, a submissive worker and desperate lover or a considerate and gentle 
woman; both refuse, however, to be governed by the other. Once dismissed, for 
criticising Bathsheba, Oak does not entreat or apologise but ‗took his shears and went 
away from her in placid dignity‘ (p. 118).  
Bathsheba‘s urgent need for Oak to rescue her sheep reinstates him in a position 
of power, making her entreat for his return. He accepts her request only once she has 
written to him politely: ‗Do not desert me, Gabriel!‘ (pp. 122-3). Though at the end we 
see Bathsheba as a grateful woman, Oak‘s victory is a transitory one. By flirting with 
Boldwood, when he comes to the shearing barn, Bathsheba endeavours both to 
emasculate Oak, ‗[trifling] with himself [Oak] in thus feigning that she had trifled with 
another‘ (p. 133) and to undermine his ability to govern her conduct. She further 
emasculates Oak by speaking to him harshly in the presence of others when Oak 
happens to cut an ewe while shearing it — overcome, ‗momentarily‘, by his love for 
her. Though succeeding in exposing the vulnerability of Oak‘s masculinity as far as it is 
associated with his love for her, she is unable to undermine his masculinity for Oak 
quickly resumes his work ‗in an unmoved voice of routine‘ (p. 130).  
Bathsheba soon comes to recognise Oak‘s virtues (as when he rescues her ricks, 
for instance). From this point on in the story, she no longer attempts to subdue Oak, 
even ‗[begining] to entertain the genuine friendship of a sister‘ for him, indicative of the 
more balanced shape their relationship has taken.
 With Troy‘s mortification of 
Bathsheba and the concomitant diminishing of his ‗presence‘ in her eyes, Oak‘s 
‗presence‘ looms larger, to the extent that she imagines for a moment ‗what life with 
him as a husband would have been like‘ (p. 240). Bathsheba ultimately regards Oak as 
an equal, consulting him, for instance, about Boldwood‘s proposal after Troy‘s death, 
hoping that Oak will now offer himself as a lover. He continues, however, to practise 
self-sufficiency. The reversal of power is complete when Bathsheba comes to Oak‘s 
cottage to ask him to stay with her.  
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At the end of the novel, Hardy appears to be endorsing a kind of gender 
relationship which is based on ‗camaraderie‘ (p. 348) and not the subjugation of one 
side by the other. The fact that they marry makes Devereux read the ending as a 
patriarchal fantasy
71
 yet the husband-subjugator role is replaced by the husband-friend 
role. Hardy apparently believes that even within the matrimonial structure, a balanced, 
more satisfying, relationship is possible if friendship takes the place of desire.  
In Far from the Madding Crowd, Hardy engages with issues which are 
developed in his later works: the determining role of gender and class structures and 
discourses in the formation of masculinity and their link to human suffering and the 
possibility of fashioning alternative modes of being a man. The novel depicts the 
impossibility of defining oneself outside the domain of contemporary structures and 
discourses; even Oak has to shape himself within their domain. Yet Hardy, at this stage 
of his writing career, is able to envisage other ways of formulating masculinity than 
those offered by the prevailing discourses of his time, ways less destructive to men 
themselves and to others, ways which can lead to less suffering and provide one with 
more tranquillity. The survival of Oak, Hardy‘s exemplar of a nobler mode of being a 
man, allows the novel to embrace a degree of optimism, although the tragic end of 
Boldwood and Troy heralds the emergence of a pessimism which pervades Hardy‘s 
later works.  
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Chapter 4 
Two on a Tower:  
 ‘Presence’ in the Social Domain 
 
Contemporary reviewers did not regard Two on a Tower (1882) as an improvement on 
Hardy‘s previous fiction, criticising it for an improbable plot and odd characters.1 Hardy 
himself, in his 1895 preface to the novel, describes the story as a ‗slightly-built 
romance‘. For him, the interest the novel possessed, which he felt was unnoticed by 
contemporary readers, lay in its ‗[setting] the emotional history of two infinitesimal 
lives against the stupendous background of the stellar universe‘ and its suggesting that 
‗of these contrasting magnitude, the smaller might be the greater to them as men‘.2 
Hardy‘s contrast invokes the Comtean distinction between universal phenomena (which 
were unchangeable) and what is related to human society (which was modifiable).
3
 For 
Hardy, it is not so much the impersonal universe which causes human suffering: ‗[a] 
cyclone in the sun‘ does not affect the ‗terrene life‘.4 Rather, it is human society which 
is mainly responsible for the misery of individuals; this, however, can be modified and 
improved through human effort, in particular through the development of sympathy.
5
 
The novel specifically addresses the issue of gender, the limitations of contemporary 
social constructions of gender and the problems they cause for men and women.  
Two on a Tower investigates the role of social structures and discourses in the 
formation of masculinity. The kind of masculinity practised by the male characters can 
be seen to be mainly conditioned by the gender structures which R. W. Connell 
enumerates: the sexual division of labour, power and emotional attachment.
6
 The gender 
practice of the male characters is simultaneously constrained by class structures which 
delineate the kind of masculinity they need to practise. Male characters need to 
constitute themselves through ‗games of truth‘, to use Foucault‘s term, the discourses 
provided by their social class and society, in order to attain the ‗rank‘ or subject status 
of a ‗man‘.7 Despite their different practices of masculinity, all of these characters 
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associate masculinity with power; they align themselves with the conventional 
definition of masculinity emphasised by John Berger, that a man‘s ‗presence‘ relies on 
‗the promise of power‘ which he incorporates. The ‗promise of power‘ should be large 
for a man to have striking ‗presence‘.8 Andrew Tolson‘s recognition of the role of class 
in the formation of masculinity, regarding ambitiousness and achievement as ways of 
constructing ‗presence‘ for middle-class men, is also relevant to this novel, in which the 
male characters, permeated by upper-class discourses, define their manhood in terms of 
social attainment and renown.  
For these men, the construction of ‗presence‘ in the public domain is the 
priority; matrimony is conceived to be an obstacle to the achievement of this aim. 
Constituting themselves as upper-class (the Bishop and Sir Blount) or aspiring to 
become so (Swithin), they define their manhood in terms of the pursuit of knowledge. 
Knowledge is not, of course, sought simply for its own sake; rather, for them, 
knowledge — whether it is in astronomy, religion or geography — turns into a tool for 
formulating a large ‗presence‘ in the social realm. In portraying the ways intellectual 
and social achievement becomes constitutive of masculine identity, Two on a Tower 
anticipates Jude the Obscure.  
Hardy portrays class structures and discourses as playing key roles in the 
shaping of Swithin‘s masculinity. Swithin is introduced to the reader as a man with ‗two 
stations of life in his blood‘, ‗linked, on the maternal side, with a local agricultural 
family‘ and on his clergyman father‘s side with the upper-middle classes (p. 12). He is 
brought up by his rustic grandmother but has been sent to Grammar School which, as 
Sally Shuttleworth notes, ‗would have [...] set Swithin apart, socially and educationally, 
from his contemporaries in Welland‘.9 Hardy here highlights the role of school as a 
social institution in the formation of Swithin‘s class subjectivity: ‗the ―other station of 
life that was in his blood‖ [...] had been brought out by the grammar school‘ (p. 15). The 
educational institution has exposed him to the discourses linked with the upper classes 
and thus has helped to reinforce his ties with ‗his academic father‘ (p. 172). Exposed to 
two different discourses, Swithin has attempted to constitute himself as upper-class by 
defining his masculinity not in terms of physical labour and toughness (the working-
class ideals of masculinity, as Tolson notes)
10
 but through intellectual and social 
achievement and mental power. His ‗scientific attainments, and cultural bearing‘ (p. 12) 
reveal this point. He has negotiated the models of masculinity available to him and has 
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adopted the one which has more strongly suggested itself. Ironically, this also reconciles 
Lady Constantine to their relationship, making him seem more worthy of her love.  
Swithin‘s pursuit of astronomy is emblematic of his effort to renounce his 
working-class subjectivity. The tower itself acquires a metaphorical significance in 
terms of social climbing. Michael Millgate argues that as ‗the offspring of a socially 
incongruous marriage‘, Swithin ‗is suspended between two worlds‘; ‗the tower offers 
him at least the illusion of escape‘ from this dilemma.11 The tower, as the emblem of his 
social aspirations, can provide him with a sense of dissociation from his working-class 
origins and association with the upper classes. His attempt to distinguish himself from 
the working classes is also demonstrated early in the novel by his initial refusal to touch 
his grandmother‘s half-eaten pudding or to join the village choir gathered in his 
grandmother‘s cottage. 
Swithin has succeeded in differentiating himself from his village folk for the 
conviction that he is not one of them is held not only by Swithin but by the rustics. Mrs. 
Martin criticises him for not doing ‗something that‘s of use‘ (p. 15). Amos Fry, 
likewise, conceives him as ‗good for nothing‘: ‗He mopes about – sometime here, and 
sometimes there; nobody troubles about en‘ (p. 12). Masculinity being associated with 
work in the working-class discourses, Swithin fears that he will be labelled as 
‗visionary‘ if his interest in celestial bodies is disclosed (p. 15). The way his behaviour 
is scrutinised by the working-class community can be seen as an example of the way 
Foucault‘s disciplinary mechanism of dividing and ‗branding‘ operates on individuals. 
Swithin is compared with others in his group, evaluated according to the level of his 
conformity with the norms of working-class discourses, recognised as a transgressor of 
those norms and therefore not a member of that class. He is unable to abandon his 
working-class subjectivity entirely, however; he still, on some occasions, perceives 
himself as rustic, as his self-consciousness about the social gap between himself and 
Viviette or the Bishop reveals. 
Swithin‘s gender practice is nevertheless mostly governed by the discourse of 
masculinity offered by the upper classes. He intends to construct his ‗presence‘ in the 
public domain in terms of knowledge, status and reputation, ‗[aiming] at nothing less 
than the dignity and office of Astronomer Royal‘ (p. 10) and determined ‗to be the new 
Copernicus‘ (p. 28). This is an aim which he thinks he has attained with his first 
discovery, which could establish his ‗fame [...] for ever‘ (p. 59). Swithin‘s ambition 
reflects his desire to incorporate a strong sense of manhood, suggesting that he does not 
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find his ‗presence‘ as a working-class boy to be large. His strenuous study can be seen 
as the discipline he undergoes in order to attain the necessary qualification for 
occupying a subject position as a famous astronomer and accordingly a man of standing. 
His hard work, punishment in the form of exercise, is accompanied by a feeling of 
‗gratification‘ at winning his desired status, suggestive of Foucault‘s discussion that 
disciplinary power works through a system of ‗punishment‘ and ‗gratification‘.12 He 
replies to Viviette‘s concern about his health, ‗cheerfully‘: ‗I have [...] been up a little 
late this last week [...]. But what does that matter, now I have made the discovery?‘ (p. 
62). Although, at this stage, he is unable to attain the ‗rank‘ of a discoverer, his labour is 
rewarded by Jocelyn St Cleeve, later in the story. The offer of the legacy can be seen as 
a proposal from upper-class society to define him as one of them. While his father has 
been excluded from his class for his deviance from its norms in allying himself with a 
working-class wife, his son is offered the ‗rank‘ of the upper-class on condition that he 
renounce women for the sake of intellectual and social accomplishment.     
Swithin‘s misery upon finding out that his ‗object-glass‘ is broken reveals the 
extent to which achievement has become the main determinant of his masculine 
subjectivity. For a man who has defined himself in terms of making a name for himself 
in the field of science, ‗to have the means of clinching a theory snatched away at the last 
moment‘ matters a lot (p. 37). He perceives himself as the victim of ‗adverse fate‘ — ‗It 
is I against the world‘ — unaware that his suffering is the effect not of an external 
power operating on him from above but of discourses which he has internalised. The 
news that ‗another man had forestalled his fame by a period of about six weeks‘ 
undercuts his sense of being entirely by shattering his self-conception as a man of 
renown, making him contemplate ‗annihilation‘ (pp. 62-3). Hardy here examines the 
problems the association of masculinity with success creates for men, the very issue 
Tolson would later theorise.
13
  
Hardy portrays Swithin as a perturbed character. Ironically, the restlessness 
Swithin demonstrates when witnessing the thwarting of his social goals is at odds with 
his claim earlier in the story that the ‗study of astronomy‘ can ‗[reduce]‘ anxiety ‗by 
reducing the importance of everything‘ (p. 31). He studies the grandeur of the universe 
but, unlike Oak, is unable to grasp his place in the order of the universe. He acts ‗the 
reverse of stoical‘ as he himself confesses (p. 42). Hardy here demonstrates the 
difficulty of renouncing the discourses which govern one; for Swithin is unable to resist 
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the pervasive discourse of successful masculinity. He only recovers a sense of self when 
he can once more visualise defining himself in terms of achievement: the promising 
news of the coming of a comet ‗[lends] him a new vitality‘, a ‗strenuous wish to live 
and behold the new phenomenon‘ (p. 67). He has a second chance to make his name.  
Subjected, ostensibly, to upper middle-class discourses which define masculinity 
in terms of achievement and which regard career and feminine association to be 
irreconcilable — the kind of discourse reflected in Jocelyn St Cleeve‘s letter (p. 114) — 
Swithin has never considered defining himself through an intimate relationship. The 
structure of emotional attachment (which demarcates the practice of gender, as Connell 
suggests),
14
 in other words, has not yet conditioned his practice of masculinity. Women 
have no place in the life of this ‗guileless philosopher‘:  
 
His parted lips were lips which spoke, not of love, but of millions of miles; 
those were the eyes which habitually gazed, not into the depths of other eyes, 
but into other worlds. Within his temple dwelt thoughts, not of women‘s looks, 
but of stellar aspects and the configuration of constellations. (p. 39)  
 
His ‗impatient wave of the hand‘ upon hearing female footsteps in the midst of his 
astronomical observation, when Viviette first intrudes his scientific seclusion (p.7), 
echoes, as Jane Thomas argues,  
 
the cruder misogyny of [...] Sir Blount Constantine, and Swithin‘s uncle 
Jocelyn St Cleeve, which seeks to contain women within the ‗inferior‘ realm of 
sexuality, the senses, emotion and imagination, and to ward off the perceived 
threat that realm represents to the ‗superior‘ masculine world of reason and the 
Sciences.
15
 
 
Though not yet exposed to the misogynistic words of his uncle, Swithin appears already 
to have internalised this particular masculine discourse.  
For Swithin, at this stage, masculinity is conflated with intellect and 
achievement and not with sexuality: ‗His heaven at present was truly in the skies and 
not in that only other place where they say it can be found, in the eyes of some daughter 
of Eve‘ (p. 40). Not yet subjected to the discourse of sexuality, he is unconscious of 
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‗their differences of sex‘ (p. 56); he does not see Viviette as a member of the opposite 
sex or a sexual object but as a friend. He is, on most occasions, quite oblivious of her 
and her feelings for him. When she comes to speak to him about her troubles, 
‗abstracted by his grand theme‘ he does not ‗heed‘ what she says (p. 27). When she asks 
him to go to London to make enquiries about her husband, he declines to do so: ‗It 
might ruin the whole of my year‘s labour if I leave now!‘ (p. 33). He agrees to go only 
on condition that Viviette assume responsibility for observing the stars and upon his 
return his first question is about the stars (pp. 35-6).  
The villagers‘ words about his relationship with Viviette remind Swithin, 
however, of other ways of constructing masculinity, rendering Viviette as a sexual 
object (pp. 79-80). He is no longer able to define Viviette as a friend and ‗fellow-
watcher‘; she is now ‗a handsome woman‘ (p. 84). He constitutes himself therefore 
through the structure of emotional attachment, attempting to assert himself through a 
romantic relationship. He acknowledges that to have ‗presence‘ in the public sphere is 
not all that he wants: ‗In thinking of the heaven above, I did not perceive [...] the better 
heaven beneath‘ (p. 81). Though ‗intellectually able, Swithin is ‗sexually retarded‘, as 
Richard H. Taylor notes: ‗he needs to be cured of‘ his excessive infatuation with science 
and the task of ‗his sexual awakening is achieved through Viviette.‘16 The discourse of 
success, which up to this point has governed him, loses its control over him when the 
opposing, more powerful, discourse of sexuality begins to pervade him: ‗The alchemy‘ 
has ‗transmuted an abstracted astronomer into an eager lover‘ (p. 85). The text defines 
Swithin a ‗man‘ only once he constitutes himself in terms of desire: in Viviette‘s eyes 
‗he had become a man‘ with a ‗maturer light in his eyes‘ (p. 86).  
The power of the upper-class rhetoric of success, however, still operates on him; 
he has no intention of sacrificing his public ambitions for ‗presence‘ in the private 
domain; rather, he is concerned about the displacement of his grand ‗intentions‘ by ‗this 
affection‘ (p. 93). Unable to defy either discourse, he thinks of accepting a role as a 
husband as a way through which he can assert himself both in the domestic and social 
domains (p. 95). He surmises that by becoming a husband he can constitute himself as 
the proprietor of a worthy love object while maintaining his position as a would-be 
famous astronomer, unaware that in so doing he is undermining the discourse of success 
which stresses the incompatibility of matrimony and achievement. He proves not to be 
                                                 
16
 Richard H. Taylor, The Neglected Hardy: Thomas Hardy’s Lesser Novels (London: Macmillan, 1982), 
pp. 141-2.  
 70 
as strong and as self-sufficient as he thought, no longer a man to whom ‗a beloved 
science is enough wife‘ (p. 56) but a man in need of emotional ties.   
At this stage, under the imperative to define himself as a husband, he rejects 
Jocelyn St Cleeve‘s tempting bequest and defies this particular upper-class discourse 
which demands that he should not marry (certainly not a woman older than himself) and 
recommends that he should ‗avoid‘ women in general until his fame is established. If he 
is able to resist the dominance of these discourses, it is, of course, partly because ‗the 
caution and bribe‘ — the threat of punishment and the promise of reward, to use 
Foucault‘s terms — ‗came too late, too unexpectedly, to be of influence‘. Had he 
received the letter sooner, he might have been affected by it as ‗a young man whose 
love of celestial physics‘, his social ambitions, ‗was second to none‘ (p. 115). The 
postponement of his return to Viviette, later in the story, suggests that he is regulated by 
such discourses. At this stage, however, as a man desirous to construct his ‗presence‘ as 
a sexual proprietor, ‗he was satisfied to his heart‘s content with his prize‘ upon seeing 
Viviette in the station: ‗If his great-uncle had offered him, from the grave, a kingdom 
instead of her, he would not have accepted it‘ (pp. 113-6). He is empowered to find 
himself the possessor of the woman he desires.  
Without economic power and by virtue of his age and his social class, however, 
Swithin is devoid of the sense of power and the large ‗presence‘ a husband 
conventionally enjoys. But although his powerlessness as a husband depresses him, it 
does not undermine his sense of manhood for he has other subject positions to rely on. 
He is displeased with the unwanted separation from Viviette, owing to her reluctance to 
introduce him as her husband, yet is not desperate. After the confirmation ceremony, he 
is ‗depressed‘ when he finds himself deprived of the pleasure of accompanying his wife 
but his ‗gloomy thoughts‘ are soon dispelled when ‗he remembered with interest that 
Venus was in a favourable aspect for observation that afternoon‘ (p. 147). The sense of 
self supplied by his subject status as a scientist comes quickly to his rescue.  
Swithin never has much sense of his status as a husband. He is able quickly to 
renounce the role, fortified by the hope of constructing his ‗presence‘ in the social 
domain through the pursuit of knowledge. He succumbs quickly to Viviette‘s insistence 
on his acceptance of the bequest. The upper-class discourse of achievement once more 
takes hold of him; with his departure to the Cape and his practical entrance into the 
masculine world of success, he forfeits his status as a lover. His ‗absorbed attention‘ to 
the new world is accompanied by  
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a corresponding forgetfulness of what lay to the north behind his back, whether 
human or celestial. [...] Viviette, who till then had stood high in his heaven, if 
she had not dominated it, sank lower and lower with his retreat like the North 
Star. (p. 244)  
 
Not keen to define himself as a husband or father, he is not subdued by the news of 
Viviette‘s strategic marriage to the Bishop: ‗the big tidings rather dazed than crushed 
him‘ (p. 247). His indifference towards his emotional ties reveals the extent to which he 
is permeated by the discourse of success. Though pondering briefly the sad chapter of 
life with Viviette, he ‗could not long afford to give to the past the days that were meant 
for the future‘ (p. 248). He remains similarly indifferent to the news of the Bishop‘s 
death, ‗[living] on as before‘ (p. 252). He returns to England only when he feels he has 
taken the preliminary steps in the process of establishing himself in the social sphere:   
 
His work at the Cape was done. His uncle‘s wishes [...] had been more than 
observed. The materials for his great treatise were collected, and it now only 
remained for him to arrange, digest, and publish them, for which purpose a 
return to England was indispensable. (p. 252) 
 
In his prioritisation of career over love, he acts as demanded by his uncle‘s upper-class 
discourse.  
Even after success has been achieved, Swithin is still reluctant to construct his 
‗presence‘ in the private domain as a husband and father. Having returned to Welland, 
he is not eager to see Viviette and remains apathetic when seeing his child. He 
postpones his visit to her and, accidentally encountering her on the tower and beholding 
her ‗worn and faded aspect‘ (p. 259), he abandons his subject position as her lover for 
good. Being constituted by patriarchal discourses which define a woman as a sexual 
object rather than a companion or friend, he is unable to develop any other feeling 
towards Viviette. Hardy criticises him for his failure to see beyond the appearance to the 
‗more promising material beneath‘, his inability to resist the discourse of sexuality and 
define himself in terms of sympathy (p. 259). He is given a moment of recognition, a 
glimpse of the possibility of formulating his masculinity through ‗loving-kindness‘, 
which causes him to return to Viviette, but her sudden death deprives him of the chance 
of such drastic self-redefinition. The image of Tabitha Lark ‗skirting the field with a 
bounding tread‘ (p. 262) suggests the possibility that Swithin might ultimately define 
himself through matrimony and sexuality but Hardy himself was inclined to see him 
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resume defining himself in terms of loving-kindness in relation to Viviette. In his 
response to Florence Henniker‘s enquiry about the ending of the novel, Hardy 
speculated that after Viviette‘s death, Swithin might grow ‗passionately attached to her 
again, as people often do‘.17 But that, of course, is not suggested by the novel itself. 
In taking a job which is masculine by definition, Swithin is operating within the 
structure of the sexual division of labour (one of Connell‘s delineators of gender 
practice). But he deviates from this structure in not assuming a role as a breadwinner. 
His practice of masculinity is not mainly circumscribed by the structure of power either 
(another structure which, according to Connell, delimits the practice of gender)
18
 for he 
does not define himself in terms of authority. In relation to his family, of course, 
Swithin can be seen to function within this structure. The power of gender, combined 
with the power of knowledge and class, allow him to constitute himself as the superior 
figure in relation to his grandmother, who is uneducated, female and working-class. He 
contradicts her and makes his own decisions, whatever she may say. The kind of 
masculinity he practises is a response to the demands of the situation in which he is 
located and the gender practice he encounters, in line with David H. J. Morgan‘s 
discussion of masculinity.
19
 With upper-class characters, he shapes his masculinity 
differently.  
The way Swithin formulates himself in relation to Viviette demonstrates that he 
does not mainly constitute himself through the structure of power; he is not a decision-
maker and nor is he the dominant figure in their relationship. Lacking the power of 
class, age and social and economic status, the very things which usually situate a man in 
the position of dominance over his female counterpart, Swithin accepts a subordinate 
role first as an acquaintance, then as lover and finally as husband. Whenever science is 
the issue, however, he constitutes himself as the superior figure, feeling ‗contempt for 
the state of [...] Viviette‘s knowledge‘ (p. 10). At these moments, empowered by his 
knowledge and his self-conception as a would-be prominent scientist, he becomes 
oblivious of differences of class and age, perceiving himself as a man of large 
‗presence‘. With Swithin taking the position of power, she has to accept a subordinate 
position, begging ‗to be enlightened‘ by his knowledge (p. 11). In social situations, 
however (for instance when he visits Welland house for the first time and is overawed 
by the grandeur of the place and thus reminded of his working-class subjectivity), he 
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distances himself from his subject position as an astronomer. His awareness of the 
social distance between them, intensified by the atmosphere of the place, makes him 
forget the elevated image of himself and fall into ‗a speechlessness that socially was a 
defect in him‘ (p. 47). On the tower, the domain of science, he is an upper-class 
scientist, but in the manor house he is a subordinate, working-class youth. Only when 
astronomy becomes the subject of their discussion can he regain his position of 
supremacy.  
As a lover and a husband, however, Swithin remains mainly passive, allowing 
Viviette to determine what sort of action should be taken. When proposing to her, he 
assents to her ‗conditions‘, not to intrude in her house and not to announce their 
marriage without her consent; having ‗no personal force to speak of in a social point of 
view‘, ‗he was as docile as a child in her hands wherever matters of this kind were 
concerned‘ (p. 140). He is unable to contradict her wish that he should be confirmed or 
prevent her from reading his uncle‘s letter; he then succumbs to her demand about 
accepting the bequest. There is only one occasion on which Swithin undertakes to 
overpower Viviette on a personal matter and this is when he intends to persuade her into 
marrying him. Only when he thinks of himself as a husband does he play the 
conventional masculine role, taking the initiative and attempting to impress her. He tries 
to govern her conduct and define himself as her husband by threatening to desert her if 
she refuses to marry him.  
Swithin‘s practice of masculinity, however, is far from being forceful. 
Negotiating the versions of masculinity available to him, he has distanced himself from 
aggressive models of masculinity and adopted a gentle version; this resonates with 
Connell‘s argument that the construction of gender is not a matter of passive 
internalisation but negotiation of the gender patterns.
20
 Though lacking the emotional 
depth and sensitiveness of Jude, he anticipates Hardy‘s later male protagonist in his 
docility towards his female counterpart, his expression of need and in the way he 
defines himself in terms of mental rather than physical power. For Swithin, as for Jude, 
masculinity is not understood in sharp contrast with femininity; he expresses need and 
acts submissively yet still feels himself a man.  
Neither is Swithin‘s practice of masculinity associated with the exercise of 
power in relation to the Bishop. In the hierarchical relationship between the two men, 
the Bishop, as Swithin‘s senior and the holder of a high social position, dominates the 
relationship. Overawed by the Bishop‘s striking ‗presence‘, Swithin is unable to practise 
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masculinity in an assertive manner. The situation in which he finds himself, in other 
words, requires that he adopts a gentle version of masculinity.  
Initially, Swithin interests the Bishop not only as a ‗handsome young man‘ but 
also as ‗a man of talent‘ (p. 149). The young man‘s ‗presence‘ wanes in the eyes of the 
Bishop, however, upon the revelation of the presence of a woman behind the curtain of 
his cabin. With the undermining of Swithin‘s honour, his subject position as a gifted 
astronomer is replaced by that of an immoral man, allowing the Bishop to overpower 
him. Swithin is rendered visible to the power of the gaze, in this case, that of the 
Bishop, representative of the Church and the Victorian society: ‗he gazed upon Swithin 
from the repose of his stable figure‘, reprimanding him for ‗infringing the first 
principles of social decorum‘ (pp. 162-3). Swithin‘s age and his working-class origin 
make him particularly susceptible to the disciplinary power of normalising judgement as 
the Bishop tells him, ‗I have sent for you here to see if [...] a direct appeal to your sense 
of manly uprightness will have any effect in inducing you to change your course of life‘ 
(p. 163). Judged against the norms of social decorum, Swithin is recognised as a 
transgressor, not eligible to retain his subject position as an honourable man. The 
Bishop punishes him by depriving him of this ‗rank‘, assigning him the lower position 
of a depraved man — anticipating Foucault‘s argument that ‗rank‘ can be employed as a 
disciplinary tool. Rank, in a disciplinary system, is the means of both ‗reward‘ and 
‗punishment‘ because it offers individuals only a temporary status; the rank awarded to 
an individual for his/her qualifications will be taken from him/her once s/he proves 
unqualified. 
21
 
The Bishop clearly succeeds in subduing Swithin: ‗The voice of Swithin in his 
next remark showed how tremendously this attack of the Bishop had told upon his 
feelings‘ (p. 163). By questioning his respectability, the Bishop challenges the young 
man‘s elevated conception of himself, ‗his air-built image of himself as a worthy 
astronomer, received by the world and the envied husband of Viviette‘ (p. 174). 
Recognising the Bishop as the representative of an institution of power which has the 
authority to define him, Swithin finds it hard to resist his judgement: ‗for a man in the 
Bishop‘s position‘ to regard ‗him immoral was almost as overwhelming as if he had 
actually been so‘ (p. 174). Accordingly, he is relieved at the end of the story to hear 
from Mr Torkingham that ‗the Bishop was not a perfect man‘ (p. 253); with the 
undermining of Bishop‘s status as a spiritual figure, his judgement of Swithin loses its 
validity, allowing the young man to redefine himself as an honourable man. 
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In spite of his class superiority to Swithin, the Bishop resembles him in defining 
his masculinity in terms of achievement and the avoidance of women. That the Bishop 
remains a bachelor at the age of ‗five and forty‘, for example, suggests that he is 
governed by these principles: he has conceived of ‗a wife‘ as ‗an impediment to a 
bishop‘s due activities‘ (pp. 188-9). For him, the pursuit of religious knowledge is a 
means of attaining social eminence, as his ‗arrogance‘ (p. 253) or, in Taylor‘s words, his 
‗immoderate obsession with his worldly dignity‘, 22 demonstrates. The discipline he has 
undergone, his years of learning and leading a life of solitude, can be seen to be 
rewarded by the distinguished social status and sense of manhood he has acquired. 
Viviette reminds the Bishop of other ways of formulating his masculinity, 
however. He recognises that to have ‗presence‘ in the public domain is not sufficient, 
betraying his loneliness and his need for an emotional relationship, as revealed in his 
letter of proposal which looks forward to ‗a discontinuance‘ in his ‗domestic life of the 
solitude of past years‘ (p. 188). Once he decides to constitute himself through 
matrimony, he practises masculinity according to the structure of emotional attachment, 
which requires his pursing the object of desire, and brings with it the sexual allocation 
of tasks and the relation of power — the kinds of structures which can be found in 
almost all social institutions, including the family, as Connell states.
23
 The Bishop 
should thus be the dominant figure both in the domestic realm, where Viviette should 
accept the subordinate role of providing emotional support, and in the public sphere, 
where she should strengthen his social position:  
 
Your steady adherence to church principles and your interest in ecclesiastical 
polity […] have indicated strongly to me the grace and appropriateness with 
which you would fill the position of a bishop‘s wife, and how greatly you 
would add to his reputation, should you be disposed to honour him with your 
hand. (pp. 188-9) 
 
 
Like her first husband, Sir Blount, and her brother Louis, in other words, the Bishop 
objectifies Viviette, evaluating her in term of her contribution to the construction of his 
masculinity. As Edward Neill points out, the Bishop is not different from these men in 
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this respect; all three ‗in fact bring an unholy trinity of patriarchal impingements on 
Viviette herself‘.24  
Although the Bishop‘s proposal attempts to conceal his emotional needs by 
highlighting the importance of his career, he desperately needs to define himself as the 
possessor of a woman, the object of desire. Once in love, he proves not to be a strong, 
self-sufficient man and certainly not a spiritual figure but ‗an earthly sort of man‘ (p. 
192). His writing to Viviette twice, allowing himself to be deceived by Louis and then 
going to her in person all indicate the urgency of his need to constitute himself as a 
proprietor. His ‗presence‘ becomes vulnerable since she can undermine his sense of 
manhood by refusing to be his. His mind‘s ‗sensitive fear of danger for its own dignity‘ 
echoes the fragility of his masculine subjectivity. As he tells Louis, he only proposed to 
her because he was assured that he would be accepted: ‗it is a great grief and some 
mortification to me, that I was refused‘ (p. 238).  
Ironically, at the end, while priding himself on his ability to win the object of 
desire, the Bishop is in fact participating in his own emasculation, by allowing himself 
to be deceived by both Viviette and Louis. It is clearly absurd that he attributes 
Viviette‘s acceptance of his second proposal not to her desperate condition but to the 
effect of his masculine power of persuasion and ‗logical reasoning‘ (p. 243). Louis 
comments that ‗the Bishop was as abjectly in love as only pompous people can be‘ (p. 
241), while Mr Torkingham sees the Bishop‘s ‗marriage‘ as ‗the result of red-hot 
caprice‘ and ‗hardly becoming to a man in his position‘ (p. 254). These discourses thus 
deprive him of his subject position as a spiritual man and define him as a foolish, 
worldly man. The power of sexuality, which now governs him, has obliged him to 
distance himself from his spiritual subjectivity.  
More than any other character in Two on a Tower, Sir Blount demonstrates a 
practice of masculinity circumscribed by gender structures such as the division of 
labour, power and emotional attachment. Whereas the ‗gender regime‘ (the term 
Connell uses to refer to the gender arrangement of any social institution)
25
 of 
Swithin‘s/Viviette‘s relationship departs from the ‗gender order‘ of society in that 
Swithin accepts a role of a husband without being a breadwinner and a decision-maker, 
the ‗gender regime‘ of the Constantine family copies the more usual gender pattern of 
society. Sir Blount has constructed his ‗presence‘ in the public domain as a lord and in 
the private domain as a husband, the provider and the dominant figure in the marriage.  
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Sir Blount is a domineering and abusive husband, as Viviette‘s reveals to Mr. 
Torkingham (pp. 22-3) and as her horror even on beholding his garments (as worn by 
Swithin) confirms. His forceful practice of masculinity in relation to Viviette unveils the 
extent to which he has associated his manhood with the exercise of power. Authority, as 
Tolson observes, is a way of constructing masculine ‗presence‘.26 Having constituted 
himself through the structure of power, which demands a husband to dominate his wife, 
Sir Blount dictates the way Viviette, as his wife, should act: she should ‗not so behave 
towards other men as to bring the name of Constantine into suspicion‘ and should 
‗avoid any levity of conduct in attending any ball, rout or dinner‘ (p. 23). Permeated by 
Victorian discourses of masculinity, he defines a wife as the property of her husband; in 
the nineteenth century, as Merryn Williams explains, ‗the power of a husband over his 
wife‘ was supported by ‗public opinion, religion and the law‘. 27  
 Even this support, however, has failed to provide Sir Blount with a strong sense 
of manhood, as his abandonment of his role as a husband would imply. His ‗mania for 
African lion-hunting, which he dignified by calling it a scheme of geographical 
discovery‘, and his zeal ‗to make a name for himself in that field‘ (p. 23) indicate his 
dissatisfaction with the kind of man he is and his desire to shape his masculinity in 
alternative ways. Although an aristocrat and a man of eminence in the social domain, he 
does not conceive his ‗presence‘ to be large. He is a lord but without the power of the 
old lords; in Taylor‘s words, Sir Blount is a ‗decadent representative‘ of the 
aristocracy.
28 
It can be argued that Sir Blount, in the decline of the aristocracy, beholds 
the waning of his own masculine power; his great-grandfather is described as ‗a 
respectable officer who had fallen in the American war‘, a man in whose memory a 
column had been erected; Sir Blount, however, lacks the large ‗presence‘ of his great-
grandfather (p. 4). Devoid of the power and the status of his forefathers and unable to 
assert his manhood the way they asserted theirs, on the battlefield and through heroism 
and valour, he envisages fabricating a situation through which he can rival his ancestors. 
If he is unable to construct his masculinity through military practice, he assumes he can 
do so through hunting lions; and if he is unable to establish his fame as a warrior, he 
dreams of making a name for himself as a discoverer. The kinds of vocations he adopts 
are all overtly masculine ones, suggestive of the extent to which he formulates himself 
through the sexual allocation of tasks.  
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These attempts to bolster his masculinity are nevertheless unable to grant him 
the strong sense of manhood he desires: he is still not a contented, cheerful man. 
Although the reader is not provided with much information about his life as a hunter 
and adventurer, what is evident is that he establishes his name not as a renowned figure 
in the field of geography but as an ‗eccentric wanderer‘. Having failed to acquire a 
sense of power from his upper-class subjectivity, he forsakes it, ‗[dropping] his old 
name altogether‘ in order to constitute himself as the husband of a ‗native princess‘, 
hoping that this formulation of masculinity can empower him (p. 195). But this 
masculine role is again unsatisfactory. Despite his claim that ‗he was living very 
happily‘ with the princess and that he was now ‗in a land which afforded him greater 
happiness than he could hope to attain elsewhere‘, his distressed mood speaks of his 
discontentment (pp. 195-6). His resort to drinking and his depression ‗at his position‘ 
reveal his failure to achieve a sense of manhood. His suicide is a final demonstration of 
his inability to become the kind of man he desires to be (p. 196).  
Like Sir Blount‘s, Louis‘s practice of masculinity is strictly delimited by 
patriarchal gender structures. That he has constituted himself through the sexual 
allocation of tasks is evident in his choice of a masculine career; his profession also 
suggests that he is operating within class structures. For Louis, as it is for the other male 
characters, the formation of ‗presence‘ through social and economic achievement is of 
importance; he attempts, however, to achieve this goal effortlessly. Though ‗in the 
diplomatic service‘ and having had a position as an ‗attaché at Rio Janeiro‘, ‗he has 
resigned the appointment‘ (p. 121), conceiving it to be a ‗harness‘, with the intention of 
finding ‗another vent for his energies‘ (p. 104). He aims to construct his masculinity in 
the social domain through his sister‘s ‗alliance‘ with ‗one of the local celebrities‘. By 
marrying ‗a genial squire, with more weight than wit, more realty than weight, and more 
personality than realty (considering the circumstances)‘, he writes, she can ‗make a 
position‘ for herself and, more importantly, for him (p. 105). Viviette becomes the 
means through which he can consolidate his social and economic position.  
Defining himself also through the structure of power, Louis attempts to take the 
dominant position in relation to his sister, intimidating her and deciding everything for 
her. His power over her is evident from her fear of facing him with a mark on her face, 
preferring to remain ‗a captive in the cabin‘, until the mark disappears (p. 122). Of 
course, he is unable to govern her conduct to the point of preventing her marriage to 
Swithin; by marrying Swithin, she resists the dominance of both his brother and the 
discourses which aim to define her as a commodity. Unaware of her marital status, 
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however, Louis endeavours to engineer a marriage between Viviette and the Bishop. He 
ultimately manages to define himself in the way he desires by resorting to complex 
strategies to win ‗the campaign‘ (itself a very masculine, military metaphor), inviting 
Bishop Helmsdale to Welland House, demanding Viviette to ‗agree, like a good sister, 
to charm the Bishop‘ and scheming to eliminate Swithin (pp. 170-3). Trapped in class 
and patriarchal discourses, Louis never considers constituting himself as a supporter and 
a friend to his sister.  
With Two on a Tower, Hardy places great emphasis on the restricting power of 
social structures and discourses. None of the male characters in this story is capable of 
standing outside the contemporary structures of gender and class. Permeated by 
discourses of success and sexuality and overcome by self-love, these characters are 
unable to envisage defining themselves through fellow-feeling. In this respect, the 
pessimism which has passed fleetingly over Far from the Madding Crowd gains in 
strength.  
It is only Viviette who is able to constitute herself according to the Comtean 
ideal of ‗altruism‘, to substitute ‗self-love‘ with ‗benevolence‘ (p. 227).29 T. R. Wright 
and Jane Thomas have discussed Viviette in relation to this Positivist ideal.
30
 In defying 
her sexual desires and ‗her love of her own decorum‘, liberating Swithin to pursue the 
path of success, Viviette defines herself in terms of ‗altruism‘. By ‗rising above self-
love‘ (p. 215), she ‗posits a new role for herself in which sexuality no longer plays a 
major determining role‘,31 a nobler mode of being a woman for Hardy:  
 
Love between man and woman, which in Homer, Moses, and other early 
exhibitors of life, is mere desire, had for centuries past so far broadened as to 
include sympathy and friendship; surely it should in this advanced stage of the 
world include benevolence also. If so, it was her duty to set her young man free. 
(p. 215)  
 
The passage invokes Hardy‘s concept of evolutionary meliorism in its associating the 
improvement of the relationship between men and women with the development of 
benevolence.  
Viviette is unable to remain the exemplar of ‗altruism‘, however, because of the 
urgency (necessitated by her pregnancy) to define herself as a respectable woman (p. 
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227). Her project of constituting herself in terms of altruism is thwarted by the society 
which, according to John Stuart Mill, obliges individuals to formulate themselves 
according to the limited models it offers.
32
 Viviette‘s defeat and the male characters‘ 
inability to escape the dominant discourses of their time lend the story a sombre tone. 
Yet, in its visualising, at least, the possibility of alternative ways of being a woman and 
a man, suggested by both Viviette‘s self-renunciation and Swithin‘s final gesture of 
benevolence, the novel offers a faint glimmer of hope for the amelioration of gender 
relations.  
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Chapter 5 
The Mayor of Casterbridge: 
The Pervasive Power of Discourse 
 
The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886), more than any other novel by Hardy, focuses on the 
issue of masculinity. It explores the ways in which masculinity is constructed through 
social structures and discourses, how an individual subjects himself to the disciplinary 
power of discourse in an attempt to acquire a ‗rank‘ (subject position) as a ‗man‘.1 In 
this novel, Hardy underlines his protagonist‘s ‗character‘ as the shaping element of his 
life. The subtitle of the novel is The Life and Death of a Man of Character and in his 
preface to the 1895 edition of the novel, Hardy describes the story as ‗a study of one 
man‘s deeds and character‘.2 The narrator associates Henchard‘s fate with his character: 
‗Character is Fate, said Novalis‘.3 Elaborating this point, Michael Millgate explains that 
the tragic fate of Hardy‘s hero ‗derives directly from his own actions, or that these 
proceed in turn from his whole personality‘.4 Hardy‘s emphasis on ‗character‘ as the 
determinant of one‘s deeds and accordingly one‘s destiny suggests that, for him, the 
power which governs one‘s thought and actions, and therefore one‘s destiny, is not 
external to the individual but inherent; power is not ‗negatively applied‘ on the 
individual from outside but is pervasive.
5
 This is a conception of power which may 
derive, in part, from Schopenhauer, for whom the governing power of the universe is 
immanent in phenomena, including humans. The Immanent Will, operating as 
‗character‘ and ‗motive‘, governs one‘s actions; a decision one makes, although 
apparently freely taken, is recommended by one‘s character, that is, by the power which 
permeates the individual.
6
 But Hardy‘s novels also demonstrate the power of discourse, 
the ways contemporary discourses of gender and class govern Henchard, determining 
his subjectivity and destiny.   
 The emphasis on the constraining power of social structures and discourses, 
which have already emerged in Hardy‘s previous works, appears more forcefully in The 
Mayor of Casterbridge. Henchard, Hardy‘s most powerful man, appears to be 
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inextricably entangled in gender and class structures and discourses. Henchard can be 
seen to be constrained specifically by discourses of masculinity which associate‘s a 
man‘s ‗presence‘ with the ‗promise of power‘ which he incorporates, a definition of 
masculinity which John Berger underlines.
7
 Henchard is obsessively preoccupied with 
the construction of his ‗presence‘ in the public domain by means of success. This 
construction of masculinity is severely attacked in the novel.  
 The first few pages reveal that Henchard‘s practice of masculinity is conditioned 
by the structures of gender relations which R. W. Connell describes. The opening scene 
explicitly portrays a gender practice delimited by the sexual division of labour, one of 
Connell‘s delineators of gender practice,8 where the masculine (public) and feminine 
(domestic) spheres are sharply demarcated. Henchard carries his bag of tools (the 
instruments of masculine work), and Susan holds the baby. As a ‗man‘, Henchard is 
clearly expected to define himself in terms of work rather than domesticity. 
 In choosing a wife and defining himself through matrimony, Henchard can be 
seen to have constituted himself through the structure of emotional attachment (another 
gender structure discussed by Connell),
9
 which demands that a man pursues and wins a 
member of the opposite sex. His marriage to Susan suggests an initial ‗favourable‘ 
emotional attachment to her; at the stage we know him, however, the emotional relation 
is a ‗hostile‘ one. Connell argues that the emotional attachment to people can be 
‗favourable‘, ‗hostile‘ or ‗ambivalent‘ (that is, simultaneously hostile and favourable).10 
Henchard‘s attachment to Susan (and other characters, as will be discussed) can be seen 
to be more of the ambivalent kind. His hostility towards his wife, suggested by his 
offering her for sale and his oppressive attitude towards her, reveals that his practice of 
masculinity is delimited by misogyny, which Connell defines as an emotional 
relationship in which ‗hostility [...] is directed at a whole gender category‘.11 These 
notions are not exclusive to Connell, of course, but are part of the whole structure of 
emotional relations which he outlines. 
 The wife-sale scene strongly indicates also that Henchard has formulated 
himself through the structure of power (the other gender structure Connell underlines),
12
 
constituting himself as the superior figure in relation to his wife, whom he construes as 
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subordinate. It is Henchard who leads the relationship; he has authority over his wife 
even to the extent of selling her. But although he occupies a position of power in 
relation to his wife, Henchard feels his ‗promise of power‘ to be small and that 
accordingly he has ‗little presence‘ as a ‗man‘. As Berger observes, it is only when a 
man‘s ‗promise of power‘ is large that he has striking ‗presence‘.13 Matrimony does not 
seem to accord with Henchard‘s desires; he does not enjoy a strong sense of manhood 
from his role as possessor. As a breadwinner also he does not have a sense of large 
‗presence‘ owing to unemployment and poverty. He abandons, therefore, his role as a 
husband and a father in order to construct his ‗presence‘ in the public domain by means 
of work and achievement of success: ‗She shall take the girl [...] and go her ways. I‘ll 
take my tools, and go my ways‘ (p. 11). The distinction he makes here between his child 
and his ‗tools‘ reveals once more that his practice of masculinity is conditioned by the 
sexual division of labour. For him, it is through the renunciation of the private that he 
can assert himself in the social realm: once ‗a free man‘, he can become ‗worth a 
thousand pound‘ (p. 9). Work and success, for Henchard, become the main determinants 
of his masculine identity, anticipating Andrew Tolson‘s contentions.14 Implicit in this 
renunciation, of course, is his scorn for his female dependents. Since they thwart his 
chance of constructing his ‗presence‘ in the social domain, he intends to get rid of them 
as one gets rid of one‘s horses.  
 Henchard abandons matrimony in order to construct his masculinity in terms of 
success, a bourgeois ideal of masculinity, according to Tolson.
15
 If an early marriage 
has led to ‗the extinction of his energies‘ (p. 9), he hopes that ‗a chaste life will rekindle 
them‘, as Elaine Showalter observes.16 His putting up his family for auction and his oath 
‗to avoid all strong liquors for the space of twenty years to come‘ (p. 18), a self-
disciplinary act, suggest his inclination to employ ‗male energy‘ for ‗productive‘ work. 
As Herbert Sussman argues, ‗[t]he definition of manhood as self-discipline, as the 
ability to control male energy and to deploy this power not for sexual but for productive 
purposes was clearly specific to bourgeois man.‘17 In Foucauldian terms, Henchard 
becomes an example of a normalised, disciplined individual. The discourse of success 
holds him in its grip, making him exercise power on himself, scrutinising his practice of 
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masculinity for its aptness to the norms of such discourses. Hardy explores the 
limitations of such practices of masculinity, the dangers of defining oneself exclusively 
in terms of achievement, at the expense of human ties, affection and emotion. By selling 
his wife, Henchard not only dissociates himself from the female community but also 
‗divorces his own ―feminine‖ self‘, as Showalter terms it, ‗his own need for passion‘ 
and ‗tenderness‘.18  
 Social class structures have already determined the kind of masculinity 
Henchard needs to practise in the social domain; he should earn a living through manual 
work. Such a construction of masculinity, however, does not provide him with much 
sense of power. He finds his ‗promise of power‘, as a working-class man, to be small. In 
Juliet M. Grindle‘s words, ‗he is in many ordinary respects a powerful man, full of 
unused and unapplied energy, who, however, experiences himself as absolutely 
powerless‘.19 Henchard is strictly governed by the conventional discourses of 
masculinity which associate a man‘s ‗presence‘ with the power he incorporates. His 
problem lies in his perception that he has little ‗presence‘ as a labourer and is therefore 
not ‗man‘ enough. His desire to become somebody in the public domain can be read as 
a desire for incorporating a strong sense of power and manhood. Subjected to the 
alternative discourses of masculinity which emerged with the advent of the bourgeoisie, 
he intends to define himself through economic power and social status, assuming that 
such a configuration of masculinity can provide him with a large ‗presence‘.  
 His discontentment with his social class is evident from the very moment he 
steps on the scene, a ‗stern‘ man whose manner of walking speaks of ‗a dogged and 
cynical indifference‘ (p. 3). J. C. Maxwell describes Henchard as a ‗very exceptional 
member of his community‘20 and this, apparently, is the way Henchard also perceives 
himself. As a skilful and educated man — as his reading from a ‗ballad-sheet‘ 
demonstrates (p. 3) — he does not define himself as belonging to the rustic community. 
His superior manner of speaking to ‗the turnip-hoer‘, whom he meets on the road (p. 5) 
and his keeping distance from the working classes in the course of the story indicate his 
inclination to differentiate himself from them. The aloofness he demonstrates in relation 
to Susan at the beginning of the story is partly because of her rustic origins. Governed 
by the disciplinary power of bourgeois discourses, Henchard has worked hard to acquire 
the qualifications, economic and social status and achieve the ‗rank‘ of a middle-class 
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man. The next time we see him, he has become a ‗successful merchant‘ (p. 35), the 
‗Mayor of the town‘, a ‗church warden‘ (p. 72), a ‗magistrate‘ (p. 197), a member of the 
council and ‗quite a principal man in the country‘ (p. 35), chiming in with Foucault‘s 
argument that ‗punishment‘ (here self-discipline) is always accompanied by 
‗gratification‘ (here winning the class subjectivity one desires).21  
Henchard, however, finds it difficult to maintain his middle-class status, 
perpetually afraid that his working-class origins will be revealed. He conceives anything 
that can relate him to his rustic background as a threat to his ‗rank‘ as a gentleman. He 
postpones his marriage to Susan in order to make her appear ‗genteel‘ (p. 73). He chides 
Elizabeth-Jane for her ‗occasional‘ ‗use of dialect‘, mixing with the maids and the 
working folk or her inability to write ‗ladies‘-hand‘ (pp. 127-9). His doggedness in 
wearing ‗the remains of an old blue cloth suit of his gentlemanly time‘, even when he is 
a ‗journeyman‘, further echoes his insistence on differentiating himself from the 
working classes (p. 226).  
Despite his effort to distinguish himself from his social class, Henchard still 
constitutes himself through working-class discourses. As Margaret Wetherell and Nigel 
Edley argue, the way men position themselves in relation to the norms of masculinity 
can be paradoxical; they may claim not be a specific kind of man but are so in 
practice.
22
 Although sharing the assertiveness and ambition of middle-class men, 
Henchard defines his masculinity in terms of toughness and aggression, which, as 
Tolson notes,
 
are working-class ways of constructing masculine ‗presence‘.23 This 
undermines his whole attempt to construct a middle-class subjectivity. His 
aggressiveness (demonstrated, for instance, by his humiliation of Abel Whittle) is 
responsible for the loss of his popularity among the townspeople and the waning of his 
‗presence‘ in the public domain. Casterbridge people prefer Farfrae to be ‗the master 
instead of Henchard,‘ believing the former to be ‗better tempered‘ and a more 
‗understanding man‘ (pp. 98-9). His inability to control his temper in the council room 
also adversely affects his social position: having achieved his social status ‗under the 
reign of self-control‘, he deprives himself of his office by demonstrating the ‗unruly 
volcanic stuff beneath the rind of Michael Henchard‘ (p. 110). He fails to become a 
gentleman, for he has ‗quitted the ways of vulgar men without light to guide him on a 
better way‘ (pp. 111-2). Hardy here shows the determining role of institutions such as 
family and social context in the formation of masculinity; Henchard is unable to practise 
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masculinity as a middle-class man would do for he was not brought up in a middle-class 
environment; working-class discourses, to which he has been directly exposed, still 
govern his deeds.   
 Since his masculinity has not been shaped within a bourgeois context, Henchard 
fails to constitute himself as a capitalist and this is another reason for his being excluded 
from the middle class. In the Darwinian sense, he is devoid of the means of competition 
in the world of success. He lacks business sophistication, rationality and emotional 
detachment, the very qualities his rival, Farfrae, possesses. Henchard is not calculating 
or political, as a man of business needs to be in order to guarantee his success. His 
spontaneous liking for Farfrae and his disclosing of his heart to him serve to weaken his 
social position (pp. 75-6). He is not ingenious enough to think of reinforcing his 
financial status by ‗buying over a rival‘, ‗encouraging‘ Farfrae ‗to become his son-in-
law‘ (p. 112). He competes with Farfrae not rationally and wisely but impetuously, not 
primarily to make more benefit but to ‗grind him into the ground – starve him out‘ (p. 
182). His act of basing his business decisions upon probabilities rather than rational 
calculations is not that of a capitalist. He makes heavy losses as a result of his resort to a 
weather prophet, Mr. Fall, for making such decisions, in whom ironically he does not 
have a firm conviction (first acting according to his advice and then ignoring it).  In his 
inability to pursue the norms of bourgeois discourses of masculinity, to remain a 
‗flourishing merchant and Mayor and what not‘, he loses his ‗rank‘ (subject status) as a 
middle-class man and becomes ‗a day-labourer‘ again (p. 226). Rank, in a disciplinary 
system, as Foucault argues, functions both as ‗reward‘ and ‗punishment‘. Individuals 
will be deprived of their ranks, temporary statuses offered to them for their 
qualifications, once they do not qualify for those statuses.
24
  
Henchard‘s failure in the public domain, however, is also linked with the 
exclusion of emotional relations from his life which, although the cause of his success 
for some time, ultimately brings about the means of his catastrophe by making him 
desperately seek love and affection. Having established his position in the public 
domain, he recognises that this is not all that he wants; he needs to have somebody in 
his life, someone he cares for and someone who cares for him, exposing the 
insufficiency of the norms of masculinity which associate manhood with the 
suppression of emotion and need, attributes conventionally defined as feminine. 
Showalter argues that ‗[t]he return of Susan and Elizabeth-Jane‘ is ‗a return of the 
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repressed, which forces Henchard gradually to confront the tragic inadequacy of his 
codes, the arid limits of patriarchal power.‘25 
 Henchard‘s sense of loneliness, of course, is not a novelty; his dissatisfaction 
with his life is evident from the first moment the reader encounters him. He is incapable 
of emotional communication with his wife because of his conception of women as 
inferiors. He has been unable, likewise, to develop a strong emotional relationship with 
Lucetta, as he reveals to Farfrae. He describes himself to Farfrae as ‗a woman-hater‘ 
who ‗[has] found it no hardship to keep at a distance from the sex‘ (p. 76) and has in 
fact intentionally maintained such a distance. Governed by the discourses which define 
femininity in terms of inferiority and weakness, as Dale Kramer points out,
26
 he has 
dissociated himself from whatever is related to femininity in order to attain a ‗rank‘ as a 
‗man‘. He ostensibly prides himself on being termed by Casterbridge people as a 
‗masterful, coercive‘ man who is known for his ‗haughty indifference to the society of 
womankind‘ and ‗his silent avoidance of converse with the sex‘ (p. 80). In the same 
manner, he looks down at anything which connotes femininity. Despite admiring 
Farfrae‘s ‗brightness of intellect‘, he is contemptuous of what he finds feminine in him, 
from physical aspects such as ‗the slim Farfrae‘s physical girth, strength, and dash‘ (p. 
88) to cultural acquirements such as his ‗penmanship‘. Having himself received ‗the 
education of Achilles‘, he pities Farfrae‘s attention to ‗finikin details‘ (p. 74).  
Henchard‘s ‗abandoning the ―feminine‖ world of feeling‘27 succeeds only in 
producing a desperate longing for emotional relationships, as his sudden attachment to 
Farfrae and his delight upon discovering the return of Susan and Elizabeth-Jane 
demonstrate. He is now keen to constitute himself as a friend, a husband and a father. 
Initially, however, he regards both Farfrae and his female associates as objects to fill the 
void of his life. He insists on Farfrae‘s staying with him, assuming that the young, 
intelligent man can fortify his ‗presence‘ in the public sphere, helping to ‗keep‘ his 
business ‗established‘ by his ‗judgement and knowledge‘ (p. 48). But his liking for 
Farfrae suggests more an inclination on his part to define himself in terms of male 
friendship. In his ‗somewhat lonely life‘ (which mainly owes to his inability to define 
himself through a romantic relationship), Henchard ‗evidently found the young man as 
desirable for comradeship as he was useful for consultations‘ (p. 87). In need of 
affection, he is impressed by what he conceives to be Farfrae‘s kindness, helping him 
                                                 
25
 Showalter, p. 103. 
26
 Dale Kramer, Thomas Hardy: The Forms of Tragedy (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 
pp. 86-7. 
27
 T. R. Wright, Hardy and the Erotic (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p. 73. 
 88 
without expecting anything: ‗―I sha‘n‘t soon forget this,‖ he said. ―And from a 
stranger!‖‘ (p. 47). That he is ready to give Farfrae ‗a third share‘ of his business to 
convince him to stay with him, that he feels relieved when the young man agrees to stay 
and that he immediately confides his secret to him reflect the depth of his need for 
‗some friend‘ to whom he can emotionally relate and ‗speak‘ (p. 75-9).  
Hardy‘s description of Henchard‘s ‗affection for the younger man‘ as ‗tigerish‘ 
(p. 88) indicates the depth of his attachment to Farfrae. In the wrestling scene, which 
will be examined below, he explicitly admits his love for the young man, ‗[discovering] 
the depths and complexity of his emotional needs‘.28 By portraying a ‗[f]riendship 
between man and man‘ (p. 95), Hardy suggests a radical redefinition of gender norms 
and an alternative mode of being a man, a redefinition further explored in Jude the 
Obscure. Hardy‘s critics have different views on the implications of Henchard‘s love 
for Farfrae. Showalter describes Henchard and Farfrae‘s friendship as ‗homosocial‘; for 
Joanna Devereux, too, Farfrae is a ‗love object‘ although there is nothing ‗sexual in 
Henchard‘s attraction towards Farfrae‘.29 Robert Langbaum states that by portraying 
Henchard‘s love for Farfrae, Hardy suggests not so much homosexuality but ‗the 
inevitable homoerotic element in the male bonding‘.30 For other critics, however, this 
manly love contains a clear, if unacknowledged, ‗sexual component‘.31 Hardy was 
aware of the contemporary controversy over the implications of male friendship, as 
valorised by the ancient Greeks. Jane Thomas has argued that many male intellectuals 
of Hardy‘s time found male friendship as an alternative way of self-assertion, 
attempting to define it as intellectual and spiritual while struggling with the illicit 
desires.
32
 Whatever the implication of Henchard‘s interest in Farfrae, he clearly finds in 
male friendship an alternative way of practising masculinity.  
Henchard simultaneously defines himself as a man through emotional 
relationships with the opposite sex. With the appearance of Susan and Elizabeth-Jane, 
he begins to negotiate identities, ceasing to define his manhood in terms of detachment 
from the female sex, allowing women to enter his life, recognising his need for them. 
That his ‗keenly excited interest in his new friend the Scotchman‘ is now temporarily 
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‗eclipsed‘ (p. 67) by the news of the return of his long-lost family attests to his zeal to 
constitute himself through matrimony and filial relationship, accepting the roles as 
husband, father, breadwinner and supporter, the roles he had once renounced. However, 
the husband role, for Henchard, does not incorporate sexuality; rather, it is more out of 
loneliness and an attempt to redefine himself as an honourable man — ‗to make 
amends‘ to Susan (p. 70) — that he re-enters the relationship. He intends now to be a 
breadwinner and supporter rather than a possessor; he is unable to develop any emotion 
towards Susan, feeling no ‗amatory fire‘ for her, and can only be ‗as kind to her as a 
man, mayor, and churchwarden could possibly be‘ (pp. 81-4). The emotional structure 
of their relationship thus departs from the normal model defined by society in that Susan 
becomes a wife without being an object of desire.  
 In marrying Susan without loving her, Henchard is able to distance himself from 
the oppressive model of masculinity which he had previously adopted; yet he still 
constitutes himself as the dominant figure in relation to his wife, both as a decision-
maker and the one on whom she should rely for provision. He is the one who decides on 
their reunion while she accepts the subordinate role of a wife, remaining ‗quite‘ at his 
‗hands‘ (pp. 72-3). He also assumes the masculine role of a provider, to whom she 
should ‗[l]ook [...] for money‘. Henchard is also still governed by the discourse of class, 
still conceiving her as socially inferior: he ‗[castigates] himself with the thorns which 
these restitutory acts brought in their train; among them the lowering of his dignity in 
public opinion by marrying so comparatively humble a woman‘ (p. 81). That after her 
death he thinks that ‗his wife was dissevered from him‘ (p. 119) [my emphasis], 
however, reveals that he needed her at least as a companion in his lonely life.  
 Henchard finds himself in need of defining himself as a father as well, providing 
for Elizabeth-Jane and offering her ‗the shelter of his paternity‘ (p. 124). For a short 
period of time, Henchard enjoys a strong sense of manhood in the domestic domain by 
assuming the roles of friend, husband and father. In all of these roles, of course, he is 
the one in the position of authority — assertion of authority, is one of Tolson‘s ways of 
constructing masculine ‗presence‘.33  
 Henchard‘s sense of large ‗presence‘ does not last long, however. His 
persistence in constructing his masculinity in terms of power and possessiveness injures 
his ‗presence‘ in the domestic (as well as in the social) domain and deprives himself of 
the love he so desperately craves. His association of masculinity with power precludes 
the possibility of forming entirely ‗favourable‘ emotional relationships with others, to 
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employ Connell‘s discussion of different kinds of emotional relations. Henchard‘s 
attitude towards others becomes ‗hostile‘ once they threaten his position of power. In 
his relationship with other characters, which can be seen in terms of Foucauldian power 
relations, Henchard attempts to govern their conduct in order to define himself in the 
ways he desires, as a friend, a husband or a father. The maintenance of the position of 
power is a necessary condition for him but he discovers that other characters are capable 
of resistance and this threatens his masculine subjectivity. 
 Henchard‘s practice of masculinity in relation to Farfrae can be seen to be 
conditioned by the structure of power. Perceiving himself to be older, manlier and of a 
higher financial and social status, Henchard defines himself as the superior figure in 
relation to Farfrae. Conceiving Farfrae to be the means of strengthening his ‗presence‘ 
in both the public and the private spheres, through his knowledge and his friendship, 
Henchard initially adopts a gentle practice of masculinity in order to govern the young 
man‘s conduct. When succeeding in achieving his aim, the older man perceives himself 
a man of large ‗presence, his ‗face‘ ‗[beaming] forth a satisfaction that was almost 
fierce in strength‘ (p. 63). Henchard deprives himself of the young man‘s friendship in 
his ‗tendency to domineer‘, however (p. 88). He regards Farfrae as a friend only as long 
as he remains a compliant man who succumbs ‗gracefully‘ to the older man‘s wishes (p. 
75). He loses him as a friend, therefore, the moment Farfrae objects to Henchard‘s 
mortification of Whittle, an act which for Henchard signifies the young man‘s rejection 
of his friendship and affection as well as the undermining of his authority. Farfrae‘s 
defiance affects Henchard‘s practice of masculinity; the older man constitutes himself 
through a hostile, and no longer a favourable, emotional relation. Either way, ‗[l]oving a 
man or hating him, his diplomacy was as wrongheaded as a buffalo‘s‘ (p. 112).  
Farfrae undermines Henchard‘s sense of large ‗presence‘ in the private domain 
by resisting the emotional relationship Henchard favours, male friendship. Farfrae poses 
a threat also to Henchard‘s ‗presence‘ in the public domain. Henchard learns that he is 
no longer ‗the most admired man in his circle‘, that Casterbridge people wish Farfrae to 
be their ‗master‘ (pp. 98-9). In his attempt both to reclaim his ‗presence‘ in society and 
to punish Farfrae for not reciprocating his affection, he gradually brings about the 
means of his own catastrophic end. His competition with Farfrae over the organisation 
of an entertainment fails; driven as it is by rivalry, Henchard ignores the possibility of 
rain. Not only does everybody go to Farfrae‘s event but all attention is diverted to the 
young man: women praise him and his fellow-men ascribe Henchard‘s success in 
business to his manager. Feeling his ‗presence‘ — ‗the character and standing that he‘s 
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built up in these eighteen years‘ (pp. 100-4) — to be under imminent threat, he 
dismisses Farfrae, hoping to find himself once more the centre of attention. 
With Farfrae‘s further social advancement, his becoming one of the council, 
Henchard attempts to defeat his opponent in business, an enterprise, which, like his 
rivalry over entertainment results in financial losses and the further shrinking of his 
‗presence‘ in the public realm. By marrying Lucetta and by accepting the mayoralty, 
Farfrae eclipses Henchard even more. Henchard‘s intruding on the King‘s visit 
ceremony is a desperate attempt to show that he is still the one in the position of power, 
that he is still a man: ‗I‘ll welcome his Royalty, or nobody shall!‘ (p. 260). But this 
inflicts a critical blow to his sense of manhood. Farfrae vividly emasculates him under 
the gaze of society, ‗[shaking]‘ him at the collar like ‗a vagabond in the face of the 
whole town‘ (p. 266). 
Henchard‘s wrestling with Farfrae — a practice of masculinity circumscribed by 
both the structure of power and hostile emotional attachment — is viewed by Henchard 
as a means of reclaiming his ‗rank‘ as ‗man‘ and punishing the young man. Like his 
former endeavours, however, it is doomed to failure. Overwhelmed by his affection for 
Farfrae, he is unable to practise violence by taking his life. In his inability to define 
himself in terms of power he feels emasculated, quite feminised: ‗So thoroughly 
subdued was he that he remained on the sacks in a crouching attitude, unusual for a 
man, and for such a man. Its womanliness sat tragically on the figure of so stern a piece 
of virility.‘ The departure from the conventional norms of masculinity, his inability to 
define himself in terms of power, though tragic (even horrific, from his own point of 
view and that of the narrator), enables him to formulate himself in a new way, to 
express love for the first time: ‗no man ever loved another as I did thee at one time‘ (p. 
271), he tells Farfrae. Showalter reads this positively: ‗unmanned‘, he ‗has finally 
crossed over [...] to the long-repressed ―feminine‖ side of himself‘, ‗[declaring] love for 
the first time to another person‘.34 Devereux, however, argues that ‗Henchard‘s loss of 
manhood is meant to be taken as a tragedy, not as a sign of renewal or rebirth into a new 
identity‘. The transition to his feminine side ‗suggests a profound loss of power and 
control, not any hope for future regeneration‘.35 Trapped in conservative notions of 
masculinity, Henchard is unable to celebrate emotional vulnerability.  
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The image of Henchard crushed by class and gender structures, I would suggest, 
is meant to be tragic; Judith Mitchell has called Henchard Hardy‘s fallen hero.36 He is 
punished for his failure to meet the norms of class and gender. Yet, concurring with 
Showalter, I would also argue that Henchard is able to redefine himself in a new way. 
His expression of love for Farfrae (which also suggests manly love) indicates the 
possibility of a major change in him, an inclination on his part to construct his 
masculinity in terms of affection and sympathy rather than power and oppressiveness. 
The ‗remorse‘, ‗shame and self-reproach‘ he experiences after his attempt to kill Farfrae 
reveals that he has begun to question the discourses of masculinity which he has 
internalised (p. 271). The reformulation of subjectivity is not, of course, an easy task for 
him; he is not confident about his new subjectivity, probably still lamenting his loss of 
power. Liberating himself from the power of discourses which have for long permeated 
him proves too difficult.  
Henchard endeavours, however, to constitute himself in the new way, to redefine 
himself in relation to both Farfrae and the female characters. He begins to formulate his 
masculinity through loving-kindness and friendship. That he thinks of ‗winning pardon‘ 
from Farfrae indicates his desire to define himself as a friend (p. 271). He runs after 
Farfrae‘s gig, ‗bowed down with despair‘, pleading for him to return home to Lucetta‘s 
bedside. Witnessing his failure to constitute himself in terms of compassion, ‗his 
exertions for Farfrae‘s good [having] been in vain‘, Henchard ‗cursed himself‘, ‗as a 
vehement man will do when he loses self-respect‘ (pp. 282-3). He hates himself in the 
manner Troy hates himself when he is unable to formulate himself in terms of 
sympathy. For Henchard, however, this is the beginning of a re-negotiation of identity 
beyond anything of which Troy is capable.  
Henchard‘s relationship with Lucetta also reveals the extent to which he is 
constrained by the structure of power. In his inability to define himself through male 
comradeship or filial relationship, and no longer having Susan in his life, Henchard 
thinks of formulating himself through matrimonial relationship with Lucetta. While he 
claims that his decision to marry her is taken out of a sense of obligation to ‗put her in 
her proper position‘, he in fact ‗unconsciously [craves]‘ to fill the ‗emotional void‘ of 
his life. He does not regard Lucetta as a sexual object, not having ‗strong feeling‘ for 
her (p. 145). But he is impressed by her social rise, indicating that he is still governed by 
the discourse of class: ‗the possibility that Lucetta had been sublimed into a lady [...] 
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lent a charm to her image which it might not otherwise have acquired‘ (p. 146). 
Marrying a lady of affluence can provide him with a sense of large ‗presence‘ both in 
the domestic and public domains. Having decided to constitute himself through 
matrimony, he defines himself through the structure of emotional attachment, pursuing 
the object of desire and attempting to win her.  
The main gender structure which demarcates Henchard‘s practice of masculinity 
in relation to Lucetta, however, is the structure of power which demands that he defines 
himself as the dominant figure in relation to her. For him, Lucetta, like other characters, 
is subordinate. When she refrains from seeing him, he decides not to call again, waiting 
for her to beg him for a visit. Yet with Lucetta now having turned into a love object, he 
is unable to practise self-sufficiency: ‗a slight inaccessibility and a more matured 
beauty‘ render Lucetta a worthy companion and even an object of desire, ‗the very 
being to make him satisfied with life‘. His ‗mouldering sentiments towards Lucetta‘ 
therefore fan ‗into higher and higher inflammation‘ (p. 174). With Henchard‘s position 
weakened by virtue of his desire for her he is obliged to adopt a different practice of 
masculinity. Seeing no hope of ‗bringing her round by holding aloof‘, ‗he [gives] in, 
and [calls] upon her again‘, only for her to prove distinctly cool towards him and for 
him to experience ‗a perceptible loss of power‘ (pp. 174-5).  
As a man who has associated his ‗presence‘ with power, Henchard finds 
Lucetta‘s rejection of him a threat to his masculine subjectivity. Her undermining his 
position of power brings into play the structure of hostile emotional relations, making 
him act aggressively. He attempts to impose on her a role as his wife, not so much out 
of love but mainly in competition with Farfrae: ‗had Lucetta‘s heart been given to any 
other man in the world than Farfrae he would probably have had pity upon her at that 
moment.‘ His forcefulness suggests a construction of masculinity severely 
circumscribed by the structure of power, which situates men in a position of supremacy 
over women: ‗unless you give me your promise this very night to be my wife, before a 
witness, I‘ll reveal our intimacy – in common fairness to other men!‖ (p. 196). He 
formulates himself as an oppressor even when Lucetta is already Farfrae‘s wife, 
attempting to blackmail her. Governed by discourses of power and male superiority, he 
is unable to define himself as a friend to Lucetta. She is only able to govern his conduct, 
making him return her letters and ‗wash his hands of the game‘, once she has restored 
his superior status by playing the role of an inferior and beseecher: ‗Such a woman was 
very small deer to hunt‘; he ‗no longer envied Farfrae his bargain‘ (p. 248). Henchard is 
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ultimately able to practise loving-kindness in relation to Lucetta, demonstrated by his 
well-wishing act of informing Farfrae of his wife‘s illness and her need for him.  
It is not only as a friend, a husband and a lover but as a father that Henchard 
formulates himself through the structure of power. He loses Elizabeth-Jane owing to a 
practice of masculinity characterised by authoritativeness and proprietorship. He could 
have resumed terming himself her father at least until the appearance of Newson, had he 
not insisted on her taking his surname. Unable to see that his ‗own flesh and blood‘ is 
named after another man (p. 86), he is tempted to reveal to Elizabeth-Jane the secret of 
her birth as he conceives it. In need of love, he wants Elizabeth-Jane to offer him the 
sort of whole-hearted affection a daughter can demonstrate towards her real father, the 
kind of warmth she now feels towards Newson: ‗I‘ll be kinder to you than he was! I‘ll 
do anything, if you will look upon me as your father!‘ (p. 121). In his materialistic 
treatment of what should be a human relationship, he deprives himself of the subject 
status of a father and subsequently of Elizabeth-Jane‘s compassion, once he becomes 
aware that she is not his. Now he is unable even to ‗endure the sight of her‘, because of 
her resemblance to Newson (p. 124). The favourable emotional relation, which so far 
had determined his practice of masculinity in relation to Elizabeth-Jane, becomes a 
hostile one. He turns into an indifferent, cold man, expelling her from his house. His 
need for her, however, obliges him to practise masculinity differently; once seeing that 
she has obeyed his command, he begs her not to ‗go away‘ from him (p. 143) — 
experiencing the same kind of remorse he feels after the banishment of Susan and 
Farfrae.  
Henchard is eventually able to define his masculinity in terms of benevolence in 
relation to Elizabeth-Jane, having already negotiated identities in relation to Farfrae and 
Lucetta. He undertakes to constitute himself as her father, seeing her as ‗a daughter of 
whom he could feel as proud as of the actual daughter‘ (p. 289). From this point 
onwards, his practice of masculinity is no longer delineated by the structures of power 
and the hostile emotional relation; he is no longer domineering and forceful but caring 
and compassionate. The ‗gender regime‘ of this newly-shaped family deviates from that 
of the dominant ‗gender order‘ of the Victorian society, to use Connell‘s  terms,37 in that 
Henchard, as a father, accepts a secondary role; he is not the authoritative figure and the 
decision-maker. The sexual division of labour is also reversed; he prepares breakfast for 
her once she comes to see him at his cottage ‗with housewifely care‘. Hardy here offers 
an alternative, nobler, mode of being a man, which incorporates the so-called feminine 
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attributes of compassion and love and the assumption of a more passive role. Henchard 
now links his ‗presence‘ to caring for and fathering Elizabeth-Jane and being loved by 
her, ‗as though that way alone could happiness lie‘ (p. 286). By portraying Henchard as 
a man who is fortified not by overpowering others but by receiving love and attention, 
Hardy undermines the conventional definition of masculine ‗presence‘.  
The return of Newson, however, threatens Henchard‘s newly-attained sense of 
‗presence‘. In his urgent need to remain a father, in the ‗greedy exclusiveness‘ he feels 
‗in relation to her [Elizabeth-Jane]‘, he once more formulate himself as a proprietor, 
deceiving Newson: ‗the sudden prospect of her loss had caused him to speak mad lies 
like a child, in pure mockery of consequences‘. The thought that Newson may come 
back and ‗carry his last treasure‘ — with which he now relates his sense of self — 
‗away‘ (p. 289), causes him to contemplate suicide, making the pool ‗his death-bed‘ (p. 
292). It is only the hope that he might be able to maintain his position as her father, that 
Newson might not return, that allows him to start his life anew: once it is arranged that 
she should live with him, he ‗shaved for the first time during many days, and put on 
clean linen, and combed his hair; and was as a man resuscitated thenceforward‘ (p. 
294). According to Showalter, he is now ‗humanly reborn‘;38 his discarding of the 
clothes associated with success, power and dominance signals the abandonment of his 
former subjectivity and an attempt to define himself in terms of love.  
By virtue of his emotional reliance on his step-daughter, whose ‗sympathy‘ was 
‗necessary to his very existence‘, Henchard humbly accepts the seed shop from Farfrae 
(p. 296). The relation of power is now to Elizabeth-Jane‘s advantage; ‗her word‘ is 
‗law‘ and Henchard is turned to a ‗netted lion, anxious not to pique her in the least‘ (p. 
297). The demands of the situation make him practise a gentle version of masculinity 
and accept a more passive role. Fearing that ‗an antagonistic word should lose for him 
such regard as he had regained from her by his devotion‘ and thus lead to the loss of his 
newly-constructed subjectivity as a father, Henchard avoids assertiveness, ‗[schooling] 
himself to accept her will, in this and other matters, as absolute and unquestionable‘ (p. 
299). His need for her unmans him; instead of confronting her and asking her about the 
state of affairs, as a father might do, he stealthily scrutinises ‗the progress of affairs 
between Farfrae and his charmer‘ with ‗his telescope‘, only to learn that he has lost her 
both to Farfrae and Newson, when the lenses revealed not ‗Farfrae‘s features‘ as he 
‗expected‘ but those of Newson (p. 304). Henchard has to relinquish his ‗rank‘ as a 
father. Aware that his loss of Elizabeth-Jane is the consequence of his own deeds, he 
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finds himself worthy of punishment and banishment: ‗I – Cain – go alone as I deserve – 
an outcast and a vagabond. But my punishment is not greater than I can bear!‘. His need 
for Elizabeth-Jane‘s affection is dramatised by his giving way to ‗a convulsive twitch, 
which was worse than a sob‘ (p. 307).  
 While in the auction scene Henchard had made a distinction between his female 
child and his basket of masculine tools, now his basket contains ‗Elizabeth-Jane‘s cast-
off belongings, in the shape of gloves, shoes, a scrap of her handwriting, and the like; 
and in his pocket he carried a curl of her hair‘ (p. 312). As a suffering individual, he is 
able to gain insight into the conditions of existence, to recognise the inadequacy of the 
norms of masculinity he had pursued: ‗in looking back upon an ambitious course‘ he 
discovers ‗that what he has sacrificed in sentiment was worth as much as what he has 
gained in substance‘ (p. 313). Though enlightened by the knowledge, he has no ‗zest‘ to 
make ‗another start on the upward slope‘, to start a life anew (p. 314). He remains 
obsessed with the image of Elizabeth-Jane, linking his sense of himself with having her 
in his life, unable to detach himself from Casterbridge. His going to her wedding is his 
final endeavour to regain her affection. In this moving scene, Hardy portrays Henchard 
as a humble man, bringing ‗a caged gold-finch‘ for Elizabeth-Jane as her wedding 
present, asking her to ‗save a little room‘ for him in her heart, a request which she 
repudiates (pp. 373-7). This is the end for Henchard. To see that he is despised as a man 
whose sense of self rests on his being loved signifies annihilation, hence his putting an 
end to his life by walking in the rain. His will can be seen to be that of a man who 
condemns himself for the way he has constituted himself throughout his life, for the 
kind of man he has been, one not worthy of remembrance. By portraying his hero‘s 
defeat and his tragic end, Hardy attacks the constraints of class and gender structures 
and discourses which cause human suffering. Henchard, like Boldwood, is unable to 
escape the dominance of discourses which have pervaded him, until it is too late. His 
pursuit of the norms of masculinity which demanded his dissociation from the feminine 
ultimately brings about his calamity. 
 Hardy depicts Farfrae in sharp contrast with Henchard. Although resembling 
Henchard, operating within the domain of his contemporary gender and class structures 
and discourses, he is not as governed by them as Henchard is. Farfrae‘s practice of 
masculinity is defined by the structure of the sexual division of labour, according to 
which he should pursue a career and earn a living. Pervaded by bourgeois discourses, 
like Henchard, Farfrae intends to construct his ‗presence‘ in the public domain by 
means of success; he is introduced to the reader as a man who has left his native land 
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and is on his ‗way to [...] the other side of the warrld to try [his] fortune‘ there. Farfrae‘s 
ambitiousness reveals his internalisation of middle-class discourses: he has ‗some 
inventions useful to the trade, and there is no scope for developing them heere‘ (p. 46). 
He decides to stay with Henchard only when he is assured of the possibility of progress. 
His determination to stay in Casterbridge, once he is offered ‗the Mayoralty‘ later in the 
story, despite Henchard‘s enmity towards him (p. 240), also indicates his social 
aspirations.  
 For Farfrae, however, having a large ‗presence‘ in the public sphere is not the 
sine qua non of his existence. His light-heartedness when he is nobody — when we first 
see him at the King of Prussia — demonstrates that he does not relate his sense of self 
with success. He is not desperate to ‗become someone‘ through work, to use Tolson‘s 
phrase;
39
 he demonstrates no inclination to defeat Henchard in business as a way of 
strengthening his economic position. He opens his business at a ‗spot‘ as far as possible 
from Henchard‘s stores, in an attempt to ‗[keep] clear of‘ Henchard‘s ‗customers‘, 
thinking that ‗there was [...] room for both of them to spare‘ (p. 112). It appears that he 
does business primarily for economic success and not for impressing others — although 
the latter can naturally evolve out of the former. He is indifferent to public opinion. 
When holding an entertainment, he is not only heedless of appearance but also considers 
an entrance fee, an act which could damage his popularity. His indifference about 
winning people‘s admiration is, paradoxically, the key to his success for he can think 
and act rationally.  
 Farfrae owes his prosperity to his ability to create a balance between the world 
of feeling and commerce, mainly, of course, owing to his ‗shallow emotions‘ which, 
according to Langbaum, ‗are an advantage for succeeding in the acquisition of money 
and power‘.40 There is a ‗melancholy fatality in his voice‘ when talking about his going 
‗to foreign countries‘ yet he thinks that for establishing himself in the social domain, 
this is a step that should be taken: ‗Never a one of the prizes of life will I come by 
unless I undertake it!‘ (p. 54). Whereas Henchard falters through his excessive 
attachment either to the public or the domestic sphere, Farfrae prospers in his ability to 
maintain a kind of equilibrium between the two domains: 
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the curious double strands in Farfrae‘s thread of life – the commercial and the 
romantic – were very distinct at times. Like the colours in a variegated cord 
those contrasts could be seen intertwisted, yet not mingling. (p. 158)  
 
For him, the construction of ‗presence‘ in the public domain is the priority but he also 
considers defining himself through an intimate relationship.  
 Initially, he is not keen to construct his ‗presence‘ in the private domain as a 
husband. He is so inattentive to Elizabeth-Jane that he does ‗not [recognise] her as the 
girl in the inn‘, when he meets her in Henchard‘s office the following day (p. 62). The 
importance of work to him is further demonstrated in the scene where he and Elizabeth-
Jane are brought together in the granary by a note. His mind being engaged with 
business, he fails to detect the romantic implication of the note, regarding it as a ‗trick‘ 
and a ‗waste‘ of ‗time‘ (p. 92). After ‗blowing‘ ‗wheat husks‘ from her clothes and her 
hair, however, he begins to see her as an object of desire; now he ‗seemed in no manner 
of hurry to be gone‘ (pp. 92-3). Once he regards Elizabeth-Jane as a sexual object, he 
defines himself through the structure of emotional attachment, attempting to win the 
woman he desires. He does not intend, of course, to sacrifice his social position for love 
for ‗by setting up a business in opposition to Mr. Henchard‘, he in fact ‗[endangers] his 
suit‘ (p. 109). Not associating his masculinity primarily with possessing the love object, 
once forbidden by Henchard to see Elizabeth-Jane, he easily allows ‗the incipient 
attachment‘ to be ‗stifled down‘ (p. 113). He intends to take a role as a husband only 
when he has economically established himself in the public domain and has the means 
of providing for his wife: ‗I wish I was richer‘, ‗I would ask you something in a short 
time‘ (p. 108). This suggests a practice of masculinity conditioned by the sexual 
division of labour, which requires a man to have economic power before defining 
himself as a husband. He decides to marry Elizabeth-Jane only when a ‗fortunate 
business transaction [has] put him on good terms with everybody, and revealed to him 
that he could undeniably marry if he chose‘ (p. 156). His choice of wife is that of a 
bourgeois businessman: Elizabeth-Jane can be a wise choice not only because she is 
‗pleasing, thrifty, and satisfactory in every way‘ but also because his alliance with her 
can lead to ‗a reconciliation with his former friend‘ (p. 159).  
 The significance of the construction of masculinity in the public sphere for 
Farfrae is also evident in his first encounter with Lucetta, where he finds himself in a 
dilemma whether to constitute himself as a businessman or a lover. Though he is 
overpowered by her beauty, the thought of ‗[losing] a customer‘ makes him forsake his 
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subject status as a lover: ‗Business ought not to be neglected‘ (p. 160). He eventually 
fails to constitute himself as a completely rational man, of course, allowing himself to 
be impressed by Lucetta‘s appearance. His decision to marry her, although rational from 
a capitalistic point of view, is somewhat recklessly taken, being the result of love at first 
sight.  
 Despite his affection for Lucetta, Farfrae is not crushed by her loss for his sense 
of manhood is not tied up with the possession of an exclusive object of desire. He is not 
one of those ‗men whose hearts insist upon a dogged fidelity to some image or cause, 
thrown by chance into their keeping‘; yet, for that very reason, the narrator does not 
categorise him with ‗the band of worthy‘ (pp. 296-7). Once forsaking Elizabeth-Jane for 
Lucetta, he now easily returns to Elizabeth-Jane. Such an easy exchange of the object of 
desire, his flexibility and adaptability, though echoing his ‗emotional limitations‘,41 is 
the means of his survival; for Hardy, though, the one who survives is not necessarily the 
better individual.
42
 With Lucetta‘s death, while he has the chance to enlarge his 
‗presence‘ in the social domain by allying himself with one of ‗the daughters of the 
professional men, or private residents‘, he chooses to marry Elizabeth-Jane, not 
regarding his alliance with a homely wife to be a blow to his social status. He is not 
normalised by class discourses to the extent Henchard is. He does what he thinks is to 
his benefit, not caring that the public opinion assumes that he has ‗stoop[ed] so low‘. 
Having once married for money and appearance and having found his ‗wife‘ to be ‗no 
credit to him‘, he now wants to make a rational choice, to marry ‗a sensible piece for a 
partner‘ (p. 302). 
 Farfrae‘s survival can be attributed to the kind of masculinity he practises. While 
he is an assertive and self-confident man, he is not aggressive and domineering. Connell 
argues that the configuration of gender is a matter of negotiation rather than mechanical 
internalisation of gender attributes.
43
 Offered various versions of masculinity, Farfrae 
has adopted a gentle practice of masculinity. It is such gender practice which is mainly 
responsible for winning the heart of the Casterbridge community and, with it, 
professional and social status. Ordinary people prefer to deal with him rather than with 
Henchard while the ‗aldermen‘ choose him as their fellow councilman and mayor (pp. 
133, 240). The structure of power does not totally delimit his practice of masculinity; he 
does not attempt to dominate or oppress others, whether men or women. His masculine 
subjectivity is more secure than Henchard‘s as it is not associated with the exercise of 
                                                 
41
 Kramer, p. 85. 
42
 See Chapter 2, p. 25. 
43
 See Chapter 1, p. 10. 
 100 
power over individuals who are always capable of resistance. Since he does not relate 
his sense of manhood to the shunning of women‘s society and the denial of the so-called 
feminine emotions, he is a more contented man than Henchard. The discourse of 
masculinity which constitutes Farfrae does not define masculinity in sharp contrast with 
femininity and does not demand the suppression of emotion; he can cry, sing and dance 
and still be a man. Not perceiving women as inferiors, he is able to associate with them 
and assert his masculinity through intimate relationships.  
Yet for Hardy, Farfrae is not superior to Henchard; for him the difference 
between the two is that between ‗the ordinary‘ and ‗the exceptional‘, to use Devereux‘s 
terms.
44
 Farfrae survives mainly because of his moderation and his ability to adapt 
himself to the conditions of his life but Hardy‘s sympathy remains with the unfit and the 
eliminated one. Henchard is eradicated because of his rigidity and inadaptability, his 
stubborn insistence on pursuing the norms of masculinity and class. In The Mayor of 
Casterbridge, Hardy portrays a darker picture of life, depicting more vividly the 
crippling constraints of social structures and discourses. Yet the novel envisages, though 
dimly, the possibility of escape from these man-made structures by portraying a change 
in Henchard. Redefinition of gender norms and alternative ways of self-formation (and 
accordingly the improvement of gender relations) are conceivable but difficult to attain. 
Hardy‘s protagonist in this novel, unfortunately, is not allowed to survive to formulate 
himself in a new way. 
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Chapter 6 
The Woodlanders: 
Defying Social Structures  
 
Though beginning work on The Woodlanders in November 1885, Hardy had written the 
‗original plot‘ in 1874 or early 1875,1 immediately after the publication of Far from the 
Madding Crowd which may explain certain similarities between the two novels. Like its 
predecessor, The Woodlanders portrays the ways in which men of different social 
classes construct their masculinities, questioning the bourgeois and aristocratic 
configurations of masculinity and sympathising with the working-class man. Again, as 
with Far from the Madding Crowd, this novel explores the possibility of resisting the 
dominant gender and class structures and formulating masculinity in alternative ways. 
The woodland story differs from its earlier counterpart, however, in its more 
complicated rendering of the material and the darker vision of life it depicts.  
The Woodlanders, like all Hardy‘s works, can be seen to examine the ways in 
which male characters function within gender and class structures which delineate the 
kinds of masculinity they should practise. An analysis of the male characters through 
the gender structures which R. W. Connell identifies (i.e. the sexual division of labour, 
relations of power and emotional attachment)
2
 as well as the structure of class reveals 
the extent to which their practices of masculinity are restricted by these structures. In 
the Foucauldian sense, these characters need to define themselves through 
contemporary discourses in order to make sense of themselves; they pursue the norms 
of the discourses of masculinity and class in order to acquire a ‗rank‘ (subject position) 
as a ‗man‘ and as a member of a specific social class.3 Pervaded by prevailing 
discourses of masculinity, for example, Hardy‘s men (especially his bourgeois and 
upper-class characters) associate manhood with power. A man‘s ‗presence‘, as John 
Berger explains, is linked with ‗the promise of power‘ he incorporates.4 Such a 
configuration of masculinity, however, reveals itself to be problematic and destructive, 
as the novel demonstrates.  
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 Thomas Hardy, The Life and Work of Thomas Hardy, ed. by Michael Millgate (London: Macmillan, 
1984), pp. 105, 182. Michael Millgate, Thomas Hardy: His Career as a Novelist (London: The Bodley 
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With Melbury, Hardy portrays a man who constitutes himself unquestionably 
within the dominant frameworks of gender and class. Melbury‘s practice of masculinity 
can be seen to be demarcated by the sexual division of labour, which is one of the 
structures identified by Connell as conditioning gender practice.
5
 As a man, he is 
expected to define himself in terms of work, which, according to Andrew Tolson, is the 
main determinant of masculine identity.
6
 Working-class structures also have delimited 
the kind of masculinity Melbury needs to practise; he should assert himself through 
physical labour; the young Melbury used to ‗[handle] trees and timber‘.7 Melbury, 
however, like Henchard, does not enjoy much sense of power from his working-class 
subjectivity; as a child, he was humiliated at the hands of an upper-class boy because of 
his ignorance. Melbury finds his ‗promise of power‘ as a working-class man to be 
‗small‘; he has ‗little presence‘, to draw upon Berger; for having a striking ‗presence‘, 
the ‗promise of power‘ a man embodies should be large.8 Subjected to the discourses of 
masculinity offered by the bourgeoisie, which he has ostensibly found more 
empowering, he has undertaken to define himself in terms of success. Work, for him, 
becomes the means of acquisition of economic and social status. The narrator describes 
Melbury as a ‗self-made‘ man; his hard work can be read as the discipline he has 
undergone to gain qualifications and win a ‗rank‘ (or subject status) as middle-class. He 
is thus introduced to the reader as a timber-merchant, a ‗successful petty-bourgeois‘.9 
Unlike Boldwood and Henchard, however, Melbury has not eschewed romantic 
relationships for the construction of his ‗presence‘ in the public domain; he has already 
defined himself through the structure of emotional attachment (which Connell regards 
as another delineator of gender practice),
10
 constituting himself through matrimony.  
Melbury‘s determination to provide for Grace‘s education can be read as a 
practice of masculinity circumscribed by the sexual division of labour, which requires 
him to assume the role of a provider; it also implies a formulation of masculinity 
according to bourgeois discourses. For the Victorian middle classes, children‘s 
education was of high significance; it was ‗one of the main ambitions of middle-class 
parents‘; ‗[t]he purpose of girl‘s education was different from that of their brothers‘, 
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however.
11
 As June Purvis explains, ‗the content of education for middle-class girls 
tended to stress ornamental knowledge that might attract and impress a suitor‘.12 
Pervaded by bourgeois discourses, Melbury regards his daughter‘s education as an 
investment which will be rewarded by a marriage which can lead to further social 
advancement not only for his daughter but for himself. Grace has ‗cost [him] a good 
deal, like the horses and wagons and corn‘ but, as a capital investment, she will ‗yield a 
better return‘ (p. 88). Fitzpiers‘s proposal is the ‗return‘ he receives for his investment, 
as he insists to Grace: ‗Haven‘t I educated you for it?‘ (pp. 157-8). For Melbury, 
Grace‘s union with a man of high rank signifies the enlargement of his ‗presence‘ in the 
public domain.   
Desirous to define himself as upper-class, Melbury attaches great significance to 
Fitzpiers‘s aristocratic origin, that ‗his daughter‘s suitor was descended from a line he 
had heard of in his grandfather‘s time as being once among the greatest‘. That they no 
longer hold any significant social status does not concern him; what is important is the 
‗rank‘ he can attain through Grace‘s union with ‗such a romantical family‘ (p. 161). His 
life-long endeavour to acquire the necessary qualifications, making a ‗lady‘ out of his 
daughter, has been rewarded by the subject status he is going to win as the father-in-law 
of an aristocrat. He therefore reconsiders Giles‘s engagement to his daughter; to 
approve of such a matrimonial tie would be to reformulate himself as working-class. 
This is what he specifically discerns at the dinner party Giles hosts, where he views his 
friendship with Giles as an association with the lower classes: ‗That‘s the sort of society 
we‘ve been asked to meet‘, he complains (p. 77). Perceiving this to be a shrinking of his 
‗presence‘ in the public domain and the loss, even, of his current subject status as a 
member of the petty-bourgeoisie, he rejects Giles as a son-in-law. Giles‘s fear early in 
the story is thus realised: ‗would‘ Melbury‘s ‗ambition which had purchased for her 
[Grace] the means of intellectual light and culture far beyond those of any other native 
of the village,‘ Giles wondered, ‗conduce to the flight of her future interests above and 
away from the local life‘? (p. 62). Hardy demonstrates the extent to which Melbury, like 
Henchard, is governed by class discourses which define masculinity in terms of 
ambition and success. He exchanges human ties for success.  
Melbury‘s treatment of his daughter as a commodity and a subordinate suggests 
a practice of masculinity conditioned by the structure of power, another structure which, 
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according to Connell, demarcates the practice of gender.
13
 He situates himself in the 
position of power in relation to his daughter, deciding for her and supporting her. In line 
with conventional definitions of masculinity, he constructs his ‗presence‘ in the private 
domain upon the power he embodies by dominating Grace; authority is a way of 
constructing masculine ‗presence‘, as Tolson observes.14 Both Melbury and Grace 
accept the roles required by the institution of the family. Melbury, as a father, takes the 
authoritative role, determining what she should do, sending her to the boarding school, 
making her encourage or discourage Fitzpiers or Giles, while she accepts the 
subordinate role of a compliant daughter; once invited to Giles‘s party, Melbury ‗knew 
very well that Grace, whatever her own feelings, would either go or not, according as he 
suggested‘ (p. 69).  
 The ‗gender regime‘ of the institution of the family here, of course, does not 
always copy the ‗gender order‘ of society (to use Connell terms)15 for Grace is not 
always docile and Melbury is not always in the position of power. Their relationship, 
like all Foucauldian relations of power, is unstable and fluid.
16
 She succumbs to her 
father‘s decisions only as long as they chime in with hers. If she agrees to be educated, 
to encourage Fitzpiers or discourage Giles, it is because she, like Melbury, desires to 
constitute herself as upper-class. She tells Giles, ‗[m]y father says it is better for us not 
to think too much of that – engagement [...]. I, too, think that upon the whole he is right‘ 
(p. 93). That she is subjected to the same class discourses which have governed Melbury 
is further revealed when, as Mrs. Fitzpiers, she comments on the working-class Giles, 
whom she beholds in the market: ‗No – I could never have married him! [...]. Dear 
father was right‘ (pp. 176-7). Yet she undermines Melbury‘s dominance as a father 
whenever his decisions do not accord with hers. Doubting Fitzpiers‘s faithfulness, she 
opposes her father: ‗I wish not to marry Mr Fitzpiers. I wish not to marry anybody‘. His 
intimidation of her on this occasion — his telling her ‗if you refuse, I shall for ever be 
ashamed and weary of ‘ee as a daughter, and shall look upon you as the hope of my life 
no more‘ (p. 168) — indicates that his power over her is not absolute. The limit of his 
power becomes more evident when he has to resort to Fitzpiers to help him to change 
her mind.  
Melbury becomes unable to define himself in terms of power as soon as Grace 
begins resisting bourgeois discourses, renouncing her ambitions for a cultivated life. 
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When he wants Grace to save her marriage by going to Mrs. Charmond, she not only 
refuses to do so but undermines Melbury‘s subject status as a father by ‗deprecating 
those attainments whose completion had been a labour of years and a severe tax upon 
his purse‘ (p. 222). She questions his idea of educating her and his ambitions for her 
cultivation: ‗I wish you had never, never thought of educating me. [...] I hate genteel 
life‘ (p. 221). From this point onwards, Melbury‘s ‗presence‘ as a father, constructed 
upon the domination of his daughter, begins to diminish.  
Melbury‘s authority over Grace is severely undercut when she flees the house to 
avoid Fitzpiers, despite his father‘s command that she should reconcile herself with her 
husband. Upon finding her in Giles‘ cottage, he accepts the worst: ‗In the face of this 
there is nothing to be said‘ (p. 324). He is practically unable to govern Grace‘s 
behaviour. His ‗presence‘ as a dominating father further shrinks when she goes to see 
her husband and stays with him without consulting his father. On finding her after a 
long search, Melbury encounters a daughter who is more concerned about the ‗large 
partnership‘ her husband is going to take than her father‘s worries. At this point in the 
story, Melbury ceases to constitute himself through the structure of power, no longer 
deciding for Grace: ‗you are your own mistress‘ (p. 362). The ‗embarrassment‘ he 
suffers ‗under the eyes of strangers‘ suggests that he is sensitive to the power of the 
gaze, aware that he has failed to satisfy the demands of patriarchal society, to dominate 
his daughter. The loss of his authority over his ‗child‘ (p. 363) signifies the undermining 
of his status as a father and a ‗man‘. Though deprived of paternal power, he does, of 
course, regain the ‗rank‘ (or subject status) of an aristocrat‘s father-in-law.  
The structure of power also delimits Melbury‘s practice of masculinity in 
relation to other characters. Initially overawed by Fitzpiers‘s large ‗presence‘ as an 
aristocrat and a doctor, Melbury takes a subordinate position. When Fitzpiers proposes 
to marry Grace, for example, Melbury assumes the role of a humble man who, unable to 
hide his joy upon hearing Fitzpiers‘s proposal, speaks his thoughts ‗before they were 
weighed, and almost before they were shaped‘ (pp. 155-7). The ‗strain‘ on Melbury 
when Fitzpiers comes to his house also demonstrates that he is overawed by the 
Fitzpiers‘s larger ‗presence‘. His reading a book on medicine and about ‗practitioners 
that have risen in history‘, with the aim of holding ‗a conversation‘ with the doctor (pp. 
162-3), can be read as a tactic he employs to strengthen his position in relation to 
Fitzpiers.  
In relation to Mrs. Charmond, Melbury also constitutes himself as subordinate, 
practising a gentle version of masculinity. Overpowered by her higher social standing, 
 106 
Melbury appears as a courteous man, taking off his hat when running into her on the 
road. His deference, however, is not entirely due to his sense of inferiority but also to a 
strategy to win her favour, as part of his plan to enlarge his ‗presence‘ through Grace‘s 
connections with the upper classes. Fitzpiers and Charmond‘s love affair, however, 
changes Melbury‘s practice of masculinity in relation to them for it undermines not only 
his subject position as the father in-law of an aristocrat but as a caring, protective father 
and an honest man: the sense that ‗his darling child was being slighted‘ and that ‗his 
ingenuousness has been abused‘ makes ‗an almost miraculous change in Melbury‘s 
nature‘, turning him from an ‗ingenuous countryman‘ into a ‗furtive‘ man (p. 216). 
From this point onwards, he attempts to dominate these characters and to govern their 
conduct. The ‗favourable‘ emotional relation thus far shaping his gender practice in 
relation to these characters gives way to hostility, to employ Connell‘s discussion of 
different kinds of emotional attachment.
17
 He decides ‗to fight his daughter‘s battle‘, 
which is simultaneously his own battle, in order to win Fitzpiers back and thereby 
affirm himself as a caring father. Melbury has the hard task of confronting ‗two 
sophisticated beings‘, however, who are ‗armed with every apparatus of victory‘. 
Finding himself in an asymmetrical relation of power, ‗the homely timber-dealer felt as 
inferior as a savage with his bow and arrows to the precise weapons of modern warfare‘ 
(p. 214). 
For Melbury to win his battle entails targeting Mrs. Charmond first: ‗the point of 
attack should be the woman‘ (p. 218). That she has ‗been a bit of charmer in her time‘ 
provides Melbury with the tool he requires to strengthen his position, allowing him to 
challenge her. No longer regarded as a respectable woman, she loses her power over 
him, allowing him to practise forcefulness. It is now Melbury who commands: ‗Forbid 
him your presence, ma‘am‘. Her moral lapse weakens her position by exposing her to 
the power of the patriarchal gaze, reducing her to ‗faintness‘ (p. 231). By convincing 
her to keep Fitzpiers at a distance, Melbury succeeds, if only temporarily, in governing 
her conduct.  
Melbury also defines himself as the superior figure in relation to Fitzpiers. With 
Fitzpiers‘s ‗presence‘ shrinking in the eyes of Melbury owing to his infidelity, Melbury 
can become an authoritative father-in-law. His flinging of Fitzpiers to the ground, where 
he is literally looked down upon by Melbury on his horse, reverses the hierarchy 
between the two, verifying Foucault‘s assertion that relations of power are mobile and 
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unstable.
18
 Melbury thus switches from a practice of masculinity defined by affection to 
a hostile emotional relation. 
Melbury also formulates himself as a domineering man in relation to Giles 
Winterborne, conceiving the young man as an inferior. Empowered by his large 
‗presence‘, his higher financial and social status and more importantly because of the 
fact that he is the father of Giles‘s beloved, Melbury attempts to dominate Giles. The 
relationship between the two men alters, however, over the course of the story. With 
Fitzpiers‘s infidelity, Melbury ‗[loses] faith in his own judgment‘ and decides ‗to 
consult‘ Giles, feeling a ‗strong need of some friend of his own sex to whom he might 
unburden his mind‘ (p. 223). That he regards Giles as a ‗friend‘ suggests the more 
balanced shape their relationship has taken. That he can now regard Giles as a potential 
son-in-law, if only out of exigency, to rescue his daughter from the ‗anomalous 
position‘ in which she will be situated after her divorce (p. 277), demonstrates a 
significant shift in the balance of power between them.  
The portrayal of Melbury, in other words, demonstrates the potential 
destructiveness of class and gender structures and discourses. Melbury‘s insistence on 
defining himself as upper-class and constructing his masculinity in terms of domination 
prove destructive to Grace and Giles. Although severely critical of his character‘s 
practice of masculinity, Hardy allows him to survive, however, probably because of his 
flexibility. The timber-merchant does not persist in formulating himself as upper-class 
or as a dominant father once these goals prove unachievable. 
The presentation of Fitzpiers involves further investigation of the determining 
role of class in the formation of masculinity. The kind of masculinity the aristocratic 
Fitzpiers needs to practise is dictated by his social class but whereas Melbury rejects the 
models of masculinity provided by his class, Fitzpiers is keen to align himself with 
them. As an aristocrat, he desires to lead a life of leisure, to construct his ‗presence‘ in 
terms of wealth, social status and intellectualism. But such a practice of masculinity is 
not possible for him without the economic power of the old gentry for his ‗family‘ are 
no longer the ‗lords of the manor‘ (p. 161). Unable to define himself in the public 
domain simply by virtue of his aristocrat name (as he has no economic power), he has 
undertaken to assert himself by pursuing a profession — a middle-class way of shaping 
masculinity, as Tolson observes.
19
 He has formulated his ‗presence‘ in the public sphere 
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by means of education while simultaneously relying on the power he embodies as an 
aristocrat. He constitutes himself, in other words, within two different discourses.  
The problem for Fitzpiers, however, is that his middle-class subjectivity as a 
professional is perceived to be lower than his upper-class one. That the ‗rank‘ (or 
subject position) of a professional is lower than that of an aristocrat is a view held not 
only by Fitzpiers himself but also by other characters. To Grammer, for example, 
‗though he belongs to the oldest, ancient family in the country, he‘s stooped to make 
himself useful‘ (although there is clearly an irony in the verb here). Similarly, to Mrs. 
Charmond, Fitzpiers is merely the ‗medical man‘ of her ‗own parish‘ (p. 61). That it is 
out of financial exigency that Fitzpiers has defined himself in terms of profession is 
suggested by his contemptuous way of talking about his career: ‗I was made for higher 
things‘ (pp. 48-9). He does not feel empowered by his middle-class subjectivity, finding 
his ‗presence‘, as a doctor, to be little. That he spends his time reading ‗philosophy‘ and 
‗poetry‘ (p. 30) indicates his attempt to associate himself with upper-class pursuits. He 
takes no great pride in his profession, as Grace observes: ‗Fitzpiers was a man of too 
many hobbies to show likelihood of rising to any great eminence in the profession he 
had chosen, or even to acquire any wide practice in the rural district‘ (p. 124). He is a 
doctor who is interested in German metaphysics and who ‗[prefers] the ideal world to 
the real‘ (p. 112). His ‗medical practice‘ interests him only in so far as it provides him 
with the means of ‗investigation and experiment‘ (p. 115); he looks at his patients as 
potential case studies, examining Old South‘s brain and even purchasing Grammer‘s. 
He describes himself as ‗a man of education‘, a scientist and a friend of poets (p. 255) 
rather than a professional doctor. It seems that Fitzpiers desires to shape his masculinity 
through the nineteenth-century upper middle-class discourses which define a 
‗gentleman‘ as a man who lives without ‗working‘, a man whose ‗leisure‘ allows him 
‗to cultivate the style and pursuits of the gentlemanly life‘.20 Fitzpiers is clearly 
reluctant to constitute himself as a professional but in the absence of the wealth which 
can provide him with a life of leisure, he has to remain one.  
Pervaded by upper-class discourses, Fitzpiers aspires to constitute himself as a 
genuine aristocrat, by marrying an upper-class lady, hence the ‗mild radiance‘ in his 
‗somewhat dull sky‘ on imagining Grace to be Mrs. Charmond (p. 112). He thinks of 
having an ‗advantageous marriage‘ ‗with a woman of family as good as his own, and of 
purse much longer‘ (pp. 134-5). He cannot imagine marrying Grace once he knows of 
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her ‗origin‘ (p. 117): ‗Socially‘ they ‗can never be intimate‘, for any ‗matrimonial 
intentions towards her‘ would be at odds with his ‗other aims on the practical side of my 
[his] life‘ (p. 134). As soon as Grace becomes the object of desire, however, he defines 
himself through the structure of emotional attachment as a husband. He attempts to 
justify this decision to remain a country doctor: ‗Why should he go further into the 
world than where he was? The secret of quiet happiness lay in limiting the aspirations‘ 
(p. 137). The fact that he still wishes that she was not ‗quite so cheap for him‘ (p. 155), 
nevertheless, reveals that he is still governed by upper-class discourses. Ultimately, it is 
the thought of Melbury‘s ‗few golden hundreds‘ that helps him ‗remove his uneasiness 
at the prospect of endangering his professional and social chances by an alliance with 
the family of a simple countryman‘ (p. 171). He will at least be able to strengthen his 
financial status through this alliance.  
At this stage, Fitzpiers‘s love for Grace and her accomplishment as a ‗lady‘ 
overshadows her ‗origin‘ in his eyes, making him oblivious to the fact that by aligning 
himself with the Melburys he is undermining his upper-class subjectivity. He has 
constituted himself as an aristocrat by differentiating himself from the working classes, 
as his words to Grace demonstrate: ‗I dare say I am [...] contemptibly proud of my poor 
old ramshackle family; [...] I feel as if I belonged to a different species from the people 
who are working in that yard‘. He also notices that Grace, although ‗refined and 
educated‘, is not ‗radically different‘ from Giles. By marrying Grace, in other words, he 
has ranked himself with the lower classes: Grace‘s ‗blood‘, as she herself admits, ‗is no 
better than‘ those in the yard (p. 179). Once in Melbury‘s house, and among the 
working folk, he further realises that he has become one of them. He repeats Mrs. 
Charmond‘s words, which, for him, reflect the opinion of the aristocratic society, that 
through this marriage he has ‗spoiled his opportunities‘. These words ‗haunted him like 
a handwriting on the wall‘ (pp. 182-3). The power of normalising judgement operates 
on him; he has, in the words of the Book of Daniel 5:27 alluded to here, been ‗weighed 
on the scales and found wanting‘. Aware of his deviation from aristocratic norms, he 
feels deprived of his ‗rank‘ (subject status) as an aristocrat. Foucault describes ‗rank‘ as 
a disciplinary tool which serves both as ‗reward‘ and ‗punishment‘.21 Fitzpiers will lose 
his ‗rank‘ as an aristocrat once he proves unqualified for maintaining that position.  
Fitzpiers is unable to define himself in an alternative way, as a country doctor, a 
middle-class professional; liberating himself from the power of upper-class discourses 
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which have constituted him proves difficult. He resists the new discourse, the new 
community and the new way of life and strives to reconstitute himself as upper-class by 
distancing himself from the rustics: ‗no mixing with your people below‘, he orders 
Grace (p. 183). But maintaining a physical distance cannot differentiate him from the 
villagers for he is ‗no longer regarded as an extrinsic, unfathomed gentleman of 
limitless potentiality, scientific and social‘ ‗but as Mr. Melbury‘s compeer, and 
therefore in a degree only one of themselves‘ (pp. 183-4). For them, he is no longer a 
man of large ‗presence‘, no longer ‗a superior hedged by his own divinity‘. Even his 
‗presence‘ as a doctor has shrunk after his marriage: ‗as doctor he began to be rated no 
higher than old Johns, whom they had so long despised‘ (p. 184). Discovering that ‗to 
keep aloof‘ is not sufficient to restore to him his lost subjectivity and large ‗presence‘, 
he decides to leave the ‗place for ever‘ by buying a practice elsewhere (pp. 183-4). His 
interest in Mrs. Charmond and his inattentiveness to his wife can also be read as 
attempts to categorise himself with the upper classes. Fitzpiers dreams of a tangible 
rupture with the village community (through Grace‘s death) that can provide him with 
the opportunity to become a genuine aristocrat: if he were ‗free‘ again, he believes, 
‗with her [Mrs. Charmond‘s] fortune‘ behind him, he would have the ‗chance of 
satisfying an honourable ambition‘ and his ‗fame, and happiness would be insured!‘ (p. 
256).  
Since his role as a husband fails to endow him with a sense of power as 
breadwinner and protector, Fitzpiers, like Troy, abandons matrimonial duties for a life 
of leisure and pleasure. His promiscuity reveals a practice of masculinity strongly 
conditioned by the structure of emotional attachment (which demands that a man 
possess the object of desire) as well as by his social class discourses. While, for the 
middle classes, sex is to be limited to married life,
22
 in the aristocratic discourse of 
masculinity which governs Fitzpiers, masculinity is defined in terms of sensuality and 
hedonism.
23
 Like Troy, he associates his ‗presence‘ with the power he embodies in 
terms of a sexual assertiveness which transgresses the codes of morality, a construction 
of masculinity disapproved by Hardy. It is only his villains, Troy, Fitzpiers and Alec 
d‘Urberville, who constitute themselves in this way.  
Later in the story, Fitzpiers attempts once more to redefine himself through 
matrimony. His return to the village, his desire to reunite with his wife and the interest 
he takes in his ‗professional practice‘ (p. 317) reflect his wish to become a husband, a 
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breadwinner and ‗a practical man‘. His asking Grace to ‗[m]ake a bonfire‘ of his 
‗philosophical literature‘, ‗plays‘ and ‗French romances‘ suggests a forsaking of his 
aristocratic subjectivity (pp. 344-5). The story ends, however, with uncertainty about the 
new roles he has adopted (as a husband and a professional), his becoming the kind of 
man Grace desires: ‗She‘s got him quite tame‘, as one of the villagers suggests, ‗[b]ut 
how long ‘twill last I can‘t say‘ (p. 365). Hardy himself wrote in his letter to J. T. Grein, 
who had asked permission to adapt the novel for the theatre, that ‗the ending of the 
story—hinted rather than stated—is that the heroine is doomed to an unhappy life with 
an inconstant husband‘.24 Fitzpiers, in other words, is unlikely to maintain his new 
husbandly role.  
Even though it is the structure of emotional attachment which mainly conditions 
Fitzpiers‘s practice of masculinity in the private domain, his gender practice can also be 
seen to have been delimited by the structure of power. He certainly defines himself in 
terms of power in relation to Grace. Initially, he is able to overpower her by his 
intellectual and social ‗presence‘; that so ‗modern a man in science and aesthetics‘ 
belongs to ‗ancient‘ families ‗lent him a social and intellectual interest which she 
dreaded‘ (p. 162). Overawed by his large ‗presence‘, she defines herself as a 
subordinate: being ‗cleverer, greater than herself, one outside her mental orbit, as she 
considered him, he seemed to be her ruler rather than her equal‘ (p. 166). Empowered 
by his position of intellectual and social superiority, he allows himself to lead the 
relationship, to decide the course of the action. He opposes any idea of marrying in a 
church. Yet even at this stage, when Fitzpiers is apparently her ‗ruler‘, Grace is able to 
resist his dominance, insisting on a church wedding. This is partly, of course, because 
his position of power has been further weakened by his infidelity, his fear that his affair 
with Suke Damson might be revealed. After their marriage, however, he constitutes 
himself as an authoritative husband on most occasions, treating Grace as an inferior. 
Later in the story, though himself transgressing his duties as a faithful husband, he 
allows himself to reprimand Grace for her lapse in her responsibilities as a wife; being 
notified upon his return home that Grace has gone to visit a friend, ‗Fitzpiers considered 
that Grace ought to have let him know her plans more accurately before leaving home in 
a freak like this‘ (p. 248). Even when he communicates with her to express a desire for a 
reunion, he does so in a commanding manner, writing in a ‗frigid‘ way, ‗briefly and 
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unaffectedly‘, that ‗living quite alone‘ made him ‗think that they ought to be together‘ 
(p. 295).  
Fitzpiers‘s desire to define himself once more as a husband, however, obliges 
him to adopt a more gentle practice of masculinity. It is now Grace who takes the 
position of power, deciding and leading the relationship, and Fitzpiers has to accept the 
passive role of a subordinate: ‗It is for you to do and say what you choose. I admit, quite 
as much as you feel, that I am a vagabond – a brute‘ (p. 321). Grace undermines his 
subject positions as a husband and a man by banishing him from her father‘s house and 
making him ‗[walk] about the woods that surrounded Melbury‘s house, keeping out of 
sight like a criminal‘ (p. 332). Grace‘s revelation that Giles has been her ‗betrothed 
lover‘ and that she has ‗encouraged‘ him severely undermines Fitzpiers‘s status as a 
husband: he ‗winced visibly‘; ‗dominated‘ by her, ‗he could not bear to hear her words‘ 
(pp. 345-6). The ‗gender regime‘ of their relationship departs from the dominant gender 
arrangements of society in that the husband accepts a subordinate role, allowing the 
wife to lead the relationship.  
It is Fitzpiers‘s gentler practice of masculinity at the end of the novel, ironically, 
which enables him to govern his wife‘s conduct: ‗His suave deference to her lightest 
whim on the question of his comings and goings, when as her lawful husband he might 
show a little independence, was a trait in his character as unexpected as it was 
engaging‘. He owes his victory, of course, to a change in Grace, her inclination to 
constitute herself through discourses which demand that she becomes a dutiful wife. 
Having re-read the marriage-service in a prayer-book and been reminded of the ‗awfully 
solemn promises‘ she has made to her husband, she is ‗quite appalled at her recent 
offhandedness‘ (p. 354). She ultimately redefines herself as an obedient wife, allowing 
Fitzpiers to reclaim the position of power and define himself as a husband: ‗―You are 
mine – mine again now‖. She gently owned that she supposed she was‘ (p. 357). The 
‗gender regime‘ of their relationship once more imitates the prevailing gender patterns 
of society as they both accept the roles a husband and a wife are expected to undertake.  
 Fitzpiers thus survives and, like Melbury, he owes his survival to his 
adaptability; having once failed to constitute himself in specific discourses, he pursues 
others. At the end, he is able to redefine himself as a husband and a possessor (chosen 
by Sexual Selection) owing to his ability to attract the opposite sex and his persistence 
in pursuing the object of desire. Radford argues that ‗Hardy perceives the sexual force 
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inhibiting Fitzpiers to be the dominant natural energy at play in human affairs‘.25 
Though ultimately chosen both by Natural Selection and by society, Fitzpiers remains 
Hardy‘s villain as for Hardy the one who survives is not always the better individual.26 
According to J. B. Bullen, the characters in The Woodlanders are ‗more 
shadowy and less palpable‘ than those in The Mayor of Casterbridge for ‗between the 
two novels Hardy‘s interest in fictional characters has shifted from matter to mind‘. In 
The Woodlanders, characters ‗are distinguished by their mental attitudes‘.27 If Hardy‘s 
characters are less palpable in this novel, it can be argued that of the three male 
characters, Giles Winterborne is the most difficult to grasp. Giles is a man ‗with a 
‗reserve in his glance, and restraint upon his mouth‘ (p. 21), whose ‗taciturnity‘ (p. 106) 
makes the task of analysing him a complicated one.  
Contemporary reviewers admired Giles; an unsigned reviewer writing in the 
Saturday Review (2 April 1887) commented: ‗Mr. Hardy has not often drawn a more 
sympathetic character than that of the undemonstrative, patient, and self-denying Giles 
Winterborne.‘28 Recent scholars, however, have criticised Giles‘s passivity and 
resignation, describing him as a ‗resigned stoic‘, a ‗subdued‘ man or a ‗sufferer‘ who 
‗pursues doggedly a downward path to a miserable grave‘.29 But the question is why 
Giles remains so inactive and resigned. If he loves Grace, why doesn‘t he act as a man 
in love usually acts? What makes him endure the loss of Grace? Why does he accept his 
material loss so easily? And why does Hardy continues to praise him in spite of his 
passivity and resignation?  
One way to explain Giles‘s behaviour, of course, is to read him as a stoic. But 
Giles is a stoic not simply because he is passive or resigned but because he is a Stoic in 
the way ancient Greeks understood the term. Hardy portrays Giles in contrast with the 
bourgeois-minded Melbury and the aristocratic Fitzpiers. Giles shapes his subjectivity, I 
would argue, according to the models of behaviour provided by the ancient Greeks, the 
Stoics. This, of course, does not suggest that he consciously follows the Greek models 
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of self-formation; rather, it is Hardy who attributes classical characteristics to his 
character.  
Giles‘s lack of interest in financial matters, his modest manner of living, his 
ability to dissociate himself from the things which are external to him, his practice of 
self-sufficiency and his self-control can all be read as Stoic inclinations. He, like Oak, 
lives according to reason, harmonising himself with the reason of the world, which is 
fate. Knowing his place in the order of the universe, he does not attempt to bring under 
control the things over which he has no power and accepts things as they happen. For 
him, wealth and romantic attachments are ‗preferred‘ but ‗indifferent‘ and therefore not 
necessary for happiness.
30
 For the Stoics, as a contemporary of Hardy observed,  
‗[t]here is no loveliness on earth to be compared with the moral excellence of virtue, no 
freedom like the peace of perfect self-control, no wealth like that of wisdom‘.31  
Giles is certainly indifferent towards money matters. He loses his houses 
through his negligence in finding ‗the true conditions of his holding‘ and although his 
only option is to write to Mrs. Charmond and ask for her ‗generosity‘, he ‗would rather 
not‘ do so. He writes to her only because of Melbury‘s insistence (p. 104) and because 
he is aware that in losing the houses, he will lose Grace. For Giles, material possessions 
appear to fall in the category of ‗indifferent‘ things; he would be happy to have them but 
can do without.   
For Giles, romantic relationships are also matters of indifference, for which he 
does not demonstrate much enthusiasm, as his lack of ‗elation‘ and ‗discomposure‘ 
when he goes to Sherton Abbas to fetch Grace demonstrates (p. 34).
32
 Hardy portrays 
Giles as a man who adheres to the Stoic principles of wisdom and the government of 
passions and desires. Giles treats the issue of his marriage with Grace rationally. 
Noticing the difference of the newly cultivated Grace from himself, he is inclined to 
reconsider their engagement: ‗If he should think herself too good for him, he must let 
her go, and make the best of his loss‘ (p. 62). His failure in love makes him ‗cynical‘ 
towards the world (pp. 172-3) but not helpless. His misfortunes, which include the loss 
of Grace, his houses and his job, make him ‗[retire] into the background of human life 
and action‘ (p. 109). But he is able to resume his life, detaching himself from the things 
over which he has no control and recognising the domain of his freedom, which is to 
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acquiesce in his fate. When Melbury asks him to woo Grace, later in the story, when 
Grace is still Fitzpiers‘s wife, Giles strives not to act emotionally, thinking it is ‗scarcely 
wise‘ to approach Grace ‗because of the uncertainty of events‘. He regards Melbury‘s 
wish as an ‗unreasoning desire‘ (p. 277). All these are classic Stoic attitudes. 
Perhaps the most characteristic Stoic quality Giles displays is the strength he 
finds in suffering. As Grace describes him, Giles is ‗a man who despite his misfortunes, 
had, like Hamlet‘s friend, borne himself throughout his scathing ―[a]s one, in suffering 
all, that suffers nothing,‖ investing himself thereby with a real touch of sublimity‘ (p. 
219). For the Stoics, suffering, hardship, poverty and even death should not be viewed 
as evil; it is our fantasy that makes these appear as evil; they do not cause unhappiness 
for the Stoic who has harmonised himself with the reason of the universe and knows 
that he owns nothing, not even his own body. The only thing that brings about 
unhappiness is failing to act in accordance with one‘s reason.33  
Hardy‘s portrait of Giles as a Stoic, however, unlike that of Gabriel Oak in Far 
from the Madding Crowd, is not entirely positive. The Woodlanders questions the 
possibility of reaching happiness by acquiescence in the reason of the universe. Giles is 
a melancholic and even rather cynical Stoic, lacking ‗Oak‘s equanimity‘, to use 
Geoffrey Thurley words.
34
 Submission to fate and renunciation entails suffering for 
Giles. In comparison with Oak, Giles finds the regulation of his emotions more difficult, 
as his loss of self-control, showing anger or desire, on some occasions, reveals. He is 
also far from ‗indifferent‘ to the social gap between the Melburys and himself, as is 
evident at his dinner party; he has a ‗self-deprecatory sense of living on a much smaller 
scale than the Melburys‘ do (p. 69). In his relationship with other characters, however, 
he appears ‗indifferent‘ to their social and material standing.  
Giles‘s Stoic inclinations certainly affect his practice of masculinity. Although 
he formulates himself through the gender and class structures of his time, his Stoic 
subjectivity determines the ways he engages with these structures. As a working-class 
man, he is expected to define his masculinity in terms of manual labour. Though 
constructing his ‗presence‘ in the social sphere in terms of work, he regards work not 
only as a means of living but more importantly as a skill. Hardy‘s emphasis on Giles‘s 
tools and Marty‘s immortalising them by employing them after Giles‘s death indicate 
the significance attached to Giles‘s skill. Giles‘s work is an art for ‗he had a marvellous 
power of making trees grow [...] there was a sort of sympathy between himself and the 
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fir, oak, beech that he was operating on‘ (p. 63). For Giles, work is not a means of 
achieving success, a bourgeois ideal, in Tolson‘s terms.35 As a Stoic, he is indifferent 
towards material gain. The narrator observes that Giles is ‗not a very successful seller 
either of his trees or of his cider, his habit of speaking his mind when he spoke at all 
militating against this branch of his business‘ (p. 36). The calamity of losing his houses 
makes him ‗discomposed‘ (p. 106) but is unable to crush him. He not only survives but 
reconstructs his life by means of his skill: while everyone ‗expects to find [him] 
starving‘, he ‗[becomes] one of the busiest men in the neighbourhood‘ (p. 224). His 
masculine subjectivity is not undermined by his financial losses for he has constructed 
his ‗presence‘ in the public domain by relying on his capabilities and his skill, which 
cannot easily be taken from him; if he is no longer a ‗yeoman‘, he is still a skilful 
worker.  
In emotional relationships, likewise, Giles acts as a Stoic. In defining himself as 
a lover, he is operating within the structure of emotional attachment, which demands 
that he, as a man, pursues and wins the opposite sex. Yet his practice of masculinity is 
not completely circumscribed by this structure for he defines himself not primarily in 
terms of sexuality, persistence and possessiveness but in terms of renunciation, 
governing his desires. His sense of manhood is not exclusively tied up with the 
possession of his beloved but with helping her and supporting her (as will be discussed 
below), which for Hardy represents an alternative way of being a man. The structure of 
power does not delimit his gender practice, either; he does not attempt to dominate 
Grace for in his ability to govern himself, he is able to govern his conduct in relation to 
his beloved.
36
 His lack of forcefulness can also be linked to his inclination to constitute 
himself in terms of friendship rather than ownership. 
Since he does not define his masculinity primarily in terms of sexuality and 
proprietorship, Giles does not attempt to govern Grace‘s conduct, making her interested 
in himself, by means of his appearance. He is aware how  
 
external phenomena – such as the lowness or height or colour of a hat, the fold 
of a coat [...] – may have a great influence upon feminine opinion of a man‘s 
worth [...]; but a certain causticity of mental tone towards himself and the world 
in general had prevented to-day, as always, any enthusiastic action on the 
strength of that reflection. (p. 37) 
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The things inessential for Giles, however, are essential for Grace; his Stoic practice of 
masculinity is not therefore to his advantage here. He is unable to impress Grace, who 
evaluates a man through his physical ‗presence‘.  
Since he regards romantic relationships as ‗indifferent‘, Giles is not insistent on 
the pursuit of the beloved. He owns three of the four ‗cardinal virtues‘ as Fitzpiers 
discovers them in ‗Schleiermacher‘: ‗Self-control‘, ‗Wisdom‘ and ‗Love‘. He does not 
show ‗much perseverance‘ (p. 142)‘, however, which is what Grace cares for most and 
what Giles‘s Stoic discourse of masculinity does not allow him to practice. Giles is not 
pathetic in his acquiescence, of course, for his renunciation is the deliberate 
renunciation of a man who intends to define himself as self-sufficient and who does not 
find it essential to constitute himself through matrimony. He is not ‗wretched‘, as 
Thurley describes him, for the very reason that he is the ‗dogged Giles‘.37 When Grace 
wants him not to think of their engagement any longer, he does not insist; rather, he 
takes the position of resignation and indifference: ‗Very well‘, he tells her: ‗I cannot say 
anything till I‘ve thought a while!‘ (p. 94). Once noticing that Melbury wishes to cancel 
the engagement and once reading the handwriting on his wall, thinking that Grace also 
shares his father‘s wish, Giles writes a note to Melbury in a ‗determined manner‘, 
cancelling the engagement (p. 107). On Midsummer eve, in the same way, ‗adhering to 
the off-hand manner of indifference which had grown upon him since his dismissal‘, he 
deliberately chooses not to step forward to win Grace: he ‗[disdains]‘ to shift his 
position, allowing Fitzpiers to ‗[capture] Grace (pp. 147-8), for to step forward is to 
express need and thus to undermine his sense of manhood. Such a construction of 
masculinity is not favoured by Grace, however, and he is not therefore selected as her 
husband. In the Darwinian sense, Giles is not chosen by the Law of Sexual Selection 
operating through Grace; lacking physical embellishments, techniques of flattery and 
perseverance, he is unable to attract the opposite sex. 
Hardy scholars have criticised Giles for his lack of aggressiveness and 
persistence, his passivity and the suppression of his sexuality, regarding such 
characteristics as responsible for his failure in love, his unhappiness and his ultimate 
tragic end.
38
 Joanna Devereux argues that Giles‘s sexual restraint is an example of the 
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‗self-denial demanded by the ideal of the gentleman‘ in the nineteenth century.39 
Andrew Radford, likewise, reads Giles‘s ‗repression of sexual appetites‘ as a pursuit of 
codes of chivalry.
40
 While in most of these discussions the emphasis is on Giles‘s 
suppression of powerful sexual desires, it appears that his disavowal of sexuality is 
more a matter of renunciation or government of desires than forceful suppression. 
Sexuality is simply not central to his masculine subjectivity. His caressing the flower on 
Grace‘s bosom and his kissing her, of course, suggest the depth of his love for Grace. 
Yet, apart from these two occasions, he is not described as a passionate lover; as Frank 
R. Giordano notes, despite his love for Grace, ‗there is something bloodless in that love, 
something that keeps him from expressing any heat or passion for her‘.41 On most 
occasions he is ready to renounce Grace and this indicates that the possession of the 
beloved is not an urgent need for him. He does not persist because, as a Stoic, he 
attempts both to govern his desires and to view romantic relationships as matters of 
indifference. 
Giles‘s lack of perseverance can also be attributed to his inclination to define 
himself in terms of friendship and loving-kindness in relation to Grace. This is 
particularly evident when he thinks of refusing her for her own happiness. When 
allowed to woo her for the second time, aware of their social differences and the 
unlikelihood of her being happy with him, he thinks: ‗Move another step towards her he 
would not. He would even repulse her‘ for her own ‗dear sake‘ (p. 287). He departs 
from the prevailing structure of emotional attachment which requires his asserting 
himself through sexuality. It is by constituting himself as a Stoic that Giles is able to 
resist the dominant discourses of his time, refusing to define his masculinity in terms of 
the possession of the beloved. 
However, though resisting the contemporary discourse of sexuality, Giles is 
governed, to some extent, by another prevailing Victorian discourse, that of honour, 
when he thinks of social propriety. By ‗[clasping] in his arms her he had watched over 
and loved so long‘ and kissing her, although aware that Grace is ‗wedded irrevocably to 
Fitzpiers‘, he feels he has undermined his subject status not only as a self-governed man 
but as an honourable man (p. 291). His self-reproach for ‗not telling her what he knew‘ 
(that she cannot be divorced) suggests his concern about the probable loss of this latter 
subjectivity (p. 292). His attempt to help Grace without compromising her once she 
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resorts to him in the woods is partially an effort to define himself as a righteous man, 
‗[wiping] out that reproach from his conscience‘ (p. 301).  
Giles‘s self-sacrifice in giving his shelter to Grace, however, cannot be entirely 
read as an endeavour to define himself in terms of honour. His altruistic act reflects also 
his attempt to renounce sexuality and constitute himself in terms of fellow-feeling, 
which for Hardy is apparently a nobler mode of being a man. It is, mainly, his Stoic 
inclinations, his ability to master his desires and perceive romantic attachments as 
indifferent, that enable him to formulate himself in this alternative way. He attempts to 
assert his manhood by helping the beloved:  
 
If ever Winterborne‘s heart chafed his bosom it was at this sight of a perfectly 
defenceless creature conditioned by such harsh circumstances. He forgot his 
own agony in the satisfaction of having at least found her a shelter. (p. 303)  
 
Now, for the first time, he really feels himself a ‗man‘, a ‗man‘ on whom a beloved has 
relied for help; that among all other men, Grace has trusted him is enough to provide 
him with a sense of large ‗presence‘: ‗There was one man on earth in whom she 
believed absolutely, and he was that man‘ (p. 304). Proud and contented with his large 
‗presence‘, his helping his beloved, he does not heed the possibility of his imminent 
death. As a Stoic, he does not mind hardship and even death. He therefore does not 
allow Grace to ‗see his face by daylight, for its thinness would inevitably betray him‘ 
(p. 305). His generosity subsequently brings about his death. By surpassing self-love, 
sacrificing himself for the well-being of the beloved, Giles, like Viviette, becomes an 
exemplar of Comtean ‗altruism‘.  
Critics have questioned the value and logic of Giles‘s self-restraint and self-
sacrifice, whether it is for the sake of Grace‘s or his own honour. For Giordano, for 
instance, who has discussed Giles‘s death as ‗martyrdom‘, ‗Giles‘s needless and 
wasteful death is a pointless sacrifice‘.42 Devereux argues that Giles‘s death suggests 
‗the inordinately high price to be paid for gentlemanliness in the later decades of the 
century‘.43 But as Michael Millgate observes, ‗awareness of the ironies surrounding 
Giles‘s death—ironies perceived and emphasised by Hardy himself—should not prevent 
it from being recognised as an extraordinary act of courage, loyalty, and love.‘44 
Hardy‘s narrator makes no explicit judgement on Giles‘s self-sacrifice. What can be 
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inferred from the text, however, is that Hardy laments Giles‘s death while admiring his 
practice of masculinity, his ability to master his desires and constitute himself through 
altruism. He has earlier commended him for his ‗chivalrous and undiluted manliness‘ 
(p. 206) and for his ‗honesty, goodness, manliness, tenderness‘ and ‗devotion‘ (p. 219). 
After his death, he continues extolling him through Grace: ‗Nothing ever had brought 
home to her with such force as this death how little acquirements and culture weigh 
beside sterling personal character‘ (p. 334). Hardy even makes his villain admire Giles: 
learning about ‗Giles‘s generosity to Grace in giving up his house to her at the risk, and 
possibly the sacrifice, of his own life‘, Fitzpiers ‗almost envied his chivalrous character‘ 
(p. 333). For Hardy, Giles is able to achieve a noble mode of being a man even though it 
leads to his tragic death.  
What Hardy explicitly questions, however, is the value of the person for whom 
Giles has sacrificed himself: is Grace ‗worth such self-sacrifice‘? Grace herself believes 
that she is not (pp. 308-9). There is certainly a bitter irony in her return to Fitzpiers, her 
valuing her ‗brush and comb‘ (p. 359) and forgetting all about Giles and even her 
promise to deposit flowers on his grave. Yet the fact that the bourgeois-minded Grace 
forgets Giles does not detract from the force of his actions. Hardy ends the story not 
with Giles being left to oblivion but with his immortalisation through the words of his 
true heroine, the understanding and sympathetic Marty South: ‗If ever I forget your 
name let me forget home and heaven! [...] But no, no, my love, I never can forget‘ ee; 
for you was a good man, and did good things!‘ (p. 367). Giles becomes Hardy‘s ‗good 
man‘ for constructing himself the way Hardy admires, through ‗[t]he purity of his 
nature‘, ‗his freedom from the grosser passions‘ (p. 314), his benevolence and altruism 
and his Stoic power of renunciation. The picture of masculinity Hardy portrays and 
praises stands far removed from the conventional picture of masculinity characterised 
by power, forcefulness, sexual assertiveness and ambitiousness. Giles is pictured as a 
man who has succeeded in formulating himself in ways other than those demanded by 
the prevailing social structures and discourses of his time.  
Giles‘s practice of masculinity is further explored in his relationship with Marty, 
where he defines himself in terms of friendship. Both have rejected not only sexual 
differences but sexuality to constitute themselves in an alternative way, as friends. Giles 
is unconscious of the sexual difference between them: concerned about Marty‘s hands 
which are hurt by work, ‗he took hold of one and examined it as if it were his own‘ (p. 
22) [my emphasis]. He does not perceive her as an object of desire: as Marty tells 
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Grace, ‗[i]n all our outdoor days and years together‘, ‗the one thing he never spoke of to 
me was love; nor I did to him‘ (p. 331).  
Marty is distinguished from Hardy‘s other female characters; as William 
Wallace, Hardy‘s contemporary reviewer, wrote in the Academy: ‗we have an entirely 
new creation in Marty South‘.45 She is portrayed as an individual who has renounced 
sexual differences as well as sexuality for an alternative, nobler, mode of being in the 
world. Hardy does not depict Marty as a representative of the female sex. At the 
opening of the story, she is portrayed doing a masculine job, her father‘s, making spars. 
The distinguishing feature of femininity, her long hair, is also renounced when she loses 
her hopes of defining herself as a beloved, when she hears Melbury‘s words about the 
attachment between Giles and Grace. Her selling of her hair also suggests her 
renunciation of sexual desires.
46
 Marty‘s rejection of sexual differences is further 
revealed at the end of the story, when she identifies herself with Giles, polishing his 
tools and intending to ‗get his apple-mill and press‘ as well to ‗travel with it in the 
autumn season as he had done‘ (p. 333). At the end of the story, she is completely 
divested of feminine features: ‗the contours of womanhood‘ are ‗so undeveloped as to 
be scarcely perceptible‘ in her (p. 366). Devereux argues that Marty, in this scene, ‗is 
described as almost sexless‘.47 By depriving Marty of feminine attributes throughout the 
story, the text presents her and Giles as perfect friends, without the complications of 
sexual difference. The description of Marty in the final scene and her eulogy over 
Giles‘s grave suggest this alternative way of being in the world. Marty is described as a 
‗being who had rejected with indifference the attribute of sex for the loftier quality of 
abstract humanism‘ (p. 366). They are no longer man and woman but fellow members 
of humanity.  
Marty can also be seen as a Stoic. It can be argued that she, like Giles, has 
harmonised herself with the reason of the universe, acquiescing in her destiny. 
Resembling a Stoic who knows the domain of her freedom, she does not attempt to 
bring under control what is out of her control. She is capable of renunciation, 
dissociating herself from the things which are external to her. In Marjorie Garson‘s 
words, ‗[w]hen their love seems hopeless, Marty abjures Giles and Giles abjures Grace 
with the kind of resigned stoicism for which Hardy apparently feels deep moral 
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approval.‘48 Marty disavows not Giles, of course, but her desire for him. She wants her 
beloved to be happy even if it is with someone else. In the midsummer night, she 
arranges for Giles to catch Grace, ‗always doomed to sacrifice desire to obligation‘ (p. 
148) — for Hardy, such Stoic renunciation, though morally valued, entails pain. It is 
arguably Marty‘s Stoic subjectivity that enables her to abandon her sexual desires (and 
with them any claim over Giles) and define herself as a friend.  
Though Hardy‘s heroine, Marty, survives, his hero finds no chance of survival. 
Contemporary reviewers of The Woodlanders criticised Hardy for allowing Fitzpiers to 
live (and win Grace) and Giles to die. A reviewer in the Athenaeum commented on the 
novel: ‗The good man suffers; the bad man not only prospers, but, what is almost worse, 
shows signs of amendment without having been adequately punished.‘ R. H. Hutton, in 
his review in the Spectator, thought that the novel offered ‗a picture of shameless 
falsehood, levity and infidelity, followed by no true repentance, and yet crowned at the 
end with perfect success‘.49 For Hardy, there is a bitter irony in the survival of Fitzpiers 
and the elimination of Giles, which is part of the increasingly tragic vision of his novels. 
If, in Far from the Madding Crowd, the worthy individual (Oak) survives and the 
unworthy (Troy) is annihilated, in The Woodlanders, it is the better individual who is 
doomed to extinction. It can be argued that Giles is eliminated for abstaining from 
formulating himself in the ways a man ‗normally‘ constitutes himself (through 
assertiveness and sexuality) and for his lack of egotism (not prioritising his own 
interests above that of others). Already not chosen by Sexual Selection (by Grace), he is 
eventually discarded by Natural Selection. For Hardy, Giles‘s alternative mode of being 
a man, renouncing sexuality and defining himself in terms of virtue and altruism, is not 
approved by and consequently not preserved by nature or by society. Yet with his very 
portrayal of Giles (and Marty), Hardy seems to suggest that resistance to the dominant 
gender discourses of his time through the practice of loving-kindness is not only 
conceivable but possible. It may not benefit the individuals concerned but it may (in the 
long run) improve the race.  
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Chapter 7 
Tess of the d’Urbervilles: 
Tyrannous Practices of Masculinity  
 
With Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891), the role of social structures and discourses in the 
shaping of masculinity, already underlined in Hardy‘s earlier fiction, is presented even 
more clearly. While in The Mayor of Casterbridge, Hardy explores the destructive 
effects of entanglement in gender and class structures and discourses upon the male 
individual, in Tess he focuses on the consequences of such entanglement for the female 
character. Tess could be said to be even more distressing than the former novel since the 
destruction of others is even more tragic than self-destructiveness.  
In Tess, as in Hardy‘s other works so far discussed, the male characters can be 
seen to formulate themselves through discourses of masculinity, pursuing their norms in 
order to be awarded a ‗rank‘ (subject position) as a man.1 They necessarily constitute 
themselves through the structures of gender and class, which have already set the 
framework within which they can operate. Permeated by patriarchal discourses, they 
associate masculinity with power; ‗presence‘, to use John Berger‘s term, is what they 
need to possess in order to identify themselves as men. As Berger explains, traditionally 
a man‘s ‗presence‘ is linked with ‗the promise of power‘ which he incarnates. It is only 
when ‗the promise is large and credible‘ that his ‗presence is striking‘; when ‗it is small 
or incredible, he is found to have little ‗presence‘.2 It is in the process of the attempted 
acquisition of ‗presence‘ (a rank as a ‗man‘) that Hardy‘s men ruin the female 
protagonist, Tess.  
 With his presentation of Jack Durbeyfield from the opening part of the novel, 
Hardy examines the problem of the conflation of masculinity with power along with the 
consequences of losing such a sense of power for a man and those in relation to him. 
Jack constitutes himself in the domestic domain through the structure of power, which 
R. W. Connell considers one of the delimiters of gender practice.
3
 Jack defines himself 
as the head of the household, making decisions for his dependents. Yet despite his 
relatively large ‗presence‘ in the private sphere, he does not enjoy much sense of power 
in the public arena. His defining himself in terms of work indicates a practice of 
masculinity conditioned by the sexual allocation of tasks, which, according to Connell, 
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is another delineator of gender practice.
4
 Class structures have further demarcated the 
way he should assert himself in the social domain; he should define himself in terms of 
manual labour. Yet he does not find his ‗presence‘ as a labourer and working-class to be 
large enough, as the way he is described demonstrates: he is a ‗haggler‘ with ‗rickety‘ 
legs.
5
 Without strong economic power, he is devoid of a strong sense of manhood. 
Work, as Andrew Tolson argues, becomes so constitutive of masculine identity that, for 
men, lack of success in work or unemployment signifies the undermining of their 
masculinity. 
6
 
Jack‘s readiness to discard his subject status as ‗plain Jack Durbeyfield‘ and 
adopt one as ‗Sir John‘ and his frantic attachment to this imaginary subjectivity reflects 
the smallness of ‗presence‘ he experiences as a common man (p. 7). As soon as he 
assumes the title of Sir John, he categorises himself with the higher classes. That the 
d‘Urbervilles are ‗extinct – as a county family‘ (p. 9), that they live nowhere, have no 
‗mansions‘, ‗estates‘ and lands does not concern him. What matters to him is that he has 
found a way of strengthening his sense of manhood, associating himself with his mighty 
ancestors. Devoid of a striking social and economic ‗presence‘, he fabricates a 
‗presence‘ for himself as a nobleman, tenuous though this is.   
This new subjectivity confers power on him, allowing him to conceives himself 
a man of large ‗presence‘: ‗luxuriously‘ lying on ‗the bank among daisies‘, he speaks 
peremptorily to the boy whom he meets on the road, ordering him to ask for ‗a horse 
and a carriage‘ to be sent to him ‗immediately, to carry me [him] home‘ (pp. 10-11). 
Then, ‗leaning back‘ in the carriage, he is described  
 
with his eyes closed luxuriously, [...] waving his hand above his head, and 
singing in a slow recitative – 
―I‘ve-got-a-great-family-vault-at-Kingsbere – and-knighted-fore-fathers-in-
lead-coffins-there!‖ (p. 15)  
 
From this point onwards, he lives an imaginary life as a nobleman; we no longer see 
him in the real world. When his wife speaks to him in the public house, he looks at her 
‗as through a window-pane‘, as if she were in a different world, before going on ‗with 
his recitative‘ (p. 26). He deliberately shuns the reality of his life; when coming home, 
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‗at sight of the smallness of his present residence‘ — a reminder of the smallness of his 
real ‗presence‘ — he strives to ‗fortify his soul‘ by identifying himself with his 
forefathers, repeating the recitative (p. 29). For him, the fictitious world becomes a 
means of escape from reality and the bitter sense of powerlessness he suffers there.  
Jack‘s subjectivity as a nobleman collides with those he experiences as a father 
and a breadwinner, however, and in the clash between the two, the former, the one 
which provides him with a stronger sense of manhood, prevails. His going to a public 
house to ‗celebrate his ancient blood‘ till late at night, of course, prevents him from 
carrying out his duty as the supporter of a family, for example taking the beehives for 
sale (p. 24). Similarly, when offered ‗a very few shillings‘, by ‗the knacker and tanner‘ 
for the carcass of Prince, his assumed nobility makes him refuse the offer, which could 
have been of some use to his family: ‗When we D‘Urbervilles was knights in the land, 
we didn‘t sell our chargers for cat‘s meat. Let ‘em keep their shillings!‘(pp. 34-5). 
Associating his horse with his subject status as a knight, he honours its carcass: ‗He 
worked harder the next day in digging a grave for Prince than he had worked for months 
to grow a crop for his family.‘ Once distress ‗loomed in the distance‘, following 
Prince‘s death on which ‗[t]he haggling business‘ ‗had mainly depended‘ (p. 35), 
instead of striving to provide for his family, he prefers living the imaginary life of a 
nobleman. He does not so much like the idea of sending Tess to the d‘Urbervilles to 
‗claim kin‘, not because he does not wish to put ‗more of the family burdens‘ on his 
daughter‘s ‗young shoulders‘ (p. 37) but because as ‗the head of the noblest branch of 
the family‘ he ‗ought to keep‘ himself ‗up‘ rather than make his children ‗beholden to 
strange kin‘ (p. 36). Though forfeiting his role as a provider, he continues to define 
himself in terms of authority in relation to his family, which, according to Tolson, is 
another way of constructing masculine ‗presence‘.7 His subject status as a breadwinner, 
which is already vulnerable — he is known to be ‗a slack twisted fellow‘ (p. 35) — is 
weakened further under the influence of the new subjectivity; he has now ‗more conceit 
than energy or health‘ (p. 47).  
When his wife is sick and Tess is away, at the end of the story, Durbeyfield 
abstains from working and providing for his family, reasoning that it is ‗wrong for a 
man of such a high family as his to slave and drave at common labouring work‘ (p. 
344). For him, to work is to undermine his subjectivity as Sir John. Though it is the 
‗season for planting and sowing‘ and ‗the garden and the allotment of the Durbeyfields 
were behindhand‘, instead of working on his land he prefers to mull over ‗a rational 
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scheme for living‘ on his aristocratic ancestry. He writes ‗to all the old antiquarians‘ in 
this part of the country, ‗asking them to subscribe to a fund to maintain‘ him (p. 346). 
He never ceases conceiving of himself as a nobleman for it is only through such self-
perception that he feels himself a ‗man‘. Tess‘s plight, therefore, though more directly 
instigated by her two lovers, can be seen to have been initiated by her father‘s practice 
of masculinity. She pays the price for his sense of powerlessness and subsequently his 
living an imaginary life, abrogation of his roles as a caring father, a provider and a 
supporter.  
Alec d‘Urberville‘s upper-class subjectivity is no less fictitious than Jack 
Durbeyfield‘s. Alec is the son of a bourgeois upstart, ‗a money lender‘, whose wealth 
has allowed him to fabricate a subject status as a nobleman for himself and his 
descendents: ‗conning for an hour in the British Museum the pages of the works 
devoted to extinct, half-extinct, obscured, and ruined families‘, he has chosen 
d‘Urberville to ‗be ‗annexed to his own name for himself and his heirs eternally‘ (p. 
39). Empowered by this imaginary aristocratic subjectivity, Alec, like Jack, constitutes 
himself as a man of large ‗presence‘. He is presented as a man who incorporates the 
prestigious social power of a county squire and the economic power of a bourgeois. His 
dandy dress, his cigar smoking and his patronising manner of speaking to Tess 
demonstrate the strong sense of manhood he enjoys.  
As a man, Alec is constrained by the sexual division of labour, expected to 
construct his ‗presence‘ in the public domain in terms of taking a masculine vocation. 
Further constituted by class structures, he has chosen the kind of vocation his social 
class requires him to take. Formulating himself through upper-class discourses (and 
relying on inherited money), he associates his masculinity not with work but with the 
ownership of property and with leading a life of leisure and ‗idleness‘,8 a construction 
of masculinity to which aristocrat Troy and Fitzpiers also aspire.  
Alec‘s practice of masculinity in the private domain can be seen to be 
significantly defined by the structure of emotional attachment (another structure which 
conditions the practice of gender, as Connell argues),
9
 which requires his pursuit of the 
opposite sex. For someone of his class position, the structure of emotional relations 
demands that he constructs his masculinity not in terms of matrimony and sexual 
restraint prior to marriage (the middle-class definitions of masculinity)
10
 but through 
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‗sensuality‘ and promiscuity.11 D. H. Lawrence, in his discussion of Alec as an 
aristocrat, states that ‗[f]or many generations‘, people of ‗old descent‘ ‗have been 
accustomed to regard their own desires as their own supreme laws. They have not been 
bound by the conventional morality‘.12 Like Troy and Fitzpiers, Alec associates his 
‗presence‘ with sexual assertiveness, entrapping women and abusing them. He prides 
himself on his renown as ‗a reckless gallant and heart-breaker‘ (p. 83). When he finds in 
Tess another prey ‗a pleased gleam‘ appears on ‗his face‘ (p. 44); it is in constituting 
himself as ‗a damn bad fellow‘ (p. 77) that he feels himself a ‗man‘.  
Governed by the structure of power, Alec constitutes himself as a superior in 
relation to Tess; he is a man and upper-class while she is a working-class sexual object. 
As Connell observes, the couple relationship is based on inequality; a woman is defined 
as a sexual object while a man is not.
13
 Alec undertakes to overpower her by 
demonstrating both an assertive and a gentle practice of masculinity. By forcefully 
inserting strawberries into her mouth and covering her with blossoms, he is asserting 
himself both as a domineering master and as a seducer. He is able to make her accept 
his mother‘s (in fact his) offer of work by personally coming for a reply and 
complimenting her: she ‗must be worth‘ her ‗weight in gold‘ (p. 46). He also attempts to 
attract Tess through the techniques of flattery and an arresting appearance (his smoking 
and his dandy appearance), the techniques he needs to master if he wants to be chosen 
by Sexual Selection, that is, by the opposite sex. He is further shown to be a man who 
associates masculinity with aggressiveness. His ability to manage a horse provides him 
with a sense of power and more importantly with a means of impressing the object of 
desire. His galloping down the slope with an unmanageable horse becomes, for him, an 
assertion of masculinity: ‗If any living man can manage this horse I can‘ (p. 54).   
 Yet Alec‘s show of power fails to impress Tess, who has no inclination to define 
herself through the structure of emotional attachment, as a beloved. His ‗kiss of 
mastery‘ in the gig, when taking her to his mansion, makes him feel a man of large 
‗presence‘ but ‗[h]is ardour was nettled‘ once she wipes away the kiss on her cheek (p. 
56). That he is not willingly chosen by Tess undercuts his masculine ‗presence‘ or ‗his 
masculine sense of self‘, in Richard Nemesvari‘s words.14 By refusing to constitute 
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herself as a subordinate, although she is only a ‗farm girl‘, she further undermines his 
position of supremacy as an upper-class man; she escapes from her captivity in his gig, 
pretending that her hat has blown off. His fury at ‗her trick‘ and his attempt ‗to drive 
back upon her‘, to ‗hem her in between the gig and the hedge‘ (p. 57) are futile attempts 
to reassert himself. His relationship with Tess, which can be interpreted in terms of 
Foucauldian power relations,
15
 is not stable; he is unable to maintain his dominance 
because Tess will not act as he demands. His emotional relationship with Tess 
accordingly becomes ‗hostile‘, to employ Connell‘s contention that emotional 
attachments can be ‗favourable‘, ‗hostile‘ or ambivalent;16 he has to resort to force in 
order to reclaim his dominance.  
Alec tries to define himself as the winner of the object of desire by playing the 
role of a supporter (rescuing her from her vulgar companions) and by constituting 
himself as a well-wisher and a friend to her family (buying them another horse). When 
these strategies fail, he resorts to drugging and then raping her (in the first edition; in 
subsequent editions, he merely takes advantage of her semi-conscious mood). Then, as 
soon as he succeeds in asserting himself as her sexual possessor, he no longer yearns for 
her. Like Troy, in other words, he associates his masculinity with sensuality and not 
love. When taking her back home, he is quite a different man, forgetting ‗his struggle to 
kiss her‘ and speaking to her ‗coldly‘ (p. 76). Though managing to dominate her, he is 
unable to enjoy a strong sense of ‗presence‘ in that regard for he has mastered her 
physically and not emotionally. As Rosemarie Morgan argues, Tess‘s ‗spirit remains 
self-governing and unyielding‘.17 By refusing to love him, she undermines his image of 
himself both as a man and as a member of the gentry: ‗He emitted a laboured breath, as 
if the scene were getting rather oppressive to his heart, or to his conscience, or to his 
gentility‘ (p. 78).  
 Failing in his attempt to retain possession of Tess, Alec attempts to construct his 
masculinity in an alternative way. The next time we see Alec, he is ‗a converted man‘ 
with ‗words of Scripture‘ upon his mouth (p. 305). Exposed to religious discourses by 
Parson Clare, he has undertaken to constitute himself as a man of God, aiming to 
‗devote‘ himself ‗to missionary work in Africa‘ (p. 315). Alec‘s new subjectivity is, 
nevertheless, fragile, easily undercut by Tess‘s looks. For even though ‗[t]he inferior 
man was quiet in him now‘, ‗it was surely not extracted, nor even entirely subdued‘ (pp. 
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309-10); it therefore rebels against the newly-assumed religious subjectivity. He 
attempts to ‗fortify himself‘ by reading Mr. Clare‘s ‗warm and encouraging letter [...] 
on the path of life he has chosen‘, as well as ‗some passages from his Bible‘ (p. 312).  
If Alec‘s subject position as a preacher is a fabricated one, there is, however, a 
real change in him in terms of his emotions for Tess; sexual desire still exists but now 
he loves her as well, as his inclination to define himself through matrimony indicates. 
Determined to become her husband, he feels emasculated when she declares herself the 
wife of another man: ‗he stopped dead‘ on hearing the news (p. 316). His endeavour, 
until the end of the story, is to win Tess from his rival and therefore to define himself as 
the one in the position of power: ―I was your master once! I will be your master again. 
If you are any man‘s wife you are mine!‘ (p. 332). According to Nemesvari, Alec‘s 
‗renewed assault on Tess‘ is mainly motivated by ‗the desire to defeat Angel and the 
version of masculine identity he represents‘, which is constructed in term of sexual 
restraint, as opposed to Alec‘s sensuality.18  
To reinstate himself in the position of power (and accordingly to reconstruct his 
‗presence), Alec needs to prevent Angel from taking that position, enticing Tess from 
him. He therefore employs a range of techniques to attract and impress her. By 
constituting himself as a friend and a provider, Alec eventually succeeds in taking the 
position of dominance, as Tess‘s possessor. Permeated by the prevalent discourses of 
his time, which associate masculinity with power and sexuality, he is unable to envisage 
formulating himself in an alternative way, through loving-kindness in relation to Tess. 
The price he pays for his practice of masculinity is nevertheless heavy, both his own life 
and hers.  
That Hardy‘s protagonist, Angel Clare, is a complicated character is a view 
shared by both contemporary and recent critics of Hardy. A reviewer in the December 
1891 issue of the Pall Mall Gazette commented that Angel was a ‗difficult type [...] to 
present‘.19 William Watson, writing in the Academy in February 1892, also found Angel 
a ‗perplexing and difficult character‘.20 For later Hardy scholars, likewise, Angel is a 
complex character. Rosemary Sumner describes him as a man of ‗unresolved conflicting 
views‘21 and for Ellen Lew Sprechman, he is ‗a young man of uncertain philosophies‘.22 
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The problem with Angel is that he is a man with multiple contradictory subject statuses. 
Hardy seems to examine in him the possibility of the formation of masculinity outside 
the domain of prevailing Victorian gender and class structures and discourses. Angel 
refrains from constructing his masculinity in terms of sexuality, success, ambition and 
religious practice and instead strives to construct new subjectivities for himself as an 
intellectual, a philosopher, a rationalist and a self-governed man. The only status he 
appears to maintain is his class subjectivity, which is perhaps what undermines his 
entire project of self-formation.  
When he first appears in the story, Angel is described as ‗a desultory tentative 
student of something‘ (p. 16), apparently looking for some ‗games of truth‘ through 
which to constitute himself.
23
 He is a middle-class man, the son of an Anglican parson, 
who is expected to follow the family, class and religious discourses to which he is 
exposed, to become ‗a minister of the Gospel‘ (p. 115). Despite his ‗warmest affection‘ 
for the Church, however, he questions certain of its doctrines, believing that religion 
requires ‗reconstruction‘ (pp. 115-6). Having conceived himself as a ‗stickler for good 
morals‘ and desired to become a ‗teacher of men‘, he is disappointed to find himself 
logically incapable of accepting ordination (p. 224). Though not specifically alluded to, 
it can be argued that the alternative discourse that Angel the moralist is inclined to 
pursue is that of Stoicism. The book he has ordered is described as ‗a system of 
philosophy‘ and the most ‗moral‘ one (p. 115). The text does not clarify what precise 
philosophy Angel pursues; it might be the Positivist philosophy, as T. R. Wright 
suggests,
24
 but it could also be Stoicism. Angel‘s preference to work for the ‗honour and 
glory of man‘ rather than for the ‗honour and glory of God‘, his belief ‗that it might 
have resulted far better for mankind if Greece had been the source of the religion of 
modern civilization, and not Palestine‘ (p. 158) and his quoting the Stoic emperor at the 
time of his distress, as we will see below, suggest his substitution of Christianity with 
this pagan philosophy.
25
 His indifference towards economic and social success, his 
having ‗himself well in hand‘, his being ‗free from grossness‘ and his being ‗rather 
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bright than hot‘ (p. 193), though interpretable in various ways, can also be read as Stoic 
inclinations.  
Angel‘s ‗desultory studies, his undertakings and mediations‘, are carried out in 
order to acquire the theoretical knowledge which can help him constitute himself in the 
manner of the Stoics, as a philosopher. His developing ‗considerable indifference to 
social forms and observances‘, his scorn for ‗material distinctions of rank and wealth‘ 
and his lack of interest in ‗the good old families‘ (p. 116), along with the ‗austerities‘ he 
undergoes, can be conceived as the effect of the Stoic system of thought on him.
 26
 This 
austere morality, however, is unable to provide him with a strong sense of self. That he 
is ‗tossed by doubts and difficulties like a cork in the waves‘ (p. 225) — suggesting that 
he still suffers from ‗the ache of modernism‘ (p. 124) — that he leaves his life of 
austerity for a new experience in London and that he ‗[plunges] into eight-and forty 
hours‘ dissipation with a stranger‘ (p. 225) demonstrate his inability, at this stage, to 
constitute himself as a Stoic, either in terms of the development of a sense of 
equanimity or in the government of his desires and impulses. Despite this lapse, he 
nevertheless attempts to formulate himself as a Stoic, as the way of life he has led after 
this episode demonstrates.   
Owing to his ‗early association with country solitudes‘ and affected by the pagan 
worldview, Angel the philosopher, develops an ‗aversion to modern town life‘, an 
‗aversion‘ which ‗shut him out from such success as he might have aspired to by 
entering a mundane profession in the impracticability of the spiritual one‘ (pp. 116-7). 
He is thus left perplexed as to how to construct his ‗presence‘ in the social domain, 
without losing his desired subject status as an intellectual and a philosopher. As a man 
he is expected to define himself in terms of economic power. Farming (a choice of 
profession which suggests a construction of masculinity within the structure of the 
sexual division of labour) is what he thinks of pursuing. It is a profession which, 
although ‗anticipated neither by him nor by others‘ (p. 114), can be the means of 
acquiring financial ‗independence, without the sacrifice of what he valued even more 
than a competency – intellectual liberty‘ (p. 117). It may appear to his family a step 
down in class, but in refraining from constructing his ‗presence‘ in terms of success, a 
determinant of middle-class masculinity, as Tolson notes,
27
 Angel rejects their values.  
 The main purpose of his sojourn at Talbothays, of course, is to achieve the 
necessary qualifications for the construction of his ‗presence‘ in the public domain as an 
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agriculturalist, and hence to achieve a ‗rank‘ (subject position) as a ‗man‘. But he also 
continues to formulate himself as a philosopher. His knowledge of human nature, up to 
this point, has been theoretical, obtained mainly from books; ‗he soon preferred‘, 
however, to obtain some practical knowledge, ‗to read human nature by taking his 
meals downstairs in the general dining-kitchen, with the dairyman and his wife and the 
maids and men‘ (p. 117). Yet his sense of class-consciousness demonstrates that he is 
still governed by middle-class discourses. He feels his ‗[s]itting down at a level member 
of the dairyman‘s household‘ to be ‗an undignified proceeding‘ (pp. 117-8), a feeling at 
odds with the Stoic teachings (which regard social status as a matter of indifference) and 
with his subject position as an intellectual. His sitting at a separate table, though 
arranged by the dairyman‘s wife‘s, suggests that he is constituted by class structures.  
Gradually, however, Angel begins to distance himself from his class subjectivity 
and to align himself with the workers on the farm: ‗The longer he resided here the less 
objection had he to his company, and the more did he like to share quarters with them in 
common‘ (p. 117). He is able to disentangle himself from class structures and regard the 
working-folks as ‗fellow creatures‘. By virtue of his living in close contact with Nature, 
while studying human nature, he achieves a fresh perspective on life: ‗He grew away 
from old associations and saw something new in life and humanity‘ (p. 118). As soon as 
he detaches himself from middle-class mentality, equipped as he is with Stoic 
knowledge (and its optimistic view of the universe),
28
 he begins to experience himself in 
a new way, to find himself ‗wonderfully free from the chronic melancholy which is 
taking hold of the civilized races with the decline of belief in a beneficent Power‘ (p. 
118).  
It is at this time that Tess enters Angel‘s life, a test of his liberal-mindedness, his 
heterodoxy and his Stoic self-government. He is first attracted to her fluty voice and 
then to her beauty and her mentality — she shares his pessimistic view of life, which he 
is now only beginning to overcome; a task in which he has not apparently been so 
successful, as his description of life as a ‗hobble‘ demonstrates (p. 123). Initially, he 
does not constitute himself entirely through the structure of emotional attachment, 
which demands that a man asserts himself by pursuing and winning of the opposite sex. 
His attraction to Tess is more spiritual than physical. The narrator describes him as ‗less 
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Byronic than Shelleyan‘, ‗more spiritual than animal‘ and his love as more ‗ethereal‘ 
than physical (p. 192). Angel can be seen as a man whose ‗presence‘ depends on the 
power he embodies in terms of self-government rather than sexual assertiveness.  
Angel‘s self-discipline can be seen as a configuration of masculinity according 
to the Victorian model of the gentleman.
29
 This model of masculinity, as James Eli 
Adams argues, was constructed by middle-class men as a response to accusations of 
effeminacy. During the nineteenth century, there were concerns about the feminisation 
of British men mainly assumed to be caused by industrialism and concomitant cultural 
and social transformations. The gendered division of spheres required the separation of 
fathers from sons, with sons being raised in the domestic (feminine) domain. The 
pursuit of career and economic success also entailed the postponement of marriage and 
the practice of ‗sexual restraint‘, conventionally a feminine characteristic. The attempt 
to differentiate ‗masculine self-discipline‘ from ‗feminine self-denial‘, describing the 
former as active and ‗aggressive self-mastery‘ and the latter as passive ‗surrender of the 
will to external authority‘, was part of this reconstruction of masculinity.30  
Angel‘s attempt to build himself as an intellectual and a philosopher, 
constructing his ‗presence‘ in terms of the power of mind rather than body, can be seen 
as part of this cultural redefinition of masculinity. Tess, for example, describes him as a 
‗bookish, musical, thinking young man‘ (p. 124). But his self-discipline is also a 
specifically Stoic attribute. Stoics, after all, were those who placed most emphasis on 
the practice of asceticism and self-mastery as a way of being in the world.  
Angel‘s asceticism is evident in relation to Tess whom he refuses to treat as a 
sexual object. His ‗preoccupation‘ with her, he insists, is ‗no more than a philosopher‘s 
regard of an exceedingly novel, fresh and interesting specimen of womankind‘ (p. 129). 
His much discussed idealisation of Tess,
31
 his rendering her as an abstraction, as ‗a 
divinity‘, as ‗Artemis and ‗Demeter‘ (p. 130) can also be read as a refusal to see her 
simply as another working-class girl. He refrains from thinking of her as a woman of 
flesh because for him to desire a milk-maid signifies the undermining of his class 
subjectivity.  
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But Angel is unable to resist defining himself in terms of sexuality. Despite his 
endeavour to see Tess as ‗ethereal‘, she becomes more and more corporeal, appearing as 
a ‗dazzlingly fair dairymaid‘ (p. 131), exuding ‗real vitality‘ and ‗real warmth‘ (p. 150). 
He is eventually obliged to define himself through the structure of emotional 
attachment, to constitute himself as a ‗man‘ and regard Tess as a sexual object. 
Overcome by his desire for her — ‗burdened inwardly by a waxing fervour of passion‘ 
for her (p. 149) — he abandons his subject positions as a self-governed Stoic and a 
middle-class man to assert himself as a lover. Noting the beauty of her facial features, 
when she is milking a cow, he forsakes ‗[r]esolutions, reticences, prudences, fears‘, 
‗jumped up from his seat, [...] went quickly towards the desire of his eyes, and kneeling 
down beside her, clasped her in his arms‘ (p. 151). His infatuation with her renders 
Angel a sensual man after all. On an earlier occasion, Hardy employs a 
Schopenhauerian metaphor to suggest the strength of the sexual attraction of Angel and 
Tess towards each other: ‗All the while they were converging, under an irresistible law, 
as surely as two streams in one vale‘ (p. 129). They cannot resist defining themselves 
through the structure of emotional attachment. 
As soon as he betrays his emotion, Angel is distressed; his new subjectivity as a 
passionate lover has destabilised his conception of himself as a self-governed man, a 
rationalist as well as a middle-class man: ‗his heart had outrun his judgement‘ (p. 152). 
Having associated his masculinity with his power to govern his desires, he does not 
know how to define himself, ‗what to think of himself‘; ‗the novelty, unpremeditation, 
mastery of the circumstance disquieted him‘ (p. 153). His restlessness, however, is not 
entirely because of his failure to control his impulses but because he desires a woman 
who is conceived to be a social inferior and thus a threat to his class subjectivity.  
 In an attempt to regain his sense of manhood, as far as it is associated with the 
containment of his desires, he undertakes to ‗hold aloof‘, to avoid seeing her for ‗flesh 
and blood could not resist it‘. Yet his craving for her is more powerful than he imagines: 
‗He was driven towards her by every heave of his impulse.‘ Keen to define his 
masculinity in terms of possessing Tess without undermining his subject status as a 
rationalist, he strives to find a logical reason for marrying her: ‗Would not a farmer 
want a wife?‘ He finds the answer to this question a ‗pleasing‘ one (p. 155) for the view 
of a probable marriage with her in this practical way allows him to become a lover 
while defining himself as a man who acts according to his reason rather than simply his 
emotions. 
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To assert himself as a rational man, however, is not sufficient to restore to him 
his sense of self; he needs also to confirm his class subjectivity, which requires his 
rendering the object of desire middle-class. He resorts therefore when visiting his 
parents to a set of reasons which attributes to Tess the values of his social class. He 
describes her as ‗equally pure and virtuous as Miss Chant‘, ‗a regular church-goer‘, 
‗virtuous as a vestal‘ and ‗a lady‘ ‗in feeling and nature‘ (pp. 163-4). His ‗rank‘ as 
middle-class man will be taken from him if he proves no longer to be qualified to 
maintain that position. As Foucault has argued, in a disciplinary system, ‗rank‘ is used 
both as ‗reward‘ and ‗punishment‘; ‗rank‘ is a temporary status offered to individuals 
according to their qualifications. It is withdrawn from them once they lose the necessary 
qualifications for maintaining that position.
32
 Despite the ‗sense of luxury‘ Angel enjoys 
as an intellectual, a man who has ‗[thrown] off splints and bandages‘ (p. 168), he still 
formulates himself as middle-class, suggestive of Margaret Wetherell‘s and Nigel 
Edley‘s discussion that one can simultaneously be resistant to and compliant with 
discourses.
33
 Angel is unaware of the extent to which he is disciplined by class 
discourses; he does not term himself conventional or middle-class but in practice he is 
both.  
Once persuaded that his assuming a role as Tess‘s husband will not undercut the 
self-conception he has so far developed, Angel proposes marriage. As soon as he thinks 
of constituting himself through matrimony, he practises masculinity as defined by the 
structure of emotional attachment, pursuing Tess and attempting to persuade her into 
marrying him. He now associates his ‗presence‘ (and even his sense of self) with 
owning the object of desire. He is unable to imagine a negative reply from her. Angel 
the lover overshadows the self-governed, upper-class Angel: you have ‗made me 
restless, I can‘t read, or play‘; ‗I want to know [...] that you will some day be mine‘ (p. 
174). He acts contrary to the Stoic lessons he has learned; he is obsessed with his 
beloved and regards her as essential for his happiness.
34
  
Angel‘s yearning for Tess is ostensibly rooted in her reinforcing his sense of 
manhood, conferring power on him in various ways. Primarily, he longs for her purity. 
Marrying Tess can empower him by allowing him to feel himself a man who possesses 
a previously-unpossessed object of desire. But this is not all Tess‘s purity can bestow on 
him. As a man proud of himself as a moralist, a man who ‗loved spotlessness, and hated 
impurity‘, marriage to the untainted Tess implies the regaining of his own lost subject 
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status as a chaste man. As Sumner argues, ‗he needs her to be the embodiment of the 
purity which he feels he has lost‘.35 His desire to embrace purity through Tess reveals 
the way that he continues to constitute himself through middle-class discourses of 
morality. As Patricia Ingham argues, according to nineteenth-century middle-class 
discourses, ‗by uniting himself in marriage to a satisfactory exponent of femininity‘, the 
middle-class man ‗could subsume her identity into his, and become possessed of her [...] 
purity, along with a domestic haven of comfort‘.36 It is in this sense, I would suggest, 
that Angel regards Tess as ‗the great prize‘ of his ‗life‘ (p. 224).  
Tess also situates Angel in the position of power by accentuating his elevated 
image of himself as an intellectual, a philosopher and a social superior. This is evident 
from his relating the grounds for her refusal to ‗her sense of incompetence for the 
position of wife to a man like himself‘ (p. 175). By looking up to him and absorbing his 
thoughts and manners, she provides him with a sense of large ‗presence‘: she addresses 
him respectfully as ‗Mr Clare‘; she regards him as ‗a guide, philosopher‘, ‗a saint‘ and 
‗a seer‘ (p. 192); she has caught ‗his vocabulary, his accent, and fragments of his 
knowledge‘ (p. 175). In Angel‘s love for Tess, according to Margaret R. Higonnet, ‗a 
certain narcissism‘ is discernable.37 With Tess, he feels himself a ‗godlike‘ figure (p. 
181), a man whose ‗promise of power‘, to use Berger‘s words, is large.  
By constituting herself as his lover and the one dependent on him, moreover, 
Tess helps to enlarge Angel‘s ‗presence‘. That he cares for the strength of her love is 
evident in his rejection of Izz after having learned that Tess ‗would have laid down her 
life‘ for him (p. 270). In Brazil, he expects her to write to him, despite his having 
forbidden her to do so, and rushes to her once he reads the passionate letter she has 
written from Flintcomb-Ash, when he finds himself reinstated in the position of power. 
Her reliance on him is another factor involved in strengthening Angel‘s sense of 
manhood; he is aware that ‗she depended for her happiness entirely on him‘ (p. 196): 
‗how utterly and irretrievably this little womanly thing is the creature of my good or bad 
faith and fortune? [...] What I am, she is. What I become she must become. What I 
cannot be she cannot be‘ (pp. 217-8).  
The knowledge of her being a d‘Urberville fills Angel with further sense of 
power. He is ‗extremely interested in the news‘ (p. 188) for this means the 
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reinforcement of his class subjectivity: ‗Society is hopelessly snobbish, and this fact of 
your extraction may make an appreciable difference to its acceptance of you as my 
wife‘ (p. 189). This, again, demonstrates the paradoxical relationship between the 
subject and disciplinary discourses, as elaborated by Wetherell and Edley;
38
 he denies 
class discourses while pursuing them. As Joe Fisher observes, ‗[t]he snobbery which 
makes him [Angel] impressed that Tess is really a d‘Urberville also makes clear his 
continuing attachment to the class structure which makes Mrs Crick seat him apart from 
the workfolk to eat‘.39 Her ‗belonging to such a family‘ is the ‗grand card‘ he is going to 
reserve ‗for a grand effect‘ on his family, once they are married (p. 194). All this 
suggests his being constrained by the structure of class as well as of power; he treats 
Tess as a subordinate, deciding everything for her and never asking her opinion.  
Angel hastens their marriage in order to turn Tess, as much as possible, into a 
middle-class woman. Feeling that he has been able to develop in her his social class 
values, to make her the kind of woman he and his society demand — ‗she had caught 
his manner and habits, his speech and phrases, his likings and his aversions‘ (p. 204) — 
he is reluctant to leave her ‗anywhere away from my [his] influence‘ (p. 203). Her 
living with him for ‗a couple of months‘, he assumes, ‗would be of some social 
assistance to her at what she might feel to be a trying ordeal – her presentation to his 
mother at the Vicarage‘ (p. 204). Despite his claim that ‗[h]er unsophisticated open-air 
existence required no varnish of conventionality‘ (p. 165), he intends to varnish her, 
thereby proving the failure of his efforts to constitute himself as a liberal-minded man.  
The ways in which Angel is enmeshed in contemporary structures of class and 
gender is explicit in his reaction to Tess‘s confession. Her revelation of her past 
experience devastates him by undermining his whole perception of himself. Having 
defined his masculinity in terms of possessing a pure object of desire, when he is robbed 
of her purity, he feels robbed of his sense of manhood: ‗his face withered‘ under the 
news (p. 228). He judges himself according to the norms of contemporary discourses of 
masculinity and finds himself unqualified for maintaining his ‗rank‘ (subject position) 
as a ‗man‘. That Tess has been possessed sexually by another man proves that the 
position of dominance is held not by him but by his rival. She is now a tainted object, 
whose possession can provide him with no sense of power and manhood: ‗the woman I 
have been loving is not you‘ but ‗another woman in your shape‘ (p. 229).  
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Angel‘s judgment of Tess‘s lapse and his own by two different standards — 
forgiveness applies to his case but not to hers — reflects the effects of patriarchal 
discourses, especially middle-class ones on him: ‗In a patriarchy, a man can be forgiven 
what a woman cannot.‘40 As Ingham observes, in Victorian society, ‗[t]here was a tacit 
but universal acceptance of men‘s fairly ungovernable sexual appetites which were 
natural enough. Female sexuality, however, was deviant‘.41 A woman is defined as a 
sexual object, not equal to a man and therefore not to be judged according to the same 
standards. Though aware that she is ‗more sinned against than sinning‘ (p. 232), Angel 
is unable to resist the discourses which have pervaded him: ‗It isn‘t a question of 
respectability, but one of principle‘ (p. 241).  
Tess‘s confession also undermines Angel‘s subject position as a middle-class 
man. With her purity, his main criterion for marrying her, gone, her rusticity is left bare. 
She becomes only ‗an unapprehending peasant woman‘ (p. 232). Having ‗[given] up all 
ambition to win a wife with social standing, with fortune, with knowledge of the world‘ 
to ‗secure rustic unsophistication as surely as [...] pink cheeks‘ (pp. 237-8), he now 
finds himself deprived of both. His choice of wife having been proved to be an 
unreasonable one — as he sees it — further undercuts his image of himself as a rational 
man. He has allowed himself to be governed by emotions rather than reason. He views 
himself as victim of deceit, beholding ‗her as a species of impostor; a guilty woman in 
the guise of an innocent one‘ (p. 229).  
While the possession of Tess cannot reinstate him in the position of power, the 
renunciation of her, he assumes, can. Nemesvari argues that Angel avoids possessing 
Tess because his ‗gentlemanly self-control‘ cannot rival Alec‘s ‗aggressive sensuality‘. 
He denies his desire for her in order to ‗reconfirm the validity of his conception of 
masculinity, and avoid any sexual comparisons to Alec that might threaten his‘.42 
Whether or not Angel feels effeminate in relation to Alec, he certainly finds his position 
of power as Tess‘s sole possessor severely undermined. The suppression of his desire 
for her certainly empowers him by allowing him to conceive of himself as the one who 
can decide whether or not to possess the object of desire. It also enables him to regain 
the lost subject positions as a self-governed man, a rationalist and a middle-class man. 
He therefore undergoes punishment, ‗[d]esperately smothering his affection for her‘ (p. 
231). He succeeds in restraining his desire for her: ‗his face‘ was that of ‗a man who 
was no longer passion‘s slave‘ (p. 235). He is no longer the ‗gentle and affectionate‘ 
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Angel but a rationalist once more: the ‗hard logical deposit‘ which ‗had blocked his way 
with the Church‘ now ‗blocked his way with Tess‘ (p. 241). He attempts ‗to subdue the 
grosser to the subtler emotion, the substance to the conception, the flesh to the spirit‘, an 
undertaking which the narrator describes as ‗the tyrannous wind of his imaginative 
ascendency‘ (p. 245) for it incorporates oppressing the loved one even more than 
himself. 
Angel‘s effort to formulate himself outside the domain of contemporary 
religious and class discourses thus fails, indicating the difficulty of resisting the 
discourses which one has internalised. Despite ‗all his attempted independence of 
judgement‘, ‗this advanced man‘, as the narrator remarks, remains enslaved ‗to custom 
and conventionality‘ (p. 265); ‗like Sue, he boasts of being an intellectual radical 
without having the true courage of his convictions‘.43 His subject positions as an 
unorthodox intellectual and a Stoic philosopher prove to be spurious; he remains at 
heart a middle-class defender of traditional Christian morality. In Tim Dolin‘s words, 
‗Angel is much more deeply the son of his Pauline father than he realizes‘.44 According 
to Michael Millgate, he ‗does even greater damage to Tess‘ than does Alec.45  
The ‗favourable‘ emotional relation, which up to this point has conditioned 
Angel‘s practice of masculinity in relation to Tess, gives way to hostility (to employ 
Connell‘s discussion of different kinds of emotional relations)46 once she undercuts his 
position of power as a man. He is apathetic towards her suffering and scolds her when 
she offers to do what he orders: ‗there is a want of harmony between your present mood 
of self-sacrifice and your past mood of self-preservation‘ (p. 230). Unable to define 
himself in terms of power by possessing her, he attempts to assert his supremacy by 
constituting himself as an authoritative husband: dictating what she should do: ‗if it is 
desirable, possible – I will come to you. But until I come to you it will be better that you 
should not try to come to me‘ (p. 253). Assertion of authority, As Tolson observes, is a 
way of constructing masculine ‗presence‘.47 Ironically, his forceful practice of 
masculinity is at odds with his earlier definition of himself as a husband who will never 
‗neglect her, or hurt her, or even forget to consider her‘ (p. 218). In allowing himself to 
be governed by anger and hatred, he violates the Stoic doctrines, proving himself to be a 
slave of passions. His oppression of Tess is also incompatible with the Stoic teachings 
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according to which humans are parts of one body and should naturally be benevolent 
towards each other.
 48
  
However, the renunciation of Tess bestows upon Angel no sense of power or 
manhood, as his restless and ‗desultory‘ conduct demonstrates. He attempts to act as 
‗recommended by‘ the Stoics: ‗―This is the chief thing: be not perturbed,‖ said the 
Pagan moralist. That was just Clare‘s own opinion. But he was perturbed‘ (p. 259).49 
His endeavour ‗to pursue his agricultural plans as though nothing unusual had 
happened‘ also proves futile. He relates his ‗desolation‘ to his betrayal of ‗his 
principles‘: ‗When he found that Tess came of that exhausted ancient line [...], why had 
he not stoically abandoned her [...]?‘ he asks. But his agony is the effect of his inability 
to grasp the most basic Stoic doctrine, not to attach himself to the things which are 
external to him and therefore not his. He has linked his sense of manhood (and his sense 
of self) with possessing Tess: ‗the notion of having Tess as a dear possession was mixed 
up with all schemes, words, and ways‘ (pp. 259-60). While Gabriel Oak and Giles 
Winterborne manage to live in accordance with the Pagan philosophy, unconsciously 
and with no theoretical knowledge of that system of thought, Angel, though equipped 
with that knowledge, fails to do so.  
Devoid of a sense of self, Angel desires an ‗escape‘, hence his decision to go to 
Brazil in ‗a fit of desperation‘ (p. 340). So desperate is he to define himself in any 
possible way that he even undertakes to constitute himself as a philanderer, asking Izz 
to join him in his trip to Brazil. This momentary impulse suggests a rebellion against the 
constraints of social structures, an act of retaliation to intentionally undermine them: 
‗He was incensed against his fate, bitterly disposed towards social ordinances; for they 
had cooped him up in a corner, out of which there was no legitimate pathway. Why not 
be revenged on society by ruling his future domesticities himself [...]?‘ (p. 269). It is 
only the knowledge that he has ‗a loving wife‘ that brings back to him a faint sense of 
power (and thus manhood), allowing him to reconstitute himself as a serious man, 
reproaching himself for his ‗levity‘ (p. 271).  
Angel‘s life in Brazil involves so much re-thinking of his values that he 
‗mentally aged a dozen years‘. He questions the moral discourses which he had 
internalised, coming to ‗discredit the old appraisements of morality‘, feeling that ‗they 
wanted re-adjusting‘. He now believes that ‗[t]he beauty or ugliness of a character lay 
not only in its achievements, but in its aims and impulses‘. From this perspective, Tess 
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could be conceived as pure after all; ‗a regret for his hasty judgement‘ thus ‗began to 
oppress him‘ (p. 340). The Englishman whom he meets on his journey helps to 
accelerate the process of his self-redefinition by making him acquainted with alternative 
discourses of morality. Dolin argues it is only when his protagonist is away from 
England that Hardy can portray a change in him; for the Victorians, such a change 
would have been incomprehensible.
50
 
It is only once exposed to alternative discourses of morality and masculinity that 
Angel recognises this. To the ‗cosmopolitan mind‘ of the Englishman, ‗such deviations 
from the social norm, so immense to domesticity, were no more than are the 
irregularities of vale and mountain-chain to the whole terrestrial curve‘. From his 
viewpoint, ‗what Tess had been was of no importance beside what she would be‘; 
Angel, therefore, has been ‗wrong‘ in leaving her. ‗The cursory remarks of the stranger‘ 
thus provoke a dramatic change in Angel‘s outlook, causing him to cease being Tess‘s 
‗critic‘ and become ‗her advocate‘ (p. 341). Liberated from the dominance of domestic 
discourses, he is now able to envisage alternative ways of seeing the world and 
formulating himself as a man.  
Still constrained by the structure of power, conceiving himself to be superior to 
Tess, Angel does not rush to her once he is back home. Reading her second letter first, 
in which Tess has bitterly reproached him, he assumes that he is no longer a man of 
large ‗presence‘ for Tess, no longer her superior, or even loved by her. He therefore 
postpones his visit to her, fearing ‗bitter words‘ and probable rebuke from a rustic 
family, which for him signifies the undermining of his social position. Tess‘s first letter, 
however, written from Flintcomb-Ash, transforms Angel: ‗The unexpected sentences 
unmanned him quite‘. Forsaking his manly ‗pride‘ with ‗eyes‘ ‗blinded with tears, he 
‗[sprang] wildly up to go and find her immediately‘ (p. 370). Tess‘s passionate language 
may have ‗unmanned‘ him in terms of rationality and self-control but has also 
empowered him, allowing him to feel himself loved and admired after all. It is only 
once re-offered the position of power that he readily goes to her.  
Angel now hopes to reconstitute himself as a husband, unaware that he has long 
ceased to have such status. Nowhere is he able to find Tess as his possession, as ‗Mrs 
Clare‘ (p. 372). He is initially ‗glad‘ to find out that she ‗passed as a married woman,‘ 
as ‗Mrs D‘Urberville‘, not discerning that this signifies her capitulation to Alec (p. 377). 
His subject position as a man is already undermined: he has transgressed the norms of 
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patriarchal and middle-class discourses of masculinity by neglecting his duties as a 
husband and a supporter; society accordingly has deprived him of his ‗rank‘ as a 
husband. Marian has questioned his gentlemanliness; for Alec, he is ‗a mule‘ under the 
name of a ‗husband‘ (p. 331) and even Tess has renounced him as her ‗husband‘ once 
hopeless of his return (p. 349). Now, with Tess‘s return to Alec, the process of Angel‘s 
emasculation is complete.  
Tess‘s stabbing of Alec, however, and her return to Angel, restores, at least 
temporarily, his sense of manhood. With the newly-formulated subjectivity, which he 
has adopted during his absence — which allows him to judge her act not by its 
‗achievement‘ but by its ‗aims and impulses‘ (p.  340) — he is able once more to 
constitute himself as her husband. Now he is determined to construct his masculinity in 
terms of protecting ‗this deserted wife of his‘ by all his ‗power‘: ‗Tenderness was 
absolutely dominant in Clare at last‘ (p. 385). He is eventually able to surpass self-love 
and define himself in terms of loving-kindness. His subject statuses as a ‗protector‘ (p. 
386) and a husband, nevertheless, are precarious ones and might be abandoned if he 
continues to live with Tess, as she predicts: he may ‗despise‘ her in the course of time 
(p. 390). The Victorian discourses of morality might govern him again. 
In the final scene of the novel, Tess is portrayed ‗lying on an altar‘ (p. 393), 
becoming a sacrifice not to the pagan gods but to society and to the configurations of 
masculinity it propagates. She is not the ‗sport‘ of ‗the President of the Immortals‘, as 
the narrator suggests (p. 397), nor the victim of biology or heredity (as Peter Morton, for 
instance, argues)
51
 so much as the victim of the social structures and discourses which 
have formulated the subjectivities of the men responsible for her fate. Tess presents a 
tragic picture of life by underscoring the power of these forces and the difficulty of 
escaping them.  
With Tess, Hardy portrays the oppressiveness of a masculinity, characterised by 
egotism rather than loving-kindness. It is only Tess who is capable of practising 
altruism (Joanna Devereux has referred to ‗her constant focus on others besides 
herself‘),52 sacrificing herself for the well-being of her family. Angel eventually defines 
himself in terms of benevolence but sympathy emerges in him too late to be of any 
positive effect. In Tess, therefore, we witness a weakening of the Comtean worldview, 
of the belief in the possible improvement of the human condition. The novel illustrates 
how hard a task it is to defy the prevailing social structures and discourses which 
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constitute individuals. Yet it also makes the reader ponder whether this suffering is not 
avoidable, if the ‗remediable ills‘ that bring about human pain are not greater than the 
‗irremediable‘ ones.53 If gender relations are socially constructed, the novel implies, 
could they not eventually be changed? 
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Chapter 8 
Jude the Obscure: 
Alternative Models of Masculinity  
 
Hardy‘s last words of his novelistic career are his bitterest, a powerful critique of gender 
and class structures and discourses which constrain individuals, defining the ways in 
which they should constitute themselves. In Jude the Obscure (1895), he depicts the 
predicament of a boy, and then a man, who on the one hand realises the necessity and 
the inevitability of defining himself through the discourses his society offers him and on 
the other hand finds those discourses unsatisfactory, not reflective of his capabilities and 
desires. To acquire a ‗rank‘ (subject position) as a man or a member of a particular 
class, Jude needs to define himself through the Foucauldian ‗games of truth‘, the 
discourses of social institutions,
1
 which associate masculinity mainly with power. 
Conventionally, as John Berger has argued, a man‘s ‗presence‘ is linked with the 
‗promise of power‘ which he incorporates. If the ‗promise of power‘ is large a man has 
striking ‗presence‘; if it is small, he deems his ‗presence‘ to be little. The ‗promised 
power‘ can be physical, economic, social or sexual ‗but its object is always exterior to 
the man‘; a man should be able to exercise power over others.2 As Andrew Tolson 
argues,
3
 ‗presence‘ is associated with characteristics such as authority or assertiveness, 
which Jude finds hard to accept.  
 Critics have suggested that a sense of quest pervades Jude. Marjorie Garson, for 
instance, argues for Jude‘s ‗logocentric desire‘; ‗constituted in lack‘, he ‗seeks to be 
made whole‘. Stefan Horlacher has discussed Jude‘s search for ‗the presence of 
signified, a fixed meaning in life‘.4 These, and other critical works, have also underlined 
the process of construction of masculinity in Jude, his moving from one masculine 
discourse, master-narrative or paradigm of masculinity to another.
5
 In line with such 
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arguments, it can be said that what Jude seeks is the incorporation of a sense of power 
which can provide him with a sense of ‗presence‘. Jude has to formulate himself 
through gender and class structures and discourses if he wants to become definable yet 
his relationship with these structures remains a combination of compliance and 
resistance. For instance, he tries to constitute himself through the sexual division of 
labour, power and emotional attachment, the gender structures which R. W. Connell 
sees as circumscribing the ways gender needs to be practised.
6
 Yet, at times, he resists 
these structures. 
The construction of masculinity through prevailing discourses of masculinity 
and class is not the only thing Jude seeks, however. He also longs for a more 
satisfactory way of self-formation which he assumes he can achieve through an 
emotional relationship; he desires to see himself loved and cared for, a practice of 
masculinity which departs from the conventional definitions of masculine ‗presence‘, 
which associate masculinity with the exercise of power over others, and makes him 
more feminine. Throughout the course of the story, the two projects are pursued 
simultaneously, eventually bringing about Jude‘s destruction.   
 Jude is a working-class child who finds himself incapable of living up to the 
ideals of masculinity, physical strength, toughness and aggressiveness, which Tolson 
describes as working-class ways of constructing masculine ‗presence‘.7 Jude‘s physique 
is not that of a working-class boy; for his slim frame even the task of drawing water 
from the well is hard; he is therefore assigned a kind of job, scaring birds, which does 
not require much vigour. Jude‘s gender practice also deviates from the working-class 
norms of masculinity: he is gentle and tender-hearted — he cannot ‗bear to hurt 
anything‘. 8 He is kind to animals, shy and meek — bearing every criticism he faces — 
and is interested in reading books. Jude‘s practice of masculinity is not recognised as 
valid by his community; his aunt defines him as a ‗useless boy‘ (p. 12) and Farmer 
Troutham punishes him for his inability to practise aggression towards the rooks. In the 
Foucauldian sense, Jude is subjected to the power of the normalising judgement (which 
functions through a mechanism of dividing and ‗branding‘), evaluated according to the 
level of his conformity with working-class norms of masculinity and is found to be 
wanting. 
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With his specific characteristics, Jude also departs from the normative 
definitions of masculinity; gentle behaviour and tenderness are conventionally defined 
as feminine attributes.
9
 Jude, therefore, can be seen not to be passively determined by 
gender discourses; rather, he negotiates the models of masculinity which are available to 
him, distancing himself from conventional forms.
10
 Phillip Mallett argues that Jude‘s is 
a new mode of being a man which combines masculine attributes with feminine traits 
such as tenderness.
11
 Jude‘s resistance to the dominant discourses of class and gender, 
however, renders him obscure, leaving him with no clear sense of self. For there is 
nothing outside discourse and its dominance cannot be escaped. Without the 
endorsement of these discourses, he cannot term himself a man. His gender practice is 
simply not recognisable: his kindness is defined as ‗weakness of character‘. With such a 
practice of masculinity, he does not have much chance of happiness or survival; as the 
narrator comments, ‗he was the sort of man who was born to ache a good deal before 
the fall of the curtain on his unnecessary life‘ (p. 17).  
Unable to constitute himself as demanded by the prevailing discourses of 
masculinity, finding them incongruous with his inclinations, Jude does not ‗want to be a 
man‘, desiring himself out of a world to which he cannot adapt (p. 18). Here, Hardy 
provides a critique of gender norms which do not suit all men, lamenting the 
impossibility of formation of alternative modes of being a man. Jude‘s tragedy stems 
from the fact that his ‗life does not coincide with the stories of men‘.12 As Victor J. 
Seidler argues, ‗[i]f we live in a ‗man‘s world‘, it is not a world that has been built upon 
the needs and nourishment of men. Rather, it is a social world of power and 
subordination in which men have been forced to compete if they are to benefit from 
their inherited masculinity.‘13 Jude himself describes ‗the man‘ against whom some 
women complain as ‗the other victim‘, ‗the helpless transmitter of the pressure upon 
him‘ (p. 287).  
In the private domain, likewise, Jude is devoid of a sense of self, mainly owing 
to his failure to practise working-class masculinity; he is respected, wanted and loved by 
no one. This makes him long for affection, attention and sympathy. He needs somebody 
to give him a sense of self-worth by caring for him; his attachment to Phillotson reflects 
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this need. In the opening pages of the story, Jude attempts to constitute himself through 
an emotional relationship with his teacher, the only one who cares for him and approves 
of his version of masculinity, which resembles his own. The teacher offers him affection 
and friendship, telling him at the time of his departure that he will not ‗forget‘ him and 
that ‗if ever you come to Christminster remember you hunt me out of old acquaintance‘ 
sake‘ (pp. 10-11). But being empowered only by finding himself the object of attention 
and affection, conventionally a feminine attribute, undermines the delineations of 
masculine ‗presence‘. 
Jude‘s attachment to Phillotson assumes an almost romantic shape, which is 
explicitly suggested in the scene where he imagines seeing his teacher in Christminster. 
He thinks of him as a beloved, breathing in the wind which he assumes has touched 
Phillotson‘s face and which he has inhaled (p. 23). Jude‘s affection towards Phillotson 
can be seen to depart from the conventional structure of emotional attachment (one of 
the delineators of gender practice, as Connell observes),
14
 according to which romantic 
feelings are definable only between the members of the opposite sex. Richard 
Dellamora discusses Phillotson and Jude‘s relationship as a mentor/protégé one, a form 
of pedagogic eros. He explains, following Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick, that in the late 
nineteenth-century England, male connections in the form of friendship or 
teacher/student relationship were considered as the means of educational and social 
advancement for young men but such relationships ‗existed in a double bind‘; while 
male connections were encouraged, the associated homoerotic relationships were 
prohibited. Jude‘s friendship with Phillotson, Dellamora argues, combines ambitious 
and erotic wishes.
15
 The erotic implications of Jude‘s relationship with Phillotson can be 
inferred but what is explicitly suggested by the text is Jude‘s desire for love and 
affection. It is this need that initially attracts Jude to Phillotson; later, of course, he 
thinks of his teacher as someone who can help realise his social aspirations as well. But 
the constitution of subjectivity through emotional relationships (whether with male or 
female characters) remains Jude‘s preoccupation until the end of the story.  
Jude then is unable to remain outside gender and class discourses. He may resist 
one discourse of masculinity or class and choose another but he cannot escape being a 
man of a specific class. He thinks, therefore, of constituting himself through the 
discourses with which he feels more affinity. The middle-class discourses of 
masculinity, pursued by his patron and teacher, become a means of self-formation for 
                                                 
14
 See Chapter 1, p. 11. 
15
 Richard Dellamora, ‗Male Relations in Thomas Hardy‘s Jude the Obscure‘, Papers on Language and 
Literature, 27 (1991), 453-72 (pp. 454, 462-5).  
 148 
him. It is Aunt Drusilla, who hints at this possible way of constructing masculinity with 
her humiliating words, ‗why didstn‘t go off with that schoolmaster of thine to 
Christminster or somewhere?‘ (p. 18). By going to Christminster, he assumes he can 
shape his class subjectivity and his masculinity as well as constituting himself through 
friendship with Phillotson. Christminster ‗acquired a tangibility, a permanence, a hold 
on his life‘ both because ‗the man for whose knowledge and purpose he had so much 
reverence was actually living there‘ and because it is the residing place of ‗the more 
thoughtful and mentally shining ones‘ he so admires (p. 22). 
Christminster is described by a carter, as the city of ‗noble-minded men‘ who 
‗earn hundreds by thinking out loud‘, a place where Jude can construct his ‗presence‘ 
through the power of the mind, rather than the body, and accordingly through social and 
financial achievement (p. 25). ‗It is the city of light‘ and ‗knowledge‘, ‗a castle, manned 
by scholarship and religion‘ where he can constitute himself in the manner of upper 
classes. Once he finds some discourses through which to define himself, ‗something to 
anchor on, to cling to‘, he gains in confidence. He is no longer afraid of darkness and no 
longer reluctant to become a man (pp. 25-6). The word ‗THITHER‘ he inscribes on a 
milestone along a road — as we later learn — specifies the direction to the place which 
can offer him a sense of self, a rescue from obscurity. With no prospect of the 
immediate formulation of his subjectivity in the way he desires, he constructs an 
imaginary subject position for himself as a scholar. From this point onwards, he leads an 
imaginary life alongside his real life, the former rendering the latter bearable.  
 Exposed to and governed by the discourse of success, Jude undertakes to gain 
qualifications for winning a middle-class ‗rank‘ (subject position). His learning of 
Greek and Latin is the first step forward towards the formation of his subjectivity as a 
man of knowledge. He is made miserable by the realisation that there is no easy rule for 
learning these languages, ‗that every word in both Latin and Greek was to be 
individually committed to memory at the cost of years of plodding‘ (p. 30). This 
‗crushing recognition‘, shattering his self-image as a scholar, robs him of his sense of 
self; finding himself once more outside class and gender structures, still obscure and 
indefinable, he wishes ‗himself out of the world‘ (p. 31). He undertakes, nevertheless, to 
learn these dead languages despite their difficulties for to withdraw from his project of 
self-formation would signify a return to obscurity. Jude‘s ‗frustration indicates‘, 
however, as Dellamora argues, ‗just how unlikely he is – by either ―cipher‖ or 
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―plodding‖ – to learn the ―art‖ of the ―foreign‖ language of the upper middle classes‘.16 
Yet Jude is unable to recognise this fact. His assiduous study of languages and his later 
combining of study and work, depriving himself of any rest, are the disciplines 
(punishment in the form of exercise)
17
 he undergoes to acquire the necessary 
qualification to be ranked as a scholar.  
Jude is unable to function outside any social class structures; situated in a 
working-class context he has to define himself in terms of manual labour. Such a 
construction of masculinity is conditioned also by the sexual division of labour (another 
structure which circumscribes gender practice, as Connell argues),
 18
 which demands 
that a man defines himself in the social domain through a masculine job.
 
Jude conceives 
of work, of course, only as ‗a prop to lean on while he prepared those greater engines 
[of scholarship] which he flattered himself should be better fitted for him‘. Among the 
professions available to him, he chooses ‗freestone-working‘ and the repairing of church 
buildings (p. 35) because working on churches and colleges allows for a stronger 
identification with the ideal image of himself as a scholar. He is unaware of the tension 
between his actual profession and this ideal image, that as a worker he is doomed to 
remain outside the walls which he helps to repair. As Tim Dolin observes, despite 
Jude‘s intellectual and spiritual aspirations, ‗it is really only ever the material and 
subsisting life that he attains.‘19 His ‗rough‘ hands (p. 133) and ‗the stone-dust‘ in his 
hair (p. 77) indicate that he can never escape being working-class.  
Jude is ultimately able to envisage himself as a Christminster man, assuming 
that he has acquired enough knowledge to ‗[knock] at the doors of one of those 
strongholds of learning of which he had dreamed so much‘ (p. 36). His self-discipline is 
rewarded by a sense of ‗gratification‘, in the Foucauldian sense,20 suggested by the 
‗warm self-content‘ which pervades him when he looks back at his progress so far (p. 
36). In his imaginary world, he constructs further fictitious subject positions as a Doctor 
of Divinity and a ‗bishop‘, with which he identifies. His obsession with attaining a 
‗large ‗presence‘ in his imagination, however, only indicates his actual powerlessness. 
The kinds of roles he imagines for himself are masculine ones (of an upper-class kind, 
suggestive of his being constrained by the structure of the sexual division of labour). 
But his reference to Christminster, a masculine world, as ‗Alma Mater‘ (and not as a 
father) and to himself as ‗her beloved son‘ (pp. 37-8) reveals that alongside his effort to 
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constitute himself through prevailing discourses of masculinity, he also desires to 
formulate himself through an emotional relationship and in terms of affection, to 
become the object of love. Joanna Devereux argues that Christminster ‗represents for 
Jude a kind of ideal woman—specifically a mother figure—such as he has never known 
in his own life‘.21  
 The construction of masculinity in terms of knowledge and success proves 
difficult for Jude, who is also governed by the more powerful discourse of sexuality. 
Struck by a pig‘s ‗characteristic part‘ thrown by Arabella, he is reminded of an 
alternative way of practising masculinity, to construct his ‗presence‘ in terms of 
sexuality. This can provide him with an immediate and real sense of manhood, as 
opposed to the imaginary sense of ‗presence‘ provided by his dream world: ‗he felt as a 
snake must feel who has sloughed off its winter skin, and cannot understand the 
brightness and sensitiveness of its new one‘ (p. 43). He now defines himself through the 
structure of emotional attachment, desiring the opposite sex. Jude abandons, therefore, 
his imaginary subject statuses as ‗a graduate, or a parson‘, or ‗a pope‘ (p. 48), and the 
whole project of constructing his masculinity in terms of knowledge, to constitute 
himself as a lover and possessor. In the ‗war waged between flesh and spirit‘,22 the latter 
is defeated. In his letter to Edmund Gosse on November 10, 1895, Hardy wrote: ‗[t]he 
―grimy‖ features of the story go to show the contrast between the ideal life a man 
wished to lead, and the squalid real life he was fated to lead.‘23 In the novel itself, his 
ideals are quickly vanquished: ‗The intentions as to reading, working, and learning, 
which he had so precisely formulated only a few minutes earlier, were suffering a 
curious collapse into a corner, he knew not how‘ (p. 41).  
 The novel attempts to justify Jude‘s sexuality by rendering it as natural and 
inevitable through the employment of Darwinian and Schopenhauerian metaphors: Jude 
is attracted to Arabella ‗in commonplace obedience to conjunctive orders from 
headquarters, unconsciously received by unfortunate men when the last intention of 
their lives is to be occupied with the feminine‘ (p. 39). It is as if ‗a compelling arm of 
extraordinary muscular power seized hold of him‘, something that ‗seemed to care little 
for his reason and his will‘ and ‗moved him along, as a violent schoolmaster a 
schoolboy he has seized by the collar in a direction which tended towards the embrace 
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of woman for whom he had no respect‘ (p. 44). Hardy employs such imagery to 
underwrite the power of the ‗the strongest passion known to humanity‘, as he describes 
it.
24
 Jude is simply unable to stand outside the structure of emotional attachment which 
defines the male and female relationship in terms of sexuality.   
Jude‘s desire for Arabella, of course, is also a desire for affection. The 
relationship allows him to construct his ‗presence‘ in terms of sexuality but it also 
enables him to define himself in terms of loving and being loved by her. He reads 
Arabella‘s ‗missile‘ (pp. 38-42) as the sign of attention and feels a ‗void‘ ‗in his heart‘ 
in her absence (p. 49). Rosemarie Morgan argues that ‗[o]rphanism and, presumably, 
maternal deprivation have wrought in him a desperate need for a reassuring, nurturing 
love object which he might idolise, to which he might cling, on which he might become 
completely reliant‘.25 This is apparent in Jude‘s relationship with Sue as well. 
The ‗gender regime‘ of Jude and Arabella‘s relationship can be seen to depart 
from the ‗gender order‘ of society, to use Connell‘s terms,26 in that the structure of 
emotional attachment is not entirely constituted; it is not the man but the woman who 
chooses and pursues a mate. The concomitant structure of power (which Connell 
discusses as another structure which conditions the practice of gender)
27
 is accordingly 
not conventionally shaped because Jude assumes a role as a subordinate. During their 
courtship, Jude follows Arabella ‗like a pet lamb‘ (p. 53). Anne Z. Mickelson argues 
that ‗Jude‘s defence against his fears is submissiveness in order to win love from a 
partner whom he can lean on and look up to‘.28 It is Arabella who takes the active role 
in her relationship with Jude throughout the story, seducing Jude, marrying him, 
deserting him, re-entrapping him and re-marrying him. Jude does not define himself in 
accordance with the prevailing norms of masculinity as a superior, a decision-maker or 
an authoritative lover or husband. Mickelson and Ellen Lew Sprechman see him as 
feminine, taking a passive role a wife conventionally takes.
29
 For Judith Mitchell, too, 
Arabella (and Sue) are masculine figures, ‗more active and decisive (Sue intellectually 
and Arabella sexually) than the more passive Jude‘.30  
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The practice of masculinity as a lover and a possessor does not provide Jude 
with a sense of ‗presence‘ for long. What he seeks from an emotional relationship is not 
just sexuality but friendship, emotional fortification and mutual understanding, which 
Arabella is unable to provide. With the loss of his sense of power, he once more thinks 
of reconstructing his ‗presence‘ in the public sphere, a project which needs to be 
cancelled under the imperative to define his masculinity through ‗the gentlemanly code 
of honor‘.31 Pervaded by the discourse of honour, which promises him a ‗rank‘ as a 
man, Jude undertakes to become Arabella‘s husband, despite his awareness ‗that 
Arabella was not worth a great deal as a specimen of womankind‘ and that this signifies 
‗a complete smashing‘ of his ‗plans‘ (p. 57).  
 Though apparently provided with a sense of manhood by defining himself as a 
husband and an honourable man, Jude experiences the shrinking of his ‗presence‘ upon 
realising that he has married far lower than he has imagined: he is shocked to discover 
her false hair, practised dimples and job as a barmaid. He also learns that her pregnancy, 
the very reason which has justified their marriage, was not genuine. The constitution of 
his subjectivity through the discourse of honour thus proves to be destructive: he is 
‗caught in a gin [his matrimonial tie] which would cripple him‘ (pp. 59-62). Deprived of 
his imaginary subject position as a scholar and with no alternative way of defining his 
masculinity, he is left once more with no sense of self, hence his attempt at ‗self-
extermination‘, walking and jumping on a frozen pond (p. 71). 
Not constituting himself through the structure of power, Jude does not act 
authoritatively; ‗he never considers divorce‘.32 He remains passive at Arabella‘s hands, 
waiting for her to take action. It is only when Arabella is gone (and with her, Jude‘s role 
as a husband) that he is able to return to the project of constructing his masculinity as an 
upper-class man. The sight of the incised ‗THITHER‘, the embodiment of all that has 
once given him a sense of self, on the milestone along the road, still ‗unimpaired‘, ‗lit in 
his soul a spark of the old fire‘, restoring to him his earlier sense of self as a scholar (p. 
73). In Christminster, he identifies himself once more with ‗the worthies who had spent 
their youth within these reverend walls‘, ‗speaking out loud, holding conversations with 
them, like an actor in a melodrama who apostrophizes the audience on the other side of 
the footlights‘ (pp. 80-1).  
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 Jude has to rely, however, on a working-class practice of masculinity, manual 
labour, to formulate his upper-class subjectivity, an incongruity which he gradually 
recognises. He begins to discern that to become ‗a son of the university‘, he needs first 
to belong to the upper classes of society, to possess strong economic or social power, 
which he lacks. For the ‗happy young contemporaries of his with whom he shared a 
common mental life‘, he is ‗a young workman in a white blouse‘ and not one of them. 
When passing him, ‗they did not even see him, or hear him, rather saw through him as 
through a pane of glass‘. Yet, for him, to abandon the invented subject position as a 
scholar is to forsake the means of self-definition, hence his reluctance to relinquish his 
intellectual ambitions (pp. 86-7). Masculinity, as Tolson observes, makes men pursue ‗a 
mirage of success‘.33  
 Permeated by such a dream, Jude is unable to envisage another way of self-
formulation. His momentary recognition that his skill might be ‗as worthy as that 
dignified by the name of scholarly study‘ is lost ‗under the stress of his old idea‘. 
Exposed to newer (middle-class) discourses of masculinity, Jude is reluctant to 
constitute himself through older (working-class) ones: ‗This was his form of the modern 
vice of unrest‘ (p. 85). Faced with the question of ‗whether to follow uncritically the 
track he finds himself in [...] or to consider what his aptness or bent may be, and re-
shape his course accordingly‘, he tells the crowd watching the procession on 
Remembrance Day  (p. 326), he chooses the latter, more ambitious option. Formulation 
of masculinity through mental, rather than physical, power, ‗accumulating ideas and 
imparting them to others‘, he assumes, is what he is most capable of accomplishing (p. 
393). The text itself suggests the value of craftsmanship by describing the workyard 
where he seeks employment as ‗a little centre of regeneration‘, only to undercut its 
suggestion by calling the work done there ‗at best only copying, patching and imitating‘ 
(pp. 84-5). ‗Jude‘s trade‘, as Michael Millgate opines, ‗is one which ties him to old 
buildings, churches, and graveyards — to the restoration of the past and the 
perpetuation of precisely those influences and traditions which bar his educational and 
social aspirations and menace the privacy of his life with Sue.‘34  
Once his sense of power as a scholar begins to diminish upon realising the 
difficulty of the task of constructing his ‗presence‘ in that field, he thinks more of his 
other source of acquisition of a sense of power, his cousin Sue, ‗whose presence 
somewhere at hand‘ fortifies him. Even her photograph is able to provide him with a 
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sense of power, making him feel ‗more at home‘ (p. 85). Constituting himself through 
an emotional relationship with his cousin becomes Jude‘s alternative way of self-
definition since ‗the particular man Jude [...] wanted something to love‘ (p. 97). Jude‘s 
relationship with Sue, as Elizabeth Langland observes, becomes ‗a means of self-
fulfillment‘, ‗an alternative to the frustrating constructions of masculinity that his 
culture holds out‘.35  
 Jude discerns himself in Sue, recognising in her voice ‗certain qualities of his 
own voice; softened and sweetened, but his own‘ (p. 88). His seeing her as the feminine 
version of himself suggests that he regards her as both a feminine and a masculine 
figure. She is both like and unlike him; Laura Green has discussed Sue as 
androgynous.
36
 The identification he feels with Sue suggests, for him, the possibility of 
an ideal friendship which incorporates emotional and mental fortification. He conceives 
of her as a socially superior version of himself; she is like him but ‗quite removed from 
the rusticity that was his‘ (p. 90). Marjorie Garson argues that he ‗[desires] in her not 
only the woman but the cultivation she embodies — the kind of culture which exposure 
to Christminster has apparently already given to her‘.37 Constrained by moral and 
religious discourses, he attempts to conceive of her ‗as someone to be proud of, 
someone one to talk and nod to‘, someone who can help him to constitute himself both 
emotionally and socially, ‗a tender friend‘ and ‗a companion in Anglican worship‘ (pp. 
88-91). Still he is governed by his desires, however, for he is forced to recognise that 
‗his interest in her‘ was ‗unmistakably of a sexual kind‘ (p. 97).  
Jude‘s speaking of Phillotson, in his first meeting with Sue, curiously enough, 
reveals that he still seeks to constitute himself as a middle-class male through friendship 
with his teacher. But seeing Phillotson, he immediately forsakes him as a mentor and a 
friend. He is not a superior social figure, ‗a reverend parson‘ (p.85), as he had assumed, 
but a failure. More importantly, Jude‘s feelings for the older man are not reciprocated; 
the teacher does not even recognise his former pupil. The loss of Phillotson as a friend 
makes Jude more reliant on Sue as a substitute. The romantic attachment between Sue 
and Phillotson, however, deprives Jude of the chance of self-formation through 
association with Sue. Observing the romance formed between the two, Jude sank ‗into 
the hedge like one struck with a blight‘ (p. 109). Left once more with no sense of self, 
he flees to his aunt, the (ironically, unsympathetic) mother figure, who remains his 
resort throughout the story for escaping a sense of failure.  
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Jude still has his fabricated subject position as a scholar to rely on for an 
acquisition of a sense of manhood but ‗the imaginary world‘ and the ‗abstract figure, 
more or less himself‘, residing in it (p. 114) should soon be relinquished. The letter from 
the head of Biblioll College cancels the project of constructing his ‗presence‘ through 
the acquisition of knowledge. The upper-class society does not approve of such a 
configuration of masculinity by a member of the working classes; Jude is ‗a working 
man‘ and should ‗[remain] in [his] own sphere‘ (p. 117). Divested of the chance of 
constituting himself both as a scholar and as a friend — ‗[d]eprived of the objects of 
both intellect and emotion‘ — he finds himself once more denied the means of self-
definition, still obscure, which is why he goes to ‗an obscure and low-ceiled tavern‘ (p. 
119) to define his masculinity in terms of drinking. His speech in Latin, his unconscious 
attempt to envisage himself as a scholar, is unable to restore to him a sense of self. 
Jude‘s fleeing to Sue, pleading with her not to ‗hate‘ and ‗despise‘ him ‗like the rest of 
the world‘, reflects the agony of a man who finds himself excluded from class 
discourses, rejected and unwanted by the world (p. 123).  
Though Jude deviates from the norms of masculinity in his desperate fleeing to a 
woman, he still defines himself through these norms; he feels embarrassed to face Sue 
the next morning. His constraint by gender norms is even more evident in his refusal to 
cry: ‗If he had been a woman he must have screamed under the nervous tension which 
he was now undergoing. But that relief being denied to his virility, he clenched his teeth 
in misery‘ (p. 124). Hardy here criticises the restrictive norms of masculinity; as 
Annette Federico argues, he ‗appears to regret that men must stifle expressions of 
emotions‘.38  
 Obliged to define himself through the structures of class and gender, Jude seeks 
another way of constructing his ‗presence‘ in the public domain. The pursuit of an 
‗ecclesiastical and altruistic life‘, ‗[doing] good to his fellow-creatures‘ by becoming a 
curate, is the way of self-definition which he now envisages. Such a practice of 
masculinity suits him as it necessitates the power of mind rather than body. The kind of 
vocation he thinks of pursuing indicates that he is functioning within the structure of 
class as well as the sexual division of labour, the career being a middle-class, masculine 
one. He immediately constructs an imaginary subject position for himself as a spiritual 
man, a substitute for his previous one as a scholar. He identifies himself with Christ: ‗he 
might so mark out his coming years as to begin his ministry at the age of thirty – an age 
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which much attracted him as being that of his exemplar when he first began to teach in 
Galilee‘ (pp. 129-30). This is perhaps the grandest of the models of manhood to which 
he aspires.  
 But Jude has not abandoned the idea of formulating himself through an 
emotional (and intellectual) relationship with Sue and this renders the practice of 
masculinity as a student of religion difficult. He finds a chance of self-definition 
through such a relationship when Sue asks him to go to her, complaining of loneliness. 
They constitute themselves temporarily outside the Victorian structure of emotional 
attachment, which defines the couple relationship in terms of matrimony, ‗[o]utside all 
laws except gravitation and germination‘ (p. 142). Their gender practice not being 
approved by society, however, Sue, who, as a woman, is more susceptible to the power 
of the gaze, is punished by the Training-School authorities for her deviance from their 
norms.  
Jude further envisages the possibility of constituting himself through friendship 
with Sue when she escapes from her college and resorts to him. The scene suggests the 
possibility of Jude defining himself through a romantic relationship with Sue. Her cross-
dressing, her putting on Jude‘s clothes and thus effacing their sexual differences, 
however, departs from the conventional structure of emotional attachment (which 
demands that a man directs his desires to the opposite sex), seeming to fit better into the 
masculine model of constituting oneself through Greek manly love or male-male 
comradeship.
39
 Here, Sue is depicted as a masculine figure; Jude regards her as a ‗being 
masquerading as himself‘ and the landlady assumes her to be ‗a young gentleman‘ (p. 
145-6). Sue is also described as ‗boyish as a Ganymedes‘ (p. 154); the substitution of 
‗Cupid‘, in the Manuscript, with ‗Ganymedes‘, ‗Zeus‘s beautiful mortal cup-bearer‘,40 
further underlines Hardy‘s suggestion of homoeroticism here. As Jane Thomas explains, 
for late Victorian men of letters, the Greek legend of Ganymede was associated with 
both noble and sensual kinds of manly love.
41
  
The idea of male friendship is further conveyed by Sue‘s description of her 
relationship with the undergraduate as a masculine one: ‗We used to go about together – 
on walking tours, reading tours, and things of that sort – like two men almost‘ (p. 148). 
Sue herself assumes the role of mentor to Jude,
42
 desiring to ‗ennoble some man to high 
aims‘ (p. 153). For Sue, sexuality has no place in such a relationship. Her reference to 
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‗Venus Urania‘ indicates her preference for an ennobling kind of love in which ‗desire 
plays, at least, only a secondary part‘ (p. 168). The Greeks associated Venus Urania 
with ‗spiritual or intellectual rather than sexual love‘.43 She insists that she is not herself 
‗sex-less‘ but desires to transcend sexuality, to sublimate it, to be ‗self-contained‘ in the 
manner of ‗the most passionate poets‘ (p. 149). Jude too attempts to ‗get over the sense 
of her sex‘ (p. 153), to suppress his desire for her, yet ‗the novel is deeply sceptical as to 
the possibility or even the advisability of maintaining a purely platonic relationship in 
such circumstances.‘ Sue‘s emphasis on the spiritual rather than sensual kind of love, as 
Thomas has shown, reflects late nineteenth-century attempts by male intellectuals to 
define such love as inspirational. Jude‘s desperate struggle to transcend sexuality, 
however, reflects the difficulty of the enterprise.
44
  
Jude appears to be seeking a new mode of being a man which deviates from the 
hegemonic structure of emotional attachment. But he is also inclined to formulate 
himself through that structure, forming an intellectual and emotional relationship with 
the opposite sex. With Sue‘s marrying Phillotson, however, this way of self-formation 
also needs to be relinquished. At this point, Jude‘s newly-constructed subjectivity as a 
spiritual man is unable to sustain him, to give him a sense of manhood. Drinking and 
sexuality, the conventional ways of practising masculinity, become his only means of 
formulating himself. ‗Jude‘s weakness for women‘, as Langland observes, becomes an 
‗important evidence of manliness. When Jude fails to live up to other discursive 
formulations of his masculinity, this one never fails him‘.45 Such practices, however, 
win him only the status of a ‗feeble‘ man (p. 184), who has succumbed to his desires, 
and that of a sinner, since Arabella is another man‘s wife.    
Jude begins to doubt his ability to constitute himself as a curate, feeling that he 
was ‗a man of too many passions‘ to ‗make a good clergyman‘. Caught in the war 
between ‗flesh and spirit‘ (p. 193), his desires and his ambitions, he longs for advice and 
emotional support. His inclination to visit the music composer, whose piece of music 
has moved him and whom he perceives to be a man with a ‗soul‘ (p. 195), demonstrates, 
in Dellamora‘s words, a desire ‗for understanding, for guidance, and for friendship‘: 
Jude seeks ‗help in his struggle for education; but he also seeks emotional communion 
with a sharer of ―yearning‖‘.46 Perhaps the composer can play the role of a mentor for 
Jude, a substitute for Phillotson and Sue. But Jude‘s desire for defining himself through 
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such a friendship is thwarted again; the composer is not as sympathetic or as soulful as 
Jude had assumed.  
 This way of self-definition not being possible, Jude returns once more to Sue as 
his other, or his last, alternative. Kissing Sue is the ‗turning point‘ for Jude, a practice of 
masculinity which transgresses social norms and provides him with strong sense of 
manhood, revealed by his ‗look of exaltation‘. Dennis Taylor defines such spiritual 
‗moments of joy‘ as ‗exceptions to the various letters of the law‘.47 Jude ultimately 
abandons the scheme of configuration of his masculinity as a ‗soldier and servant of 
religion‘, making a bonfire of all his ‗theological and ethical works‘ (pp. 216-7). He 
abandons the construction of his ‗presence‘ in terms of social achievement to define 
himself through an intimate relationship with Sue. He even deserts his already ordinary 
social ‗presence‘, his stable job as an artisan, and the possibility of ‗progress‘ in his 
‗trade‘, becoming an itinerant worker. He is even ready to ‗[desert] more than that‘ for 
the more satisfactory mode of being a man as Sue‘s lover (p. 237). 
 Neither Jude nor Sue feels any affinity with the models of gender subjectivity 
provided by their society, the matrimonial roles which are assigned to them. As Sue 
insists to Jude, ‗the social moulds civilization fits us into have no more relation to our 
actual shapes than the conventional shapes of the constellations have to the real star-
patterns‘ (p. 205). They renounce the subject positions of husband and wife to fashion 
themselves in the way they desire. Here, Hardy, voicing John Stuart Mill, sees 
happiness to lie in the construction of subjectivity as the individual desires and not in 
accordance with the models prescribed by society.
48
 Sue herself quotes Mill to justify 
her rejection of all laws and conventions: ‗She, or he, ―who lets the world, or his own 
portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the 
ape-like one of imitation‖‘ (p. 223).    
 Jude intends to construct his masculinity not simply through emotional and 
‗mental communication‘ (p. 352), as Sue desires, but through sexuality, not realising 
that Sue has no intention of defining herself as a sexual object. He ‗disclaims all 
masculine ambition‘ by ‗burning his books‘ but ‗has forgotten‘ that Sue ‗prefers the 
masculine world of intellect and friendship which overtly at least is not sexual‘.49 Jude 
defines himself, therefore, as Sue demands, as a comrade. Jude‘s practice of 
masculinity, however, since it is formed outside the conventional gender structures is 
not definable, not capable of expression. This period of life is therefore not depicted 
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since Jude, as the new man, who has ‗[reformed] himself as a sexual being‘, in Dolin‘s 
words, has no story to tell; Jude‘s transformation has no ‗mythos‘ to support it.50  
 Jude is unable, however, to stand outside the structure of emotional attachment, 
unable to forgo sexuality, obliging Sue to formulate herself through that structure. He is 
not content with an intellectual, inspirational and emotional relationship; Sue has 
‗elevated‘ him but he desires to construct his ‗presence‘ in terms of sexuality as well (p. 
266). In the clash between flesh and spirit, therefore, the former is again victorious. Jude 
attempts to justify himself by describing sexual desires as ‗natural‘ and thus irresistible. 
This justification is validated later in the story when Sue describes Jude‘s sexuality as 
‗the natural man‘s desire to possess the woman‘. Both Jude and Sue, however, also refer 
to sexuality (specifically male sexuality) as wicked and gross (pp. 260, 352). There is a 
tension in the text between its rendering of male sexuality as ‗natural‘ and ‗right‘ and its 
rejection as wicked.
51
  
 Hardy opens this section of the story with the words of Marcus Aurelius, 
ostensibly to suggest the difficulty of the task of elevating oneself by mastering desires, 
as recommended by the Stoics: ‗Thy aërial part, and all the fiery parts which are 
mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to 
the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound mass the 
body‘ (p. 256). Hardy seems in the novel to question the possibility of self-formation in 
the manner of the Stoics, finding the desires which govern individuals to be too 
powerful to be governed. 
 By constituting themselves in terms of sexuality, Jude and Sue construct 
themselves through the structure of emotional attachment. But they deviate from this 
structure, as defined by the Victorians, in formulating themselves through the couple 
relationship without taking the roles of husband and wife. For a period of time, they live 
in ‗a dreamy paradise‘ (p. 272), experiencing ‗Greek Joyousness‘ (p. 297), outside 
social norms and laws, fashioning themselves they way they desire. Their behaviour at 
the Wessex Agricultural Show demonstrates the happiness and satisfaction they 
experience in their present modes of self-formation, as lovers and comrades with 
‗complete mutual understanding‘ between them (p. 292).  
Jude‘s and Sue‘s resistance to the prevalent Victorian gender discourses 
nevertheless renders them obscure and marginalised. Jude is gradually removed from 
the social domain. He is unable to get orders, dismissed from his job, ‗the relettering of 
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the Ten Commandments, and banished from ‗Artizans‘ Mutual Improvement Society‘ 
(pp. 300-5). They are subjected to the Foucauldian power of the gaze, judged according 
to the norms of Victorian moral and religious discourses, labelled deviants and 
excluded.
52
 This whole episode illustrates ‗the tyranny of the majority‘ of which Mill 
complained.
53
 Jude is driven more and more into the margins of the public domain, 
forced to leave Aldbrickham and lead a ‗shifting, almost nomadic life‘, doing occasional 
‗freestone work‘ (p. 309). He is ultimately obliged to leave the public arena altogether. 
By the end of the story, he is entirely confined to his room, no longer a skilful artisan 
but an invalid.  
Jude‘s deviant practice of masculinity leads to loss of his ‗presence‘ in the 
public domain and his ‗rank‘ (subject position) as a man. With Jude remaining in the 
domestic domain and Sue taking the role of a breadwinner (the ‗gender regime‘ of their 
relationship departing from the gender patterns of society), Jude is no longer able to 
define himself through the structure of the sexual division of labour. Unable to 
formulate himself in accordance with the prevailing discourses of masculinity (in terms 
of work or social achievement), he feels he is deprived of an important means of self-
definition. He resorts, therefore, to the dream world he had inhibited earlier in the story, 
attempting to acquire a sense of manhood from his imaginary subject position as a 
Christminster scholar.  
From the outset, Jude has endeavoured to constitute himself in terms of both 
social achievement and emotional relationships. The constitution of his subjectivity 
through friendship with Sue, accordingly, is not sufficient to provide him with the sense 
of manhood he requires; he needs to define himself through the dominant discourses of 
masculinity and class. His decision to be in Christminster on the Remembrance Day and 
his identification with the graduates reflect his need for at least an imaginary sense of 
self as a scholar. To ‗see the procession‘ held for the graduates and to ‗catch a few 
words of the Latin speech‘ through the open windows allow him to identify himself 
with the young scholars (pp. 323, 328). His reading of the Latin inscription on ‗the 
façade of the nearest college‘ for those around him and his speech to the crowd, relating 
his failure to become a son of the university to his ‗poverty‘ (pp. 325-6), suggest a 
continuing wish to define himself as one of the graduates. In Langland‘s words ‗to see 
his failure is also to see [...] that he might have become ―a son of the university‖‘.54  
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Jude recognises that he has no chance of entry to the upper classes of society, 
that he will be ‗an outsider‘ till the end (p. 328) and that Christminster ‗hates all men 
like me‘ (p. 320). This recognition and the aversion he has developed towards 
Christminster dogmas, caused by his awareness that ‗the values the college walls protect 
are themselves hypocritical and debased‘,55 are unable to liberate him from the 
dominance of the discourses of masculinity and class which have pervaded him; he 
simply cannot define himself outside them. Here, Hardy also criticises class structures 
which deprive individuals of the chance of formation of their subjectivities according to 
their capabilities: ‗there is something wrong somewhere in our social formulas‘ (p. 327), 
as Jude says. Jude‘s inability to stand outside the structures of gender and class, his 
clinging to his fictitious subject position as a scholar, divests him of his last means of 
self-definition, his roles as Sue‘s comrade and lover. His preference for his dream world 
over the real one contributes to his neglect of his family.
56
 The animosity of their 
community, of course, plays a role in bringing about the catastrophe; punished for their 
deviant modes of self-formation, Jude and Sue are refused accommodation.  
 Both Jude and Sue are forced to abandon their resistant practices of gender, their 
roles as ‗pioneers‘ (p. 352), and conform to social norms. In the Foucauldian sense, they 
are marginalised and punished for their transgression from the norms, in order to be 
corrected and normalised.
57
 But Jude and Sue are unable to formulate themselves in the 
ways others do. Earlier in the story, Jude describes himself and Sue as ‗sensitive‘ 
individuals: while ‗the intention of the [marriage] contract is good, and right for many, 
no doubt; but in our case it may defeat its own ends because we are the queer sort of 
people we are‘ (p. 286). Their deviant modes of self-fashioning have no chance of 
survival, of being chosen by Natural Selection or by society. As Jude tells Mrs. Edlin, 
‗the time was not ripe for us! Our ideas were fifty years too soon to be any good to us‘ 
(p. 400).  
Sue believes in the operation of an external power on them, ‗the ancient wrath of 
the Power above us‘ (p. 342), ‗something external to us that says, ―You Shan‘t!‖‘ (p. 
337). She does not, of course, recognise the power of the discourses which have 
constituted her, governing her thoughts and mentality. When Jude tells her, ‗we are 
acting by the letter; and ―the letter killeth!‖‘ (p. 388), he is not only quoting St. Paul but 
subverting him. The letter here can be seen to signify religious discourses.
58
 The 
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tragedy, for Hardy, lies in the fact that their attempted resistance to the discourses which 
they have internalised proves difficult; in Langland‘s words, ‗the destructive cultural 
self-constructions [...] are always already within, crucial to the formation and 
development of individual subjecthood and therefore perilous to reject‘.59 Sue believes 
in the artificiality of social conventions but is unable to act according to this knowledge, 
not having ‗the courage of my [her] views‘ (p. 251). Jude too is unable to disentangle 
himself from the discourses of class. With Sue and Jude, Hardy depicts the tragic fate of 
defiant individuals who have resisted defining themselves according to the prevailing 
social norms, suggesting ‗the virtual impossibility of any individual defining himself in 
opposition to the dominant culture of his or her society‘.60  
 With Sue‘s return to religious conformity, Jude too has to conform, to 
reconstitute himself in the ways his society demands, as Arabella‘s husband. Drinking, 
sexuality and practice of honour are his only remaining ways of self-definition. But 
these conventional practices of masculinity fail to provide him with a sense of self. He 
goes, therefore, to Sue either to redefine himself as Sue‘s lover or to ‗[finish]‘ himself. 
Failing to reconstitute himself in the way he desires, he welcomes death, walking back 
home in the wind and rain. The view of the carved THITHER, on the milestone, ‗nearly 
obliterated by moss‘, for him signifies the end of his hopes for achieving a sense of self 
(p. 390). He continues his walk in the rain, allowing ‗the deadly chill‘ ‗to creep into his 
bones (p. 391), in a final act of self-annihilation.  
Unable to formulate himself either through the prevailing discourses of class and 
masculinity or outside them, Jude is left with no means of self-definition; he is as 
obscure at the end as he is at the beginning of the story. He finds himself in a world with 
which he is not in accord, a world that does not want him, that has excluded him, hence 
his wishing himself out of it, invoking Job‘s curse of the day he was born: ‗Let the day 
perish wherein I was born and the night in which it was said, There is a man child 
conceived‘ (p. 403). With Jude‘s defeat, Hardy provides a cutting critique of the gender 
and class structures which subdue individuals, underscoring ‗the difficulty of 
conforming to cultural constructions of masculinity‘.61 Jude‘s final ‗prone position‘ 
implies his ‗crushing defeat by a gender as well as a class system‘ in which he ‗can find 
no place‘ for himself.62 
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In his portrait of Phillotson, too, Hardy can be seen to depict the impossibility of 
self-formation outside the domain of the prevailing gender and class structures and 
discourses. Phillotson‘s career as a teacher reveals a practice of masculinity conditioned 
by the sexual division of labour as defined by the middle classes. His desire to enlarge 
his ‗presence‘ in the public domain by means of social achievement further indicates his 
being constrained by his social class; achievement, as Tolson observes, is associated 
with the middle-class construction of masculinity.
63
 Phillotson aspires to get ‗a 
university degree‘, ‗the necessary hallmark of a man who wants to do anything in 
teaching‘, to become ‗a university graduate, and then to be ordained‘ (p. 10). His desire 
to shape his masculinity in these ways echoes his inclination to incorporate a large 
‗promise of power‘, to become a man of striking ‗presence‘. Yet he is not governed by 
the discourse of success to the extent that Jude is. He renounces his social aspirations 
once they prove unattainable. He is even ready to abandon the idea of entering the 
church as ‗a licentiate‘ (his alternative way of enlarging his ‗presence‘ in the public 
domain): ‗he was comfortable in his present position‘ as a teacher (p. 102). He has 
attempted, nevertheless, to strengthen his ‗presence‘ by engaging in some scholarly 
research, the ‗investigation‘ of ‗Roman-Britannic antiquities‘, which he defines as a 
‗hobby‘, of course (p. 160). 
The structure of emotional attachment has not conditioned Phillotson‘s practice 
of masculinity since he has not constituted himself through sexuality. Pervaded by the 
middle-class discourse of success, he has eschewed marriage and intimate relationships 
in order to construct his ‗presence‘ in the public domain.64 Meeting Sue, however, he 
thinks of formulating himself through matrimony, which indicates the insufficiency of 
the discourses of masculinity which he has pursued earlier. He regards Sue as an object 
of desire; when giving ‗her private lessons‘, he ‗was not really thinking of the arithmetic 
at all, but of her‘ (p. 105). Since his distance from the opposite sex is ‗forced upon him 
by his academic purpose, rather than a distaste for women‘, he constitutes himself as a 
lover, kissing ‗the dead pasteboard [of Sue‘s photograph] with the passionateness and 
more than all the devotion, of a young man of eighteen‘ (p. 162).  
 Phillotson is not, however, as constrained by the structure of emotional 
attachment as Jude. He renounces his desire for constituting himself as the possessor of 
his wife when Sue refuses to be defined as a sexual object, hiding in a closet and 
jumping out of the window to avoid him. He becomes ‗a pitiable object‘ but does not 
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find his masculinity undermined (p. 227). The ‗gender regime‘ of their relationship does 
not copy the dominant gender arrangements of society in that Phillotson becomes a 
husband without being a possessor. In allowing Sue to go to her lover, Phillotson further 
deviates from the dominant gender structures of his society. He resists the ‗doctrines‘ he 
is ‗brought up in‘, which demand that he defines his masculinity in terms of possessing 
a wife and dominating her, putting her ‗under lock and key‘ (p. 230), in order to 
construct his masculinity in terms of loving-kindness. Phillotson‘s action invokes the 
Comtean ideal of altruism, the victory of benevolence over self-love.
65
 Although he 
‗would have died for her‘, he does not want to be ‗cruel to her in the name of the law‘ 
(p. 235).  
 Phillotson refers to his act both as ‗chivalry‘ (p. 231) and ‗an act of natural 
charity‘ (p. 247) and ‗loving-kindness‘ (p. 359). His reference to his act as one of 
‗chivalry‘ can be read as an attempt on his part to define himself within the domain of 
dominant (valid) discourses of masculinity and therefore to maintain his ‗rank‘ as a 
man, which he discerns might be in jeopardy owing to his eschewing the power a 
husband is expected to exert over his wife. The formation of his masculinity in 
accordance with his feelings and human ‗instinct‘ provides Phillotson with a strong 
sense of manhood:
 ‗His mild serenity at the sense that he was doing his duty by a 
woman who was at his mercy almost overpowered his grief at relinquishing her‘ (pp. 
230-2). That he is helping the one who relies for her happiness on him provides him 
with a large ‗presence‘, specifically because he reads his liberation of Sue as 
‗manliness‘ (p. 231). Mallett refers to Phillotson as a ‗New Man‘ for his acting 
according to his ‗instinct‘ rather than ‗principles‘.66 
 Phillotson‘s alternative mode of being a man is not, however, found acceptable 
by Victorian society. He is subjected to the disciplinary power of the Foucauldian gaze 
and normalising judgment, operated by the educational system and religious 
community, and is conceived to be the transgressor of the norms of morality. 
Accordingly, he is punished, deprived of his ‗rank‘ (subject position) as a respectable 
man and is assigned a lower ‗rank‘ in discourse as a dishonourable man —‗rank‘ in a 
disciplinary system is employed as both ‗reward‘ and ‗punishment‘.67 He is labelled 
eccentric and immoral, stripped of his social and subsequently financial status and 
repudiated by ‗the respectable‘ community (p. 247). But this punishment does not make 
him conform; he insists on the construction of his masculinity in terms of benevolence 
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in relation to Sue, ‗[dissolving] the legal tie altogether‘, to ‗open up a chance of 
happiness for her‘ (pp. 252-3). As with Jude, Phillotson‘s refusal to formulate himself 
through the prevailing discourses of masculinity of his time leaves him obscure. His 
new subjectivity is not definable; his life as a new man is not portrayed because 
masculinity as loving-kindness has no discourse to support it — to follow Dolin‘s 
discussion of Jude.
68
  
 Phillotson is unable to maintain his new mode of being a man. By depriving him 
of his ‗presence‘ in the public domain — ‗[h]e had been knocked from pillar to post‘ 
and ‗had been nearly starved‘ (p. 357) — the power of normalising judgement obliges 
him to conform with the norms. He has to formulate himself according to the dominant 
discourses of his time, as a husband and an authoritative man, if he wants to regain his 
‗rank‘ as a man and his social position. For there is no possibility of self-formation 
outside these discourses. Though aware of the insufficiency of these norms of 
masculinity, he believes it is ‗necessary to act under an acquired and artificial sense of 
the same, if you wished to enjoy an average share of comfort and honour; and let the 
loving-kindness take care of itself‘ (p. 359). He can reconstruct his ‗presence‘ in the 
public domain, ‗resume his old course, perhaps return to the Shaston school, if not even 
to the Church itself as a licentiate‘ (p. 358) if he conforms. He abandons, therefore, his 
new subjectivity, substituting loving-kindness with ‗selfishness‘ and cruelty (pp. 365-6). 
He marries Sue in spite of his awareness of the torture she undergoes, abandoning the 
ideals of Comtean altruism and Millite self-determination.  
 Alternative modes of being a man, as constructed by Jude and Phillotson, are not 
favoured by society; the time is not ripe for them. While Phillotson, in his ability to 
adapt himself to the conditions of his life, survives, Jude is eliminated. Hardy‘s 
sympathy remains with the unfit and resistant subject, who for him is the worthier 
individual. Hardy‘s last novel is his most pessimistic in underlining the constraints of 
the dominant social structures and the difficulty of escaping them. Hardy‘s characters 
are obliged to operate within the domain of gender and class structures and discourses to 
understand themselves; any effort at self-formation outside these structures proves to be 
futile. Jude demonstrates conformity to be unsatisfactory and resistance improbable. Yet 
there remains a glimmer of hope: Hardy‘s emphasis throughout the story that his 
characters are ahead of their time suggests the possibility of a future when alternative 
ways of self-formation will have become a possibility. This may not afford much 
comfort in the present but it does hold out some hope for future change.   
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Chapter 9  
Conclusion 
 
The study of selected novels of Thomas Hardy reveals an engagement with certain 
common issues relating to masculinity. From the early stages of his novelistic career 
(as, for instance in Far from the Madding Crowd), Hardy can be seen to be preoccupied 
with the question of determinism versus free will; his novels explore the constraints of 
social structures and discourses which constitute individuals as gendered on the one 
hand and the possibility of resistance to these structures and the formation of alternative 
modes of being on the other.  
Hardy‟s novels, though portraying fate and biological factors as significant 
determinants of the characters‟ lives, emphasise the role of social forces in the shaping 
of subjectivity, forces which pervade them, governing their thoughts and actions 
(resembling the Foucauldian conception of power), forces which appear in the form of 
discourses.
1
 Such a conception of the constitution of subjectivity by social forces was 
partly inspired by the philosophical discussions of the time; for two of Hardy‟s favourite 
thinkers, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, despite their different world-views, 
individuals were the effect of society, that is, ideas and beliefs.
2
 But I have argued that 
Hardy also anticipates later discussions of the social construction of gender and 
subjectivity. His male characters are shown to operate, by necessity, within the domain 
of gender and class discourses and structures (for instance, the gender structures which 
R. W. Connell enumerates, the sexual division of labour, power and emotional 
attachment),
3
 which define the ways in which they should practise masculinity. 
Subjected to the Foucauldian power of the gaze and normalising judgement, Hardy‟s 
male characters assume the task of exercising power on themselves, disciplining 
themselves to attain the necessary qualifications for acquiring the „rank‟ (subject 
position) of a „man‟ or a member of a specific social class.4 The definitions of 
masculinity provided by their society, however, are not always in accordance with their 
desires or capabilities; the prevailing norms of masculinity and class of their time prove 
to be constraining, unsatisfactory and difficult to pursue. What distinguishes Hardy‟s 
earlier works from the later ones is the more critical tone the latter assume, their more 
radical interrogation of the dominant discourses of masculinity and class. In Hardy‟s 
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novels, the association of masculine „presence‟ with power (which John Berger 
considers a conventional way of constructing masculinity)
5
 and the construction of 
masculinity through the suppression of emotion and need (a point also noted by 
contemporary sociologists of masculinity, such as Andrew Tolson)
6
 prove confining, 
inadequate and destructive. The increasingly dark vision of the novels, I would argue, 
stems from the recognition of the fact that the prevailing gender and class structures and 
discourses are necessary for an acquisition of a sense of self. There are therefore 
difficult to escape or to renounce. Those who recognise the inadequacy of these 
discourses of gender and class are unable to articulate alternatives; they are bound by 
them at the most fundamental level. To stand outside these discourses, as Jude 
discovers, is to become obscure and indefinable. This is at least part of his tragedy.  
Hardy‟s novels, however, do envisage the possibility of a limited resistance to 
the prevailing gender and class structures of his time. The construction of masculinity in 
the manner of the Stoics (rejecting materialistic and worldly attachments and physical 
impulses), is for Hardy, one possible way of self-definition outside the domain of these 
structures, an alternative, nobler way of being a man. Yet the hope in the practicability 
of such a reconfiguration of masculinity and its ability to confer tranquillity and 
happiness on the individual, I would suggest, weakens in his later works. Hardy 
seemingly finds defiance of the dominant social discourses and the very act of 
renunciation to be difficult. Discourses of masculinity and class, which permeate 
individuals, prove too powerful to be resisted. In his later (tragic) novels, Hardy still 
sees resignation to what is out of one‟s control as a way of attaining equanimity yet the 
protagonists of these novels are unable happily to acquiescence in their lot for they feel 
their destiny, or rather the social order, is far from being perfect and just.  
The construction of an alternative masculinity through loving-kindness and 
altruism is portrayed in the novels as another way of resisting the dominant discourses 
of masculinity. This mode of being a man, however, although possible, is difficult to 
achieve and hard to maintain under the pressure to fashion subjectivity in accordance 
with the models society offers. But Gabriel Oak and Giles Winterborne manage to 
constitute themselves both as Stoics and through loving-kindness and friendship. 
Swithin and Angel, however, fail to define themselves through fellow-feeling while 
Phillotson abandons this mode of self-formation because his altruism clashes with 
Victorian social norms. Yet Hardy himself, I would argue, retains his conviction in this 
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mode of self-definition despite the failure of his characters. The Comtean ideal, the 
hope in the advancement of human society through the development of altruism, may 
wane in the course of Hardy‟s novelistic career but does not entirely vanish.  
So, even though Hardy‟s novels do not portray change, they depict the potential 
for it. The novels anticipate contemporary social-constructionist theories of masculinity 
in suggesting that social structures do not determine individuals mechanically; rather, 
gender and class structures are constituted through the practices of individuals, who can, 
over time, modify those structures. The possibility of change lies in this dynamic 
relationship between structure and practice. R. W. Connell argues that gender structures 
which delimit gender practice „do not continue, cannot be “enduring”, unless they are 
reconstituted from moment to moment in social action‟.7 These structures moreover are 
themselves historical constructions and therefore inherently susceptible to change. 
Changes to these structures can be instigated by alterations in external circumstances, 
which can be social, cultural or economic but the structures themselves also „develop 
crisis tendencies, that is, internal contradictions or tendencies that undermine current 
patterns and force change in the structure itself‟.8 That „gender regimes‟ of institutions 
do not always imitate the overall gender patterns of society suggests the potential for the 
modification of the wider structures in the long run.
9
 
In Hardy‟s novels too, I would suggest, gender structures are shown to be 
capable of modification once individuals refrain from constituting themselves through 
them. This is evident, for instance, in the construction of masculinity through the 
practice of Stoicism or in terms of loving-kindness or whenever the male characters do 
not constitute themselves as authoritative figures or as possessors. The structure of 
power specifically is resisted in Jude the Obscure, where the male characters do not 
define themselves in terms of authority and assertiveness (although Phillotson does 
return to conformity with that structure at the end). The structures of the sexual division 
of labour and power are also shown to be resisted at the end of The Mayor of 
Casterbridge, where Henchard plays the role of a housewife and caretaker and assumes 
a subordinate role.  
Hardy wrote in an intellectual atmosphere dominated by deterministic and 
evolutionary ideologies which severely limited the possibility of freedom. In Charles 
Darwin‟s highly deterministic world (which was governed by the laws of heredity and 
Nature), individuals played little part in the development of the characteristics of their 
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species. Yet, for Darwin, transformation in the conditions of life could cause 
„variability‟ in living beings which if preserved by natural selection could lead to the 
formation of „new species‟.10 In Spencer‟s world-view too, where the Unknown Cause 
determined everything in an absolute manner, change was conceived to be indispensable 
to evolution, being triggered by the very power which permeated and determined 
humans and society.   
Spencer, as we have seen, contends that individuals may not be the cause but are 
the medium through which social evolution occurs. Opinion is the „the agency‟ by 
means of which the Unknown Cause operates: it „is a unit of force, constituting, with 
other such units, the general power which works out social changes‟. The expression of 
opinion, therefore, whether „conservative‟ or „progressive‟, is important for the progress 
of society. By expressing the views which might appear to be „in advance of the time‟,11 
an individual is in fact participating in the overall process of evolution:  
 
He, like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad 
agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause; and when the Unknown 
Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to profess and 
act out that belief.
12
  
 
Opposing opinions or units of force, when converged, can instigate change in the social 
conditions which evolution requires. Spencer‟s view of power as a force which 
produces both resistance and conformity in the individual bears resemblance to 
Foucault‟s notion of power, as Jane Thomas argues. For both, power creates resistance 
and for both modification to the external conditions is possible through the convergence 
of points of resistance, that is, the unification of opposing opinions or discourses.
13
  
For Foucault (as discussed in Chapter 1), power is not repressive but productive, 
creating resistance; resistance is an inevitable accompaniment of all relations of power. 
Points of resistance can be found all throughout the power network, which, if unified, 
can lead to changes in the conditions of life.
14
 Foucault argues that power produces 
discourse and simultaneously counter-discourses: „discourse transmits and produces 
power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes 
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it possible to thwart it‟. Discourse can be „a point of resistance and a starting point for 
an opposing strategy‟.15 Reverse discourses, once unified, can become dominant, giving 
rise to new ways of thinking, acting and being in the world. Hardy can be seen to hold a 
conception of power and of the mechanisms of change similar to those of Spencer and 
Foucault.
16
 For him, as for them, opposing opinions articulated by resistant subjects can 
eventually gain dominance. This allows for the emergence of new (equally but 
differently determined) modes of being in the world. This may take time and cause 
individual pain, as it does for Jude and Sue, who are portrayed as fifty years ahead of 
their time. But the implication is that change will eventually occur.  
The surfacing of the deviant discourses of masculinity in the late nineteenth 
century, as voiced by some intellectuals of the time, who offered a definition of 
masculinity constructed through manly comradeship,
17
 can be seen as an example of the 
emergence of reverse discourses of masculinity and modes of being a man. Such a 
resistant configuration of masculinity, departing from the conventional structure of 
emotional attachment, which defines desire in the framework of the gender binary, is 
hinted at in The Mayor of Casterbridge and Jude the Obscure. These two novels appear 
to imply the susceptibility of gender structures to change. Jude‟s and Sue‟s alternative 
modes of self-definition also indicate points of resistance taking shape alongside the 
conventional Victorian modes of being a man and a woman.  
Hardy‟s mainly deterministic view of existence appears to renounce the notion 
of freedom, portraying individuals as governed by the social forces which pervade them. 
Yet it suggests that the potential for change at a fundamental level exists. Departing 
from Schopenhauer‟s highly deterministic philosophy, which envisages the possibility 
of escaping the Immanent Unconscious Will only in annihilation, Hardy hopes that the 
„Unconscious Will of the Universe‟ can eventually become „aware of Itself‟, for 
 
what has already taken place in fractions of the Whole (i.e. so much of the 
world as has come conscious) is likely to take place in the Mass; & there being 
no Will outside the Mass—that is, the Universe—the whole Will becomes 
conscious thereby; & ultimately, it is to be hoped, sympathetic.
18
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Conscious humans can affect the unconscious Will, making it conscious and, hopefully, 
sympathetic. This shapes the core of his melioristic philosophy: the development of 
sympathy which can gradually improve the human condition. 
Here Hardy attempts to address „the question of Free-Will v. necessity‟. For 
him, the human will is „neither wholly free nor wholly unfree‟; „as a subservient part‟ of 
the „Universal Will‟, it is „swayed‟ by the Will and to that extent not free but  
 
whenever it happens that the rest of the Great Will is in equilibrium the minute 
portion called one person‟s will is free, just as a performer‟s fingers will go on 
playing the pianoforte of themselves when he talks or thinks of something else 
& the head does not rule them.
19
   
 
It is in these moments of emancipation, when the individual‟s mind is not ruled by the 
Will, that he or she can think alternatively and eventually become the means of 
change.
20
  
Hardy‟s characters, then, are shown to be largely constrained by the pervasive 
power of discourses but there are moments when sensitive, critical subjects, such as 
Jude (and Sue), who are unable to adapt themselves to the conditions of their lives, are 
capable of gaining a superior insight into the conditions of existence, calling into 
question the social norms and discourses which have constituted them. Even though 
these characters are unable to move forward enlightened by that insight, for Hardy, such 
moments have the potential for change and the amelioration of conditions of life. The 
alternative ways of thinking (points of resistance) produced by the resistant subject can 
eventually give rise to new discourses and new ways of being in the world. 
From the early stages of his novelistic career, Hardy portrays the conventional 
models of masculinity alongside emergent, less conventional (less virile) models, which 
associate masculinity with power of the mind rather than the body. Swithin St Cleeve, 
Angel Clare and Jude Fawley all attempt to construct their masculine „presence‟ in 
terms of mental power. These characters also practise gentler versions of masculinity 
and, with the exception of Angel Clare, they are not so authoritative and assertive. But it 
is in Jude that Hardy depicts a mode of masculinity which departs radically from the 
normative Victorian definitions of masculinity in its incorporation of the 
conventionally-defined feminine attributes of emotionality, sensitivity and tenderness. 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Hardy‟s discussion of the Will and its relation to human will and of the ways the mechanisms of change 
work for Hardy are also explored by Thomas; see Femininity, pp. 24-6. 
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With such a presentation of masculinity, in which gender boundaries are blurred, the 
novel anticipates the emergence of a kind of masculinity which embraces more 
mutuality between the masculine and the feminine.
21
 Jude‟s gentle version of 
masculinity, although ahead of his time, may find a chance of survival in the future. 
Hardy‟s novels can be seen to be an interrogation of the configuration of 
masculinity based on the maintenance of a rigid distinction between the masculine and 
the feminine, as propagated by the prevailing gender discourses of the Victorian era. For 
Hardy, as is evident in his novels, the incorporation of benevolence and sympathy in the 
construction of masculinity is of great significance. The formulation of masculinity in 
terms of loving-kindness, fellow-feeling and altruism (feminine attributes, as Comte 
contends)
22
 rather than egotism and oppressiveness (conventionally masculine traits), if 
preserved by society, is seen to promise an eventual amelioration in gender relations. 
Hardy‟s novels thus suggest that the structures of gender and class are capable of being 
formulated in alternative ways, allowing for the shaping of less confining and less 
destructive modes of being a man.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 Phillip Mallett, „Hardy and Masculinity: A Pair of Blue Eyes and Jude the Obscure‟, in The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Thomas Hardy, ed. by Rosemarie Morgan, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p. 402. 
See also Laura Green, „“Strange [In]difference of Sex”: Thomas Hardy, the Victorian Man of Letters, and 
the Temptations of Androgyny‟, Victorian Studies, 38.4 (1995), 523-49. 
22
 See Chapter 2, p.  27. 
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